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This thesis is a normative critique ofEU constitutionalism. Its aim is not to expose
the flaws ofEU constitutionalism by reference to the templates of the nation state
and our inherited constitutional vocabularies, but to articulate an internal, immanent
critique, which will bring to the fore the internal contradictions of the EU
constitutional order. The argument put forward in this thesis shows that the initial
solely economic focus of the Community has influenced its gradual evolution into a
political entity and has kept its current political character subordinated to economic
definitions. Due to the specific conditions of its historical development (the process
through which the EC Treaty was constitutionalised was to a large extent judicially
driven), EU constitutionalism has been marked by a substitution of juridification for
politicisation. Furthermore, the legal outcome of this juridification has enshrined the
exigencies of the market within its deepest structures (this will be shown through an
analysis of the concept ofEU fundamental rights). This double substitution of the
legal for the political and of the economic for the legal amounts to a simulation of the
political; political power is in essence no longer present except to conceal that there
are no effective mechanisms for the exercise ofpolitical power in the EU. At the
same time, this simulation of the political functions in a deeply ideological way,
because it renders invisible the existing structures ofpolitical economy and the
asymmetrical relations of domination which have been established through them.
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In my beginning is my end...
The end is where we start from...
T.S.Eliot (Little Gidding)
Only when reflection comes to a halt can a beginning be made...
Kierkegaard
The European Community1 initially set up as an international organisation concerned
mostly with economic matters2, has gradually acquired a sui generis character, which
distinguishes it radically from international law, to the extent that its founding text
(the Treaty) has been qualified by the European Court of Justice, as a Constitutional
Charter . Last year the Convention on the Future ofEurope produced a draft of an
EU constitution4, which having failed to attract the unanimous support of the
Member-States in the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels (12-13 December
2003)5, was finally signed in the recently concluded Intergovernmental Conference
that took place in Brussels (16-17 June) under the presidency of Ireland. EU
constitutionalism is at the forefront ofEU developments. The emergence of a formal
document which will possibly6 be the official Constitution of the EU has been
welcomed by many as an exhilarating development that will overshadow all the
1
Although constitutionally separate, the three European Communities (European Coal and Steel
Community, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community) have for
practical reasons been administered as one, especially since the merger of the institutions in 1967. In
2003 the ECSC expired.
2 The aims of the EEC Treaty (signed in Paris in 1957), as set out in the Preamble and in article 2 were
"to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated rising of the standard of
living and closer relations between its member-States." According to P.Craig and G. de Burca "the
economic impetus behind the 1957 Treaties was made clear. In accordance with the thrust of the
Spaak report, the EEC treaty avoided the explicit political aims of the earlier draft European Political
Co-operation (EPC) Treaty, and concentrated on economic integration setting out its aims in the
preamble and in Article 2." In P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2nd ed., 1998, p.ll.
3 Case 294/82, Les Verts v. Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339 at 1365 No.23, repeated in Opinion 1/91,
[1991] ECR I- 6079 at 6102.
4 The official term at the time was "Constitutional Treaty".
5 Discussion of the proposed Constitutional Treaty faltered over disagreement about the voting rights
of different Member States. Spain and Poland, each with around 40 million people, having been given
27 votes by the Nice Treaty -compare with 29 votes given to Germany (82 million), France, Britain
and Italy (approx. 60 million each)- would not agree to a new balancing of voting rights.
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previous stages in the history ofEU constitutionalism. The underlying assumption
seems to be that a formal Constitution will be the panacea for all the EU
constitutional problems of the past. My thesis will resist this unqualified optimism.
The argument I will put forward here will expose the deeper problems ofEU
constitutionalism; it will reveal that some of these problems have been incorporated
into our current acquis constitutionnel. To the extent that the new Constitution does
not break with these aspects of the acquis communautaire, certain fundamental
problems will pertain after the ratification of the new Constitutional Treaty.
For a long time the EC/EU7 constituted the novel parameter of our political
environment that challenged in the most fundamental way the theories we had
developed in terms ofwhat counts as a political entity and what the conditions
required for its constitution are. During this time legal theorists seemed to focus
more on constructing theoretical models that would offer an apologetic confirmation
of the European project rather than on subjecting the EC/EU structures to a critical
discourse. The idea was that the shortcomings of the EC/EU were somehow
connected only with the fact that the EC/EU failed to comply with the templates of
the pre-existing political entities, the nation-states, and that this failure was
unavoidable since the EC/EU inaugurated a new model ofpolitical organisation. In
an attempt to avoid measuring the EC/EU against the benchmark of the statist
standards, legal theorists ended up creating theoretical models that would necessarily
accommodate and account for the actual structures of the EU. It is only during the
last fifteen years or so that the critical leverage of legal theory vis a vis the EC/EU
has been fully recovered and different aspects of the EC/EU constitutional/legal
order have been put to scrutiny. There is now a significant body of theoretical work
6 The most difficult part, the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, subject to the turmoil of a
national referendum in up to 20 Member States, is still ahead of us.
7 Since 1993, when the Treaty ofMaastricht came into force, the European Community has been one
of the three pillars, which form the European Union. The other two pillars, the ones on the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) remain to a great extent
"more like familiar creations of international law, not sharing the institutional structure, law-making
processes or legal instruments of the Community pillar, largely beyond the jurisdiction of the
European Court ofjustice and lacking the key Community law characteristics of supremacy and direct
effect." P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.l. For the
purposes of this thesis the terms EC/EU law, Union/Community will be used interchangeably.
Besides, the new constitution abolishes the three-pillar structure.
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that has shed light to different aspects ofEC/EU constitutionalism. Some theorists
have concentrated on the procedural and political deficit ofEU constitutionalism,
while others have focused on certain substantive issues (fundamental rights,
development of direct effect, supremacy etc). This thesis will adopt a holistic
perspective in its analysis of the problematic areas ofEU constitutionalism, bringing
together both procedural and substantive aspects of the EU constitutional order. This
holistic approach is premised upon the belief that certain problematic aspects of the
EU constitutional order can only be fully appreciated when viewed in their
interconnection.8
The argument put forward here will be that EU constitutionalism has been marked by
a substitution ofjuridification for politicisation (judicially driven process of
constitutionalisation of the EC Treaty) and that the legal outcome of this
juridification has enshrined the exigencies of the market within its deepest structure
(this will be shown by reference to the concept ofEU fundamental rights). This
double substitution of the legal for the political and of the economic for the legal has
negative implications both on the level ofnormative coherence and on the level of
political representation. I will suggest that this problem stems from the fact that the
EU is a goal-oriented entity and that its goals, mainly associated with economic
integration, seem to have been decided prior to its constitution as a political entity.
The problem is that the choice of the EU's goals is not politically (and consequently
not democratically) controlled.
My analysis will suggest that the Community constitutional/legal system functions as
the mediator, or rather, the vehicle that neutralises and, thus, enables the substitution
of the "economic" for the "political". This phenomenon partly reproduces the
existing situation within national liberal democracies, which participate in a
globalised economy. At the same time it is quite accentuated due to the specific
constitutional history of the Union and the novel features ofpolitical unity such a
multi-national project involves. I will argue that to regard the market as an end and
politics as a means to that end constitutes a very substantive reversal, which not only
8 This does not in any way mean that the analysis will be an all-encompassing or an exhaustive one.
3
severs the emancipatory character ofpolitics, but also unavoidably affects the
coherence of the legal system. Thus, the aim is to bring to the fore the specificity of
the political realm vis a vis the economic.
I accept that in a system of globalised economy there will always be close
connections between economy and politics. I reject, however, the fatalistic approach
according to which every political decision is or, even worse, should be reduced to
market considerations. I am not putting forward an argument against the market. I
accept that democracy and the market can be mutually sustaining institutions and I
am willing to explore whether the latter sets certain necessary limits to the function
of democracy. My view, however, is primarily concerned with the subordination of
politics to the demands of market orthodoxy, or rather with the replacement of
deliberative governance by a commodification of the political process.
Having clarified that my argument is not against the EU, nor the market, but against
the substitution of the market for politics, I will furthermore argue that the project of
European integration can in fact help us break the vicious circle ofmaterial
determinism and monocausal explanations which seems to be the trend in our current
political universe. One could argue that by reproducing and magnifying (both
quantitatively and qualitatively) the already existing problems of national liberal
democracies, the EU legitimises in a way the national systems, because it offers an
even worse normative alternative; everything seems better than it truly is, if
compared with something worse. I believe, however, that there is a positive element
in this; the magnification of the problems raises their visibility. As a result it is easier
to recognise and de-codify the substitution, which takes place at the level of the EU,
than it is to perceive its equivalent on the national plane. And, once revealed, the
substitution can also be identified at other levels. This is not only a matter of
perception; it is also a matter of size and corresponding power. Within a globalised
economy it is easier for the big players to change the rules of the game. Even before
the recent accession, the EU, having a nominal GNP of about $6 trillion (compared
with $5 trillion for the USA and $3 for Japan) and a population approaching that of
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the United States and Japan combined, represented the largest single unit in the
world economy. This overwhelming power enables the European Union to take the
risk, innovate and make the beginning of a new conception of politics, which will not
be frustrated by overriding economic restraints and which will change our self-
understanding both on the national and on the international level.
It is believed that a good introduction presupposes the mastery of the art of flirting;
namely it is a game of hide and seek, in which a good player should reveal only what
is necessary to stimulate the interest of one's readers, but he/she should at the same
time conceal what is necessary to keep this initial infatuation going throughout the
book. As Mark Taylor puts it, "mastering the art ofbeginning requires cultivating the
ability to be sufficiently suggestive to interest and allure without becoming overt
enough to bore and dissuade".9 Being an unrepentant fan of openness and
transparency in all (alas!) fields, I will not follow this tactic. In fact I will express my
firm opposition to this tendency to associate fascination with what remains unsaid in
what is said, by giving a summarised, yet quite revealing presentation ofmy
argument in this introduction. This is why I am calling it "concluding preface"10. The
chapters to follow will flesh out the argument suggested here.
In the first chapter I will analyse my methodological tools and my theoretical
premises. Law is a social practice and its knowledge cannot be simply a matter of
immediate observation. It is instead mediated by the observer's presuppositions
about the world. These shape the decisions of the observer as to what is worth
noticing, which in their turn shape his/her assessment of the way the social practice
works as a whole. As Terry Eagleton argues, "there is no such thing as
presuppositionless thought"11; there are more or less explicit presuppositions. The
above indicate that the legal scholar actually participates in the making of
Community law, or any kind of law for that matter. Since analyses affect outcomes,
this means that knowledge is necessarily bound up with power. With these points in
9
M. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1980, p.2.
101 am borrowing here Mark Taylor's use of the term. See above fn. 9.
11
T.Eagleton, Ideology: An introduction, London: Verso, 1991, p.3.
5
mind I will try to render explicit the ideas that have informed my own investigations
in this thesis.
I will devote a big part of chapter 1 in exploring the concept of ideology. I will
explain that ideology refers to the way in which meaning is bound up with power and
I will look closer at the different ways in which this coupling ofmeaning and power
can take place (ideological modes/strategies). My defence of the pertinence of the
concept of ideology against those who view it as belonging to the past (a past in
which liberalism and capitalism had not overwhelmingly triumphed over their
competitors) will lead me to post-modernism and in particular to Baudrillard's theory
of simulation. My analysis will argue against the opposition between ideology and
simulation and it will reveal the underlying intimacy (ifnot complicity) between the
two. The argument here will be that simulation corresponds to advanced
commodification, which is organised around configurations of sign value (political
economy of the sign); simulation is, thus, intricately connected with capitalism and
the structures of domination which are associated with it. In fact, simulation is the
mode in which ideology functions most effectively today.
Since my thesis is a critique of the EU, it necessarily involves a certain
deconstruction of the European politico-legal system. I will, thus, employ
deconstruction as a methodological tool and I will try to defend it against the
prejudices that have been associated with it. However, my deconstructivist approach
has the aspiration of forming the basis for a radical reconstruction of the EU project,
because, as I will analyse in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis is not to argue against
the European project as such, but against its current normative structure. If I dwell on
European legal proposals concerning democratic and constitutional legitimacy and if
I do so in connection with the concepts of simulation and ideology, this is because,
by decoupling actuality from potentiality, I seek to affirm the truly progressive
possibilities stemming from the European project.
Chapter 2 will be a rebuttal of the no-demos thesis, which, if true, would make my
argument redundant. In the heart of this thesis lies the argument that the EU can
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never be legitimate, because it can never be satisfactorily democratic due to the
absence of a European people. Under this approach, the concept of the people of a
polity is an organic one, based on common ethnic origin, shared values, language and
common cultural habits. When applied to the European Union, this stance leads us to
pessimistic conclusions as to the prospects for a community ofEuropeans, because it
implies that every attempt to legitimise the Union by transferring the allegiances of
the citizens from their national to a trans-national European level will not be
successful.
I will start with an analysis of classical theories of community which are based on the
assumption that organic homogeneity is a prerequisite for the existence of a demos,
and by contrasting them with modem theories of citizenship and community, I will
show that the absence of a homogeneous demos does not pose insuperable obstacles
to the legitimation ofEuropean integration. I will argue that we do need some type of
common culture, "a European identity", but that this can be conceived in civic terms.
Habermas's theory of constitutional patriotism, offering a model ofpost-national
citizenship, which can be based on constitutional principles, will be the focus ofmy
analysis.
Having argued in Chapter 2 that the concept of the demos need not be rooted in the
national identity of a people and that democratic processes can function within the
wide EU boundaries provided that the citizens are socialised into a common
constitutional culture, I will then turn to the constitutional framework of the EU and
explore whether it can function as the basis around which the European citizens will
unite. At this point I will develop an argument at two steps: the first step will be to
show how the EU constitutional order has been brought about by judicial fiat
(chapter 3), while the second step will explore the impact of this judicial process of
constitutionalisation on the normative content of the EU constitutional order (chapter
4).
Although it is not my aim to undertake a systematic reconstruction of the relevant
judicial judgements, in chapter 3 I will challenge the Court's narrative of the process
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of constitutionalisation of the Treaties. It is part of the construction of any narrative
to forget or trivialise things which disrupt the coherence of received ideas and my
intention is to bring these forgotten scrolls to the surface in order to rearticulate the
current formulation of the European integration's narrative. The brief exploration of
the acquis communautaire in Chapter 3 will show that the constitutionalisation
process has been mainly the product of the European Court of Justice and has taken
place in the absence of deliberative constitutional politics. As a result, it reflects the
participation and representation ofEuropean citizens in the judicial rather than the
political process. Due to the different modalities of communication associated with
law and politics, this development has in its turn contributed to the
institutionalisation of the absence of democratic participation which could
substantiate the EU as a political project.
Chapter 4 will constitute the second part of the argument put forward in Chapter 3.
As mentioned above, this argument is a two-fold critique of the EU constitutional
order. The first part (Chapter 3) concerns the judicial impetus of the
constitutionalisation process, while in this chapter the focus will shift from the
procedural to the substantive. The focus will no longer be the process of
constitutionalisation as such, but its normative outcome. A number of theorists have
viewed the constitutional initiative of the Court as legitimised, because its case-law
granted fundamental rights to individuals. In this chapter I will analyse the notion
and the position of the right in the structure of the EU and find it insufficient in terms
of conceptual clarity, coherence and consistency. This part will reflect on some of the
broader theoretical questions concerning the role of fundamental rights in a
democratic context. Through an analysis of the way the term "fundamental right" is
being used within the EU, it will be shown that the initial solely economic focus of
the Community has influenced its gradual evolution into a political entity and has
kept its current political character bound and subordinated to economic definitions,
so much so that membership to the EU civil society has relied until recently on the
participation of the individual in the common market. This substitution of
marketisation for juridification constitutes the second part of the "EU simulation"
that I want to expose. The aim in chapter 4 is to show that, even ifwe view the EC
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Treaty as a constitutional charter, this has enshrined commodification within its
deepest structure and is, therefore, unable to offer a coherent basis for the
Community legal order. Hence, even ifwe could disconnect the substantive issues
from the procedural ones (in my opinion in democracy procedure is a matter of
substance), the former are in the case of the EU unable to offer a normatively viable
alternative. I will argue that commodification and economic integration cannot offer
a satisfactory alternative basis for representation. These are associated with a fixed
ideal of usefulness, which cannot exhaust the concept of the political nor the
meaning of representation, because it rejects contingency and it welcomes a certain
kind of closure (the closure which refers to the goals of the polity).
A democratic society, as Lefort reminds us, is radically indeterminate; it is
characterised by the dissolution of the markers of certainty. The ECJ, following the
treaties has posited the common market as the purpose and ultimate foundation of
Community law. The market has therefore become the indisputable marker of
certainty for the EU and it has been postulated as its common good. This postulation,
however, is not a simple procedural one. It constitutes a substantive closure and it is
incompatible with the contestability presupposed by politics.
The EU needs to relativise what is now taken for granted in the light of new
alternatives; it needs to re-define its own telos, or rather it needs to subject the choice
of its telos to an on-going constitutional political debate. To this effect, I will propose
a concept of politics (and a corresponding concept ofpolitics of identity), which
embraces difference and contingency, and recovers the field ofpolitical possibility
by keeping any definition of its telos open to constant revisability. And although the
existence of a formal constitution is not necessarily incompatible with such a
reflexive concept ofpolitics12, the text of the EU constitutional treaty, incorporating
the main features of the existing constitutional acquis communautaire, may not be
very promising about the openness of our EU constitutional future.
12 On the concept of "reflexive politics" see E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics, Dordrecht:




Every tool is a weapon if you hold it right.
Ani DiFranco
Wo die Gefahr waechst, waechst das Rettende auch.
(where danger is, grows the saving power also)
Hoelderlin
Introduction
In a fascinating article on international relations theory, Robert Cox starts with the
observation that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose"1. His
argument is that no theorist is a tabula rasa and that even if he/she manages to attain
a certain self-reflective attitude and thus a distance from his/her own perspective, this
perspective can never be completely overcome. He concludes that: "there is no such
thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space" . Agreeing
with Cox regarding the necessarily purposive character of theoretical approaches, I
will clarify in this chapter the theoretical standpoint that will be underlying my
critique ofEU constitutionalism. Hence, this first chapter will be an exercise in self-
reflection.
The starting point for the analysis ofmy methodological approach will be an
exploration of the concept of immanent critique. The argument put forward in this
chapter will develop immanent critique as critique of ideology exploring both
concepts and tracing their connection. A clarification of the particular conception of
ideology that I embrace and the different ways in which ideology can function, will
be followed by an excursus on the end of ideology debate. Post-modernist theorists
question the theoretical pertinence of ideology. Their argument is that in light of the
current relativisation of any given reality, ideology, being premised upon the
possibility of representation of reality, has become obsolete.
1




The focus in this part will be Baudrillard's theory of simulation. Remaining
ambivalent towards Baudrillard's theory, I will reject its "end of ideology"
implications as being itself ideological, but I will rescue from it the notion of
simulation as the mode in which ideology functions most effectively today. Both
these aspects of simulation (nature and effectiveness) will be rendered explicit
through the exposure of the underlying connection between simulated hyperreality
and the political economy of late capitalism.
a) From immanent critique to critical theory
Let me first of all start with a brief explanation ofmy use of the word "critique". My
conception of critique is aligned with the Marxian tradition of immanent critique.
Marx objected to idealist philosophical theorizing on the basis that it distracted us
from historical conflicts by offering to resolve them at a higher imaginary level. His
objection is epigrammatically encapsulated in his celebrated eleventh thesis on
Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the
point is to change it"3. This objection was not in fact a dismissal ofphilosophical
thinking in its entirety, but of a certain type ofphilosophical thinking that abstracted
from and, thus, neglected the existing social inequalities. In doing so, idealist
philosophers failed to point out the numerous social injustices that surrounded them
and their philosophy ended up providing justifications for bourgeois society.
As an alternative to abstract idealist philosophy, Marx developed a new type of
theorising as a 'practical-critical activity'. This new form of theorising is oriented
towards transformative action and emancipatory practice, "a kind of practical
philosophy which will help to transform what it is seeking to comprehend"4.
In a letter written in 1843, Marx explains his vision ofphilosophical enquiry:
3
K.Marx, Early political writings (edited and translated by J. O' Malley), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994, p.118.
4 T. Eagleton, Marx andfreedom, London: Phoenix Press, 1997, pp.3-4.
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"Philosophy has become worldly and the most decisive proof of this is that
philosophical consciousness has been drawn into the torment of struggle not only
externally but internally as well. Just as the construction of the future and becoming
fit and ready for all times is not our task, so is all the more certain what we have to
accomplish in the present. I mean the ruthless critique of all that exists, ruthless in
the sense that critique does not fear its own consequences, and just as little, conflicts
with existing powers."5
And despite the fact that this ruthless critique is geared to changing the social
surrounding within which it takes place, it is very much embedded within the
objective process of a particular history and society. It is clear that, for Marx, the
critic must begin with existing forms of consciousness. The critic should "begin with
each form of theoretical and practical consciousness and out of the very form of
existing actuality he can develop true actuality as its ought and its goal"6. In this
sense critique, or immanent critique as it is called, resists the divorcing of symbolic
action from social reality (which is what idealist philosophers do) and it "juxtaposes
the immanent normative self-understanding of its object to the material actuality of
this object"7. In immanent critique there is no transcendental or ready-made system
against which existing forms of consciousness are juxtaposed; the object of inquiry is
reflexive; it presupposes that what is investigated is a social reality which has its own
self-interpretation. Furthermore, the task of immanent critique is not only "not to
juxtapose an ideal, eternal standard to the existent", but also "through a ruthless
critique of the existent to reveal that what is, already contains within itselfwhat
ought to be as a possibility.. ..The task of the critic is to show that the given is not a
mere fact, that to understand it to be actuality is also to criticise it by showing what it
could be but is not".
Since Marx's time, this particular tradition of critical knowledge, which is ultimately
oriented towards the transformation and emancipation of its object of study, has been
5 K.Marx and F.Engels, Werke, Berlin: Dietz, 1980, volume 1, p.344.
6
ibid., p.345.
7 S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 34-35.
8 ibid.
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revisited, further elaborated and developed by a number of theorists9. Here I will
only make a brief comment on two influential accounts of critical theory in the
twentieth century, the ones given by Horkheimer and Habermas.
Horkheimer's account of critical theory developed mainly as a reaction to positivism.
He argued that the empirical methods employed by natural sciences cannot offer a
viable model for social enquiry. Horkheimer insisted that positivism's focus on the
empirical study of social life (parallel to the empirical study of nature) tended to
"absolutisize" knowledge and present it "as though this were grounded in the inner
nature of knowledge as such or justified in some ahistorical way"10. By describing,
explaining and predicting regularities, positivism as applied in the sphere of social
sciences ended up presenting social phenomena "as an unchangeable force ofnature,
a fate beyond man's control".11
In other words, according to Horkheimer, positivism in the sphere of social sciences
contributed to a naturalisation of the existing social conditions. As a result of this
process, "men see themselves only as onlookers, passive participants in a mighty
1 9
process which may be foreseen, but not modified." It is obvious that such a kind of
theory leads to disempowerment, because individuals do not perceive themselves as
active producers of their social cosmos. It makes individuals experience society as a
1-5
nonhuman natural process. Horkheimer, drawing from the Marxian tradition of
critique, resists this passivity imposed by positivism and suggests another approach
to the study of social life, which he calls critical theory.
Critical theory takes "seriously the ideas by which the bourgeoisie explains its own
order- free exchange, free competition, harmony of interests, and so on and follow(s)
9 In her book Critique, Norm and Utopia (op. cit. fn.7), Seyla Benhabib gives an enlightening account
of the historical development of the critical theory of society. For a brief summary of the same
account see S. Marks, The Riddle ofall Constitutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.121-
146. See also D.Held, Introduction to critical theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1980, S.E. Bronner and
D. MacKay Kellner (eds) Critical Theory and Society, London: Routledge, 1989 and S. E. Bronner Of
Critical Theory and Its Theorists, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994.






them to their logical conclusion",14 where the inner contradictions of the bourgeois
society are fully exposed. In this sense critical theory is not just "an expression of the
concrete historical situation, but also a force within it to stimulate change."15 It is
important to note here that critical theory is not so much concerned with the
improvement of certain aspects of social structure. Rather, it focuses on structural
change.
Habermas further develops Horkheimer's opposition to positivism. As we saw
above, Horkheimer distinguished between positivist/traditional and critical theory
with their different methods and aims. Habermas,16 on the other hand, identifies three
different forms of enquiry, which correspond to different cognitive interests. First of
all, there are the natural sciences, which employ empirical analytical methods. Their
aim is to describe and explain existing regularities in a way that will allow us to
make predictions about material conditions. But then again our ability to make
predictions about future conditions is connected with the 'technical exploitability' of
this particular type of knowledge. Thus, according to Habermas the cognitive interest
that corresponds to natural sciences with their empirical-analytical methods is a
'technical' one.
l'he second type ofknowledge, as identified by Habermas, is associated with
disciplines such as history and literature. These 'historical-hermeneutic sciences'
involve interpretive rather than predictive propositions. The aim here is clearly not to
predict, but to comprehend. As a result these sciences are not technically
'exploitable'; they are connected with a certain cultural tradition and they enable
people within that tradition to understand each other and to interact more effectively.
Hence the cognitive interest behind historical-hermeneutic knowledge is a practical








Finally Habermas examines the social sciences. Aligned with Horkheimer, he
distinguishes between 'positivist' and 'critical' social science. The former is geared
to developing predictive propositions about social structures and adopts the methods
of empirical-analytical sciences. Its final aim is to identify relations of causation
which will allow us to control social structures. In this sense positivist social science
is no different from empirical-analytical sciences and, likewise, the cognitive interest
underlying it is a technical one.
On the other hand, the objective of critical social science is neither to predict nor to
comprehend existing social structures, but to transform them. Its aim is "to determine
when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and
when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle
be transformed."18 The paradigmatic method employed by critical social science is
self-reflection. Critical social science invites social actors to reflect upon their
position/role within the social structure and to engage in emanciparoty action.
In Habermas' view the legitimate task of social enquiry is to actively transform
relations of domination/oppression and, thus, to emancipate society.
Although critical theory is not a tightly woven project and it does not in any case
form a unity, its variants have developed around certain central axes. At this point I
am not going to expand on the theoretical differences between the central figures of
critical theory, but I will briefly highlight the common thread that runs through the
various accounts of critique and critical theory. First of all, critical theorists view
theorising as a form ofpraxis. They agree that the aim of social enquiry is neither a
simple understanding/interpretation nor a prediction regarding social structures, but
an active participation which will bring about the emancipatory transformation of the
existing social order. In this sense, both critical theory and social enquiry feature a
certain degree of reflexivity. This means that theoretical analyses affect outcomes
and in any case it is affirmed that knowledge can never be neutral, but is in one or the
other way, bound up with power. The purpose of theory is to "analyse and expose the
hiatus between the actual and the possible, between the existing order of
18 ibid.
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contradictions and a potential future state"19. The theorist is part of the societal
process and her task is to bring to the surface what is latent in objective reality.
By bringing theoretical proposal to the level of the praxis, critical theory assumes the
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present as "vide pour le futur" , empty for the future. This approach refuses any
deterministic conception of historical development and any rational celebration of
the result21. It views society as a social product, which is open to transformation; it
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rejects "resignation to the powers that be, to the nature-like process of social fate".
Its method of procedure is immanent critique, according to which the critic cannot be
abstracted from the contradictory dynamics ofpower underlying the object of its
study. Critical theory examines the contradictions between the object's idea of itself
and its actual existence, questioning the object's self-image and revealing its
unfulfilled potentialities.
However, critical theorists, unlike Marxists, do not themselves advance a clearly
defined political agenda, because they believe that "the process of liberation entails a
process of self-emancipation and self-creation."23 In other words, the project of
actualising the multiple immanent possibilities of society is not viewed as an issue
that theory can or should resolve on its own; it is a practical question that can only be
answered by the historical subject. Critique cannot on its own transform particular
historical conditions, but it can help to create the preconditions for their alteration.
Ultimately, it is only in historical struggles that the essential theoretical truths can be
verified.24 Hence, critical theory acknowledges the existence of a gap between theory
and practice and further contends that this gap needs to be filled by a conscious
emancipatory politics.
19 D.Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1980, p.22.
20 L. Althusser, "Machiavel et nous" in F. Matheron (ed) Ecrits philosophiques etpolitiques, vol. 2,
Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1995, p. 62.
21 M. Hardt, A.Negri, Empire, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001, p.48.
22 T. Adomo, Minima Moralia, London: New Left Books, 1974, p.98.
23 ibid., pp.25-26.
24 H. Marcuse, "The concept of essence" in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, Boston: Beacon
Press, 1968, p.73.
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b) Critical theory and the EU constitutional/legal order
It is this reflexive and necessarily political vision of theory, as outlined above, that
will inform my thesis and its critique of the EU constitutional/legal order. Having
given a brief analysis of the particular conception of critique that I endorse, let me
now proceed with an exploration of certain methodological approaches to the
European project, which exemplify the "orthodox" stance in this area. I will argue
that, despite their self-declarations, they are not critical, or at least not critical
enough, and by not being critical, they end up providing a basis for legitimacy for the
actual (and to a great extent unsatisfactory) structure of the EU.
Catherine Richmond has written a very sophisticated article on the need to preserve
the current indeterminacy of the EU. Her argument starts with an analogy:
"Once upon a time the sun rose in the morning and set in the evening. The earth was
the centre of all creation, and around it giving life and sustenance to the creatures
upon it, circled the sun. Stars, galaxies, the universe, all that exists to survey and
understand, were measured and examined in relation to this focal point: the planet
earth.
The sun still "rises" in the morning and "sets" in the evening. However, our view of
the world has changed; it no longer rests upon the earth as our single, taken for
granted, point of reference. We have been able to test through physics our initial
model of the universe, find it wanting and change it accordingly. But the initial,
inadequate model was a necessary starting point, and when we revise it we are
improving our theoretical model; what we seek is a "best" modelfor making
intelligible what we observe. We never observe without some implicit conceptual
model, though at any given time the element of choice in the adoption of a particular
theory is easily overlooked. "25(my emphasis)
Her analogy is quite clear. The nation state used to be the centre of our political
universe. We used to measure and examine all political phenomena in relation to this
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"focal point". Now we need to revise our initial theoretical model and recognise the
European Union as the focal point of our political life. I find Richmond's analogy
wanting; she uses one particular similarity (in our case the need for the revision of
theoretical models) as a sufficient basis for drawing conclusions regarding other
dissimilar aspects of the two terms of the analogy.
One first obvious objection to Richmond's analogy is the difference of objective
between natural and social sciences. Even though modern physics has destroyed the
myth of determinism, it is still the case that physical laws indicate more or less rigid
causal connections and are statements of fact. In the sphere ofpolitical and legal
institutions, however, the object of enquiry is different, in the sense, that the social
scientist cannot impose an external logic on her data; she must understand the
internal logic of social life and at the same time she can call into question this very
logic. Drawing from Habermas's taxonomy, as mentioned earlier, one could observe
that Richmond fails to distinguish between two completely different forms of enquiry
and their corresponding different cognitive interests.
Although Richmond acknowledges that "we cannot empirically test the nature of the
Community legal order", she goes on that "we therefore choose concepts and
theories that allow us to impose order upon it, to enable us to understand what we
see"26 (my emphasis). Richmond defines comprehension as unreflective acceptance
of the self-understanding of our object of enquiry. This unnecessary equation forces
understanding to mean "to come to terms with" and with it the role of theory
becomes a profoundly conservative one. In fact, 'understanding what we see' may be
as conservative a choice as deciding not to 'see' and acknowledge the changes that
have already taken place in the social/political sphere.
In the theoretical debate concerning European integration, the 'cardinal' dilemma
usually presents itself as a choice between the existing nation-states and the existing
25 C. Richmond, "Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European
Law" in N. MacCormick (ed) Constructing Legal Systems: European Union in Legal Theory,
Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp.47-90 atp.48.
26 ibid.
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Community legal order. According to this mapping, the ones who insist on the
primacy of the nation-state are the 'conservative' party of the debate and the ones
who choose European post-nationalism/supra-nationalism over state-nationalism, are
the 'non-conservative' ones. In their effort to argue for the necessity to surpass the
narrow-minded logic of the nation-state, it seems to me that a significant number of
legal theorists tend to construct theoretical models, which are orientated to
accommodating rather than criticising the European Union's normative reality.27
I recognise that the European legal system is a novel species of legal system which,
being a hybrid, dynamic, metamorphic system can only be theoretically
accommodated ifwe revise our traditional theories. It offers us the possibility to test
them and at the same time to develop them in more fruitful ways. Having said that,
however, I do not agree with what seems to be the current trend in legal theory; that
is to construct theoretical models, whose ultimate aim is to silence or explain away
all contradictions and, effectively, to offer an apologetic confirmation of the
actuality, the present shape of the European legal system.
In the chapters to follow I will question the normative basis of the European legal
system by bringing to the fore its internal contradictions. I should emphasise at this
point that my aim is not to argue against the European project; it is to argue for a
European order with a sound normative basis. I will agree with Curtin that "it is vital
that those who believe in the overall imperatives of the march towards closer and
deeper European integration critically examine the many imperfections of the
Union... .so as to determine by positive choice rather than inertial navigation the
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desirable destination of the European journey".
27 As Ian Ward puts it, "discovering critical approaches to European legal studies is, to use
Eisenhower's familiar adage, like trying to catch lightning in a bottle- possible, but it just never seems
to happen". I. Ward, "In Search of a European Identity", 57 (1994) Modern Law Review, p.315.
28 D. Curtin, "The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe ofbits and pieces", 30 (1993)
Common Market Law Review, p.21.
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Weiler, on the other hand, takes a different approach. In his influential article "The
9Q •
Transformation ofEurope", he explores the evolution of the Community over time.
His contribution is important because it helps us understand not only the direction in
which the European Community has developed, but also the different forces involved
TO
in this development. There are, however, some objections, against his analysis.
Weiler accepts that the plea for a law in context approach (be it law and economics
or law and society etc) is de rigueur31, yet he chooses what he calls a "pure theory"
explanation of the development of the European Community. This is a self-
referential explanation which is extracted from within the phenomenon itself. It seeks
to rationalise its internal development by reconstructing its coherence as if the
internal dynamics of the system were insulated from every external aspect.
Weiler admits that the insulation cannot be total and that his contribution cannot but
be a part of a more totalistic and comprehensive history. His endogenous explanation
of the constitutional development of the European Community, although mainly
legalistic, is necessarily -Weiler does not doubt this32- a partly historical and political
explanation. However, by presenting itself as a philosophically unproblematic
activity, it ends up being a status quo account ofwhat has happened, because it
embraces the implicit assumption that the phenomenon to be studied is a
straightforward given beyond change and that the future will be a continuation of the
present. Here again, drawing on Horkheimer, one can raise the objection that the
positivist approach (because what is a pure theory of law if not a positivist one?)
brings forward a passivity which is incompatible with a truly critical approach to
social phenomena.
According to Allott, "when we seek to explain philosophically a set ofpolitical
phenomena such as the constitutional development of the European Community, we
find ourselves caught in a hermeneutic web, explaining phenomena by explaining
29 J. Weiler, "The transformation ofEurope" first published in 100 (1991) Yale Law Journal, p.2403
and then with changes in J. Weiler, The constitution ofEurope: do the new clothes have an emperor?,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
30 H. Schermers, "Comment on Weiler's The Transformation ofEurope", 100 (1991) Yale Law
Journal, pp.2525ff.
31 J. Weiler, op. cit. fn.29, p.15 (of the book).
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explanations of phenomena, making phenomena in explaining them".33In his search
for methodological tools, Allott rejects deterministic and sub-deterministic
approaches, which view history as either a chain of cause and effect akin to natural
sciences or as an identification ofmacro-patterns in the past, which somehow affect
our understanding of the present and influence our future making behaviour.
His preferred kind ofhistory-making is the one which views history as an ever-
present reality in consciousness. The relevant past in this case is not only a certain
historical reality of events, but also the subjective reality of social consciousness.
And social consciousness, because of its evaluative character, conceives of the past
and the future as realms of choice. Instead of identifying a certain point in time and
recounting a story from that point onwards (and this is what Weiler does), this
particular method views history as a web of different strands whose interaction
presents us with different sets of possibilities. We are the only ones who can choose
among the possibilities left open for the future, as we are responsible for the choices
of the past. It makes sense to control the choices of the past so that we can reach the
best decisions regarding the future. Allott's point is that history is not fate. I fully
agree with him and I will use the same line of reasoning to rebut the concept of
retrospective inevitability in the constitutional development of the EU.
Weiler, unlike Allott or Curtin, approaches history based on what seems to be
'unreasoned abandon'. He believes that history is an inevitable dynamic of doing
first and thinking later. He agrees that the constitutionalisation process in the
European Union was a veritable revolution that occurred without a profound debate
within the European polity34 and he attempts to rationalise this process by using a
metaphor from the old testament:
"And Moses wrote all the words of the eternal.. .And he took the book of the
Covenant and read in the audience of the people: And they said, All that the Eternal
hath spoken we will do and hearken."
32 ibid.
33 P. Allott, "The European Community is not the true European Community", 100 (1991) Yale Law
Journal, p.2485.
34 J. Weiler, The Constitution ofEurope: do the new clothes have an emperor?, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.4.
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The anomalous textual inversion, first we do, then we hearken -that is try to
understand what it is we are doing- is a metaphor that Weiler thinks we can apply to
the discussion ofEU constitutionalism. He believes that the dynamic ofpraxis
preceding deliberation "is an act of existential decisiveness, of veritably taking one's
destiny in one's hand, of following an intuition, an ideal, an aspiration"35. In this I
will disagree with him. Following Allott, I will argue that the constitution of a
political society constitutes, as much as it expresses its own identity and, as a result,
it must be a reflection of the interactions that take place within it. "A society
imagines what it might be, struggles to decide what it shall be and becomes what it
has chosen to become".36 After all, as Hardt and Negri poignantly remind us,
theory/philosophy "is not the owl ofMinerva that takes flight after history has been
realised in order to celebrate its happy ending", but it "is subjective proposition,
desire and praxis that are applied to the event."37
c) Ideology critique
The two approaches discussed above (Richmond, Weiler) do not only exemplify the
"orthodox" and to a great extent apologetic theoretical stance towards EU
constitutionalism, but they also function, as I will argue in this part, as ideological
mechanisms. This brings me to my next methodological point, which is connected
with the use of the concept of ideology as a distinctive analytical tool in the
development ofmy argument. When I recapitulated the main tenets of critical theory,
I mentioned that the critical approach is intended to bring to light the contradiction
between the object's idea of itself and its actual existence. This gap between self-
image and actuality is ideological, to the extent that the distorted image of actuality,
allows it to evade critique and to safely re-produce itself. Through the critique of this
ideology and the deconstruction of the EU constitutional history as we have inherited
35 ibid., p.27.
36 P. Allott, "The crisis of European Constitutionalism: reflections on the revolution in Europe" 34
(1997) Common Market Law Review, p.468.
37 M. Hardt, A.Negri, op. cit. fn. 21, 2001, pp.48-49.
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it, the immanent possibilities of alternative political/constitutional organisations for
the EU can be revealed.
We saw earlier how immanent critique is closely bound up with Marxism. Similarly,
a big part of the analysis of the term ideology has sprung from the Marxist tradition.
However, the concept of ideology is not linked with any single intellectual
10
movement; the term was coined before Marx and it has acquired a variety of new
meanings since Marx's time. I am aware of the fact that since its inception two
centuries ago ideology has undergone many transformations; it has evoked a whole
array of different notions and has served a variety ofpurposes, not all of them
compatible with one another. As Eagleton puts it, ideology is " a text woven of a
whole tissue of different conceptual strands"39. For this reason, I will not even
attempt to give an exhaustive definition, or rather catalogue of definitions for
ideology40. Instead I will briefly sketch the particular conception of ideology that I
will be employing and I will then engage with the post-modem end of ideology
debate that tends to consider ideology as an obsolete concept. By exploring different
ideological strategies, I will defend the interpretive validity of ideology critique and I
will argue that a rejection of ideology functions as an endorsement of the political
status quo and is, thus, in its turn, yet another expression of ideological practice.





Terry Eagleton (op. cit. fn. 38 pp. 1-2) gives the following non-exhaustive list of definitions of
ideology:
a) the process of production ofmeanings, signs and values in social life; b) a body of ideas
characteristic of a particular social group or class; c) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant
political power; d) false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; e) systematically
distorted communication; f) that which offers a position for a subject; g) forms of thought motivated
by social interests; h) identity thinking; ijsocially necessary illusion; j) the conjunction of discourse
and power; k) the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world; 1) action-
oriented sets of beliefs; m) the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality; n) semiotic closure; o)
the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to a social structure; p) the
process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality.
For a survey of different theories of ideology see also N. Bimbaum, "The sociological study of
ideology 1940-1960", 9 (1960) Current Sociology and J.B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of
Ideology, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.
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In an effort to systematise the different meanings of ideology, Raymond Geuss41 has
suggested a quite interesting taxonomy that seems to account for some of the most
prominent conceptions of ideology. He distinguishes between descriptive, pejorative
and positive conceptions of ideology. Ideology in the purely descriptive or
anthropological sense refers to the psychological dispositions and beliefs of the
agents within certain social groups or classes. This non-evaluative , non-judgemental
meaning of ideology comes close to the notion of a world view, a Weltanschauung.
On the other hand, ideology in the positive sense is viewed as a set ofbeliefs that
inspires a certain social group or class and aims at the radical transformation of
society as a whole. The person who considers this type of ideology to be positive
necessarily approves of the particular goals and motivations put forward by the social
group in question. Some Marxists for example speak approvingly of the socialist
ideology.
In its pejorative meaning, ideology refers to a set of values and beliefs that can be
viewed critically/negatively in virtue of their epistemic, functional or genetic
properties42. When Geuss says that a form of consciousness can be ideologically
false in virtue of epistemic reasons, he refers to situations in which the beliefs of the
ideology are not supported by empirical data. A form of consciousness, on the other
hand, can be ideologically false from a functional point of view, when it plays a
role/function in concealing social contradictions and in stabilising/legitimising
certain kinds of institutions and practices. As for genetic ideology, it refers to false
consciousness connected with facts about its origins, genesis or history; it requires
ignorance or false belief on the part of the agents of their true motives for accepting
it.
The reference to ideology in the descriptive sense is a neutral one, while ideology in
the pejorative sense obviously implies an oppositional perspective. As Eagleton puts
41 R. Geuss, The idea ofa critical theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981, Chapter 1.
42 In Geuss' own summary, consciousness may be false because it "incorporates beliefs which are
false, or because it functions in a reprehensible way, or because it has tainted origin". Op. cit. fn. 41,
P-21.
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it, in this pejorative sense "ideology, like halitosis, is what the other person has".43
As far as the subcategories of this critical conception are concerned, most theorists
concentrate on two of the three types identified by Geuss; the most commonly drawn
distinction is between epistemological conceptions of ideology and
sociological/political/ethical (or functional in Geuss's terms) ones. We saw above
that the former entails some error in the understanding of empirical reality, while the
latter is instrumental to the maintenance ofparticular political/social structures. This
type of ideology may also involve mystification and to a certain extent illusion
regarding the processes through which these particular structures are being
rationalised and thereby legitimated. In the former case (epistemological conception)
the illusion is external to empirical reality, it concerns our understanding of it, but is
not internally connected with it, while in the latter (political conception) this illusion
is part of the reality, whose structures it legitimises.
The epistemological version of the pejorative conception has been strongly criticised
during the last few decades mainly due to the development of new theories of
knowledge and the emergence of a far-reaching pluralism, which is coupled with a
touch ofmoral and cognitive relativism. The argument in a capsule is that a
correspondence theory of truth /knowledge according to which our ideas are external
to and match the physical/material world is not plausible. It is argued that there can
be no epistemic space and therefore no external relation between our practices and
our ideas of them. Besides, this particular cognitive model somehow assumes the
existence of one truth, one way ofviewing the world, which is at odds with the
pervasive pluralism of our societies. What makes such epistemological approaches
even more suspect is the fact that they give immense power to a handful of experts
on theoretical issues of establishing truth to the detriment of the vast majority of the
democratic body. For these reasons epistemological conceptions of ideology are
fairly unpopular nowadays.
Thompson, like Geuss, distinguishes between neutral and critical conceptions of
ideology. Being opposed to the neutralization of the concept of ideology, he
43
T.Eagleton, op. cit. fn. 38, p.2.
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formulates a critical conception of ideology, which preserves the negative, political
connotations of the Marxist legacy, but dispenses with its epistemological
assumptions.44 For Thompson, false consciousness and illusion are not intrinsically
connected with the concept of ideology. Neither is the working of a dominant class a
pre-requisite for ascertaining the operation of an ideological practice.
While Thompson argues against the reduction of all social conflicts to the opposition
between bourgeoisie and proletariat, he retraces in Marx's work elements of a
different, 'a latent conception of ideology'. Epistemological issues of
misrepresentation are still present in this conception, but the focus shifts from the
reproduction of the interests of the dominant class to a more general interconnection
between meaning and relations of domination. According to this latent Marxist
conception, as reconstructed by Thompson, "ideology is a system of
misrepresentations which serves to sustain existing relations of class domination by
orientating individuals towards images and ideals which conceal class relations and
detract from the collective pursuit of change"45.
Drawing on this latent Marxian conception of ideology, Thompson binds the analysis
of ideology to the question of critique and reformulates it in terms of the interplay of
meaning and power. He concludes that "the study of ideology requires us to
investigate the ways, in which meaning serves in specific contexts to establish and
sustain relations of domination"46. This particular conception of ideology owes
something to Marx's latent notion of ideology, but diverges from that account in
significant aspects.
First of all, it avoids the epistemological presuppositions connected with the
tendency to think of ideology as pure illusion, as a realm of ideas which reflects
inadequately "the social reality that exists prior to and independently of these
images"47. Thompson recognises that ideas are as much reflective as they are








constitutive of social reality. Hence a clear-cut divide between material reality and its
intellectual representation is not possible, or rather it is not plausible. According to
Thompson's conception, the falsity of particular representations is a contingent, but
not necessary characteristic of ideology. What is crucial is whether a particular
symbolic form can actually serve to establish and sustain relations of domination;
unlike the Marxian conception of ideology, for Thompson, the truth or falsity of a
symbolic form is almost irrelevant.
Another point of departure from the Marxian tradition of ideology is the significance
of class. In Marx's work, class domination constitutes the principal axis ofhis
analysis. In Thompson's definition, on the other hand, we can speak of domination
"when established relations ofpower are systematically asymmetrical, that is when
particular agents are endowed with power in a durable way which excludes and to
some significant degree remains inaccessible to other agents or groups of agents,
irrespective of the basis upon which such exclusion is carried out"48. The link with
class struggle is again a contingent, not a necessary one.
According to Thomspon's definition of ideology, which is the most widely accepted
definition of ideology today, ideology is a body ofmeaning and values (rather than
solely ideas), a discourse bound up with specific social interests and, thus, related to
questions ofpower. Ideology is a matter of discourse rather than language. In this
sense, ideology concerns "less signification than conflicts within the field of
signification"49. This necessarily also means that ideology is less a matter "of the
inherent linguistic properties of a pronouncement than a question ofwho is saying
what to whom for what purposes".50 On its grammatical surface it may appear to be
referential51, however, its true end is persuasion and through that, production of
certain effects and furtherance of specific political purposes. In other words, ideology
is action-oriented discourse, or to use Austin's term, it is performative rather than




T.Eagleton, op. cit. fn. 38, p.l 1.
50
ibid., p. 9..
51 ibid., p. 19.
52 ibid.
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ideological character of an utterance; this can only be decided by an analysis of its
relation to its social/discursive context. As a consequence, the exact same linguistic
formulation may be ideological in one context and non-ideological, or even
emancipatory, in another.
Let me take stock of the analysis so far. I have explored the distinction between
neutral and critical conceptions of ideology and I have investigated the different
variations of the critical conception. I have briefly sketched the problems which stem
from focusing too much on the epistemological premises of the concept. I concluded
this part of the analysis with Thompson's reformulation of the Marxian concept of
ideology. Having taken away from the definitional core of ideology the element of
epistemic misrepresentations, Thompson focuses mainly on the interplay ofmeaning
and power. He views ideology as discourse that aims to defend and thereby
reproduce existing relations of domination.
In developing my argument about the constitutional order of the EU, I will be
employing the concept of ideology in its critical/pejorative sense. It is this
perspective that is connected with the aims of critical theory, as analysed in the first
part of this chapter, and will bring to the fore the possibility ofpromoting
emancipatory change in the EU. For the purposes of this thesis, my critical
conception of ideology will focus on the ways ideas are constructed and mobilised in
order to sustain "actuality" in the EU with all its underlying structures ofpolitical,
legal and economic domination.
d) Ideological modi operandi
Having clarified the conception of ideology that will inform my analysis in the
following chapters, let me now briefly examine the different ways in which meaning
can actually serve to establish and sustain relations of domination. Here I will only
give a summary of the theoretical and to a great extent overlapping accounts given
by Thompson and Eagleton. In the following chapters I will pursue in greater detail
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these issues and I will show how these general modes of operation of ideology are
instantiated in the EU context.
One can distinguish between five general modes through which ideology operates:
legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation and reification. Each of these
modes of operation can be linked with a number of different strategies of symbolic
construction. According to Susan Marks' clear exposition, the difference between a
mode of operation and a strategy of symbolic construction is that the latter indicates
the way "in which meaning capable of operating as ideology is mobilised", while the
former refers to the ways "in which meaning, thus mobilized, may come to sustain
relations of domination" .
To clarify the difference between a mode of operation and a symbolic strategy, let
me start with an analysis of legitimation. Legitimation is a mode of operation of
ideology; the ultimate outcome of this operation is to represent certain relations of
domination and their corresponding socio-political structures as just and worthy of
support. The particular strategies employed to this end are: rationalisation,
universalization and narrativization. All these strategies ultimately seek to present
certain established relations (of domination) as just and worthy of support; they
pursue, however, the same aim in different ways. Rationalization is the strategy that
defends existing relations and institutions by presenting them as the outcome of a
perfectly logical and coherent chain of reasoning. Universalization, on the other
hand, legitimizes an order that serves the interests of a group ofpeople by
representing it as serving the interests of all people. Finally narrativization justifies
claims to legitimacy by presenting them as part of stories that "recount the past and
treat the present as part of a timeless and cherished tradition."54
A second mode of operation of ideology is dissimulation. This particular modus
operandi establishes and sustains relations ofdomination by concealing, denying or
obscuring them. Some of the strategies of symbolic construction it employs are
displacement (a term usually associated with one object/individual is used as a
53 S. Marks, op. cit. fn. 9, p. 19.
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signifier of another object/individual, thus transferring any established positive or
negative connotations to the "new" object/individual), euphemization (whereby the
relations /structures of domination are described in positive terms e.g. foreign
workers with no citizenship rights are described as "guest workers") and trope
(figurative use of language).
Another ideological modus operandi is unification. This conceals the existence of the
multiple divisions of society and embraces individuals in a form ofunity or
otherwise in a collective identity (e.g. construction of symbols of national unity such
as flags, national anthems, emblems etc). In practice this modus operandi can be very
similar with some of the symbolic strategies of legitimation such as universalization
or narrativization.
Fragmentation, yet another mode of operation of ideology, is exactly the opposite of
unification. Rather than presenting unconnected individuals as a form of unity, it dis¬
unites and fragments social groups, thereby reducing their power to challenge the
existing structures of domination (strategy of differentiation) or, equally frequently,
it tends to emphasise the existence of an enemy, which threatens the otherwise idyllic
existing collectivity. Thompson calls this particular strategy "expurgation of the
other" and offers the example of the Nazi propaganda against Jews and Communists.
Finally, reification is another general mode through which ideology can operate.
Reification stabilises existing relations of domination by representing them as a
permanent and natural state of affairs. It thus situates them outside of time and
outside ofhistory. Ideology qua reification employs different strategies, among
which naturalization and eternalization are the most important. The former treats
social/historical products as the inevitable outcome ofnatural processes (e.g. unequal
treatment of the sexes may be presented as the natural outcome of their physiological
differences), while the latter conceals the historical character of
relations/structures/institutions and portrays them as permanent and unchanging
givens. The obvious outcome in both cases is the tendency to promote passivization;
54 J.B. Thompson, op. cit. fn.44, p. 61.
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existing relations seem to be a given outside the realm of intervention of any
individual or collective subject.
From this brief discussion of ideological modes and strategies it may seem that
distinguishing between the different ideological manoeuvres is a straightforward
task. The truth is that, although they can be usefully separated for analytical
purposes, in reality they rarely work independently. Nor, of course, do the modes and
strategies mentioned here exhaust the possible ways in which meaning can serve to
establish and sustain powers of domination. In fact different writers give slightly
different accounts of the modi operandi of ideology and their corresponding
strategies. One could even argue that they can all be subsumed under the general
heading 'legitimation'. Eagleton, for example, argues that Thompson's definition of
ideology effectively equates ideology with legitimation.55
On the other hand, as explained earlier, ideology is a matter of context and cannot be
diagnosed in abstracto. This also means that the different strategies employed by
ideology are not necessarily always ideological. For example rationalisation may be
used to legitimise the authority of a tyrannical monarch, but it can also be used to
legitimise a revolution against the same monarch. Depending on the way it is
deployed, rationalisation may sustain relations of domination or equally plausibly, it
may challenge them. Hence no symbolic form is ideological as such. Thompson is
adamant that "whether the meaning generated by symbolic strategies, or conveyed by
symbolic forms, serves to establish and sustain relations of domination is a question
that can be answered only by examining the specific mechanisms by which they are
transmitted from producers to receivers, and only by examining the sense which
these symbolic forms have for the subjects who produce and receive them"56.
Another point that arises from the analysis of the different ideological strategies is
that most of them involve a certain degree ofmystification; they somehow "mask
existing social conflicts" and "they offer an imaginary resolution of real
55
T.Eagleton, op. cit. fn. 38, p.5.
56
J.B.Thompson, op. cit. fn. 44, p.67.
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contradictions"57. Given, however, that I earlier rejected the epistemological
conception of ideology arguing that false consciousness is not a necessary, but only a
contingent feature of ideology, I need to clarify the relation between this seemingly
recurrent mystification and false consciousness. Do the two effectively go hand in
hand or can we meaningfully distinguish between them?
Ideology as false consciousness, as we saw, is based on a cognitive model, which
assumes that ideas correspond to the empirical evidence of the surrounding social
reality. When this correspondence is broken, then the existence of false
consciousness is affirmed. In the case of the illusion ormystification involved
sometimes in the operation of ideological strategies, falsity is not connected with the
non-correspondence of ideas with a pre-constituted reality, but with the fact that
there is no single vantage point from which one can perceive reality. In other words,
falsity here consists in the fact that a particular arrangement of social structures or
relations, which may be perfectly logical/coherent/beneficial/ 'true' for a certain
social group, is actually presented as logical/coherent/beneficial/ 'true' for everyone.
The falsity, the mystification and the illusion lie in the fact that one particular point
of view presents itself as the Archimedean point beyond dispute. This is a much
more subtle cognitive model. Epistemological concerns do arise, but they focus
mainly on the way in which a certain perspective of knowledge can sustain power,
which is effectively a political concern; a cognitively shaded concern perhaps, but a
deeply political one nevertheless.
e) Simulation: the end of ideology or the latest stage of ideology?
I have so far given a brief analysis of the concept of ideology and the particular
conception of it that I shall employ in my thesis. During the last 50 years, however,
numerous theorists have announced the death of ideology. "The end of ideology"
discourse started in the fifties as a reaction to the experience of totalitarian ideologies
such as fascism, Stalinism and Nazism. Later on, with the demise of the socialist
57
T.Eagleton,, op. cit. fn. 38, p.6.
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regimes in Eastern Europe, Francis Fukuyama declared that the end of the history
had been attained. As he put it, this world-wide expansion of liberalism was " not
just the end of the cold war or the passing of a particular period ofpost-war history,
but the end of history as such: that is the end point ofmankind's ideological
evolution and the universalisation ofwestern liberal democracy as the final form of
human government."58 His point is pretty clear. Western liberalism has triumphed
over all other ideologies. Hence, ideological competition has practically ended and
the concept of ideology has lost its pertinence. In this particular strand of the "end of
ideology" discourse (undertaken mainly by right-wing theorists59), it seems that
ideology is taken to signify a comprehensive system of ideas, a Weltanschauung, or a
particular political tradition. To the extent that this is a rejection of the descriptive
version of ideology, it does not affect the critical conception of ideology that I
sketched above.
On the other hand, more recently, post-modernist theorists60 have also raised
objections to the usefulness of the concept of ideology on a completely different
basis. Ideology is an obsolete concept, so goes their argument, because it
presupposes the existence of something that counts as truth; it relies upon the
possibility to distinguish between correct and false representation of reality. Since,
however, according to post-modernism, reality is utterly fragmented, its
representation can only be a matter ofperspective rather than a matter of fact; an
absolute notion of truth is not tenable. This particular strand of the end of ideology
debate is mainly targeting the epistemological premises of ideology. The most
significant representative of post-modernism in this area is Jean Baudrillard. I will
look at his work in a way that will allow me not only to rebut the post-modernist
rejection of ideology, but also to dismiss the "end of ideology" debate as an
ideological tool.
58 F. Fukuyama, "The End of History?", 3 (1989) National Interest, p.4.
59 See among others D. Bell, The End ofIdeology, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1962, S. M.Lipset,
Political Man, London: Heinemann, 1964 and E. Shils, "The End of Ideology?", 5 (1955) Encounter.
60 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (edited by C.
Gordon), Brighton NY: Harvester press, 1980. For an overview of different post-modem theories, see
also F. Jameson, Post-modernism: the cultural logic oflate capitalism, London: Verso, 1991.
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Baudrillard is undoubtedly the one post-modern theorist "who has gone furthest
toward renouncing Enlightenment reason and all its works, from the Kantian-liberal
agenda to Marxism, Frankfurt Critical Theory, the structuralist 'sciences ofman' and
even- on his view- the residual theoreticist delusions of a thinker like Foucault."61
Baudrillard rejects the meta-narratives of enlightenment and their capacity to
distinguish truth from falsehood. The ideas of truth, validity and reason become
suspect in his work. In our current system, he points out, reality is constructed
through the interaction ofmedia, advertising strategies and codes. Political rhetoric
backed by mass media techniques of disinformation has substituted political debate,
while the coverage ofpolitical life by the media reduces substantive policy issues to
meaningless slogans62. In this political environment public opinion and consensus are
manipulated by suitably chosen poll systems and methods of statistical analysis that
magically yield the desired outcomes. As a result, the conditions of an informed
public debate have now broken down. Baudrillard concludes that rationalist
epistemologies are inadequate for the analysis of such media-centred socio-political
activities. In this new stage ofpost-modern evolution the old paradigms/categories of
knowledge and pseudo-knowledge (ideology), truth and falsehood, reason and
rhetoric, essence and appearance do not make sense any longer.
Notwithstanding his earlier affiliation with Marxist thought, Baudrillard is very
critical of the Marxian theory on the basis that this is only another variant of the
enlightenment theme, since it basically embraces the idea that one can criticise
existing beliefs from some vantage point of truth. Marxism privileges the material
conditions of being and their interconnection with the mode ofproduction (what he
calls "base") over the superstructure which embraces politics, philosophy, art,
religion etc. To the extent that Marx's theory presents itself as providing the one
right answer to the way base and superstructure interact, it is aligned with the
Enlightenment aspiration to provide meta-narratives and through them an infallible
method for explaining the world.
61 C. Norris, "Lost in the Funhouse: Baudrillard and the Politics of Postmodernism" in M. Gane (ed)
Jean Baudrillard, vol. 1, London: Sage Publications, 2000, p. 363.
62 ibid., p. 369.
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As for Marx's methodological weapon, his concept of critique, Baudrillard dismisses
it as follows: "the concept of critique.. .as the quintessence of Enlightenment
rationality, is perhaps only the subtle, long-term expression of the system's expanded
reproduction.. .Perhaps under the guise ofproducing its fatal internal contradiction,
Marx only rendered a descriptive theory. The logic of representation - of the
duplication of its object- haunts all rational discursiveness. Every critical theory is
haunted by the surreptitious religion, this desire bound up with the construction of its
object, this negativity subtly haunted by the very form that it negates." Hence,
according to Baudrillard, Marx's critical project ends up being part of a repressive
simulation; very much like its idealistic predecessors, Marx's theory pretends to give
an authoritative answer to a question that can have more than one answers.
Moreover, given that truth and rationality have turned out to be fictive, it is not only
Marxist theory, but theory in general that has lost all credibility.
Norris summarises Baudrillard's argument as follows: "ljTheory is a discredited
enterprise, since truth has turned out to be a fictive, rhetorical or imaginary construct;
2) this prevents (or ought to prevent) our engaging in activities of "rational"
argument or Ideologiekritik and 3) we must henceforth drop all talk of the "real" as
opposed to its mystified, distorted or ideological representation, since such talk
continues to trade on old assumptions that no longer possess any force or
credibility."64
Baudrillard further elaborates his objection against the possibility to distinguish
between real and non-real in his book Simulacra and Simulations, where he presents
the different stages of dismantling truth. "These would be the successive phases of
the image: 1) It is the reflection of a basic reality 2) It masks and perverts a basic
reality 3) It masks the absence of a basic reality 4) It bears no relation to any reality
whatever; it is its own pure simulacrum."65 He is adamant that what simulation is all
about "is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real and thus of saving the reality
63
J.Baudrillard, Selected Writings (edited by Mark Poster), Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988, p.l 16.
64 C. Norris, op. cit. fn. 61, p. 369.
65 J. Baudrillard, op. cit. fn. 63, p. 170.
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principle."66 In other words, ideology is, in his view, only an alibi for the existence of
truth. The only truth for Baudrillard is that there can be no truth; truth is forever
beyond reach.
His preferred examples ofhyperreal simulacra include Disneyland and Watergate.
Disneyland represents for Baudrillard "the idealised transposition of a contradictory
reality."67 "Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the
rest (i.e. the world outside Disneyland) is real, whereas in fact all of Los Angeles and
the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and
simulation." 68 Likewise, Baudrillard claims that the Watergate scandal was used
instrumentally to re-affirm the morality of the political system in the USA. The fact
that Watergate was exposed as a scandal functioned at the same time as a way of
legitimising the system. Effectively the system's outrage over the scandal was the
perfect disguise for its own scandalous immorality.
But where do these examples and the overall theory of simulation lead us? One
cannot deny Baudrillard's description of our life according to which, we are indeed
dominated by the media and their numerous manipulative marketing strategies.
Present day politics seems to be completely void of reason, or at least of any reason
that can be meaningfully communicated to the citizens. In fact, the citizens, these
supposedly political animals, have been overburdened by too much information,
channelled to them through the media, so much so that they have retreated from
political life. The media have colonised political life to the extent that they have
pushed the proper subjects ofpolitics out of it.
There is very little one can say about Baudrillard's diagnosis of the hyperreality of
our political life. The question, however, remains whether, this persuasive diagnosis
justifies Baudrillard's pessimistic prognosis regarding the impossibility to change the
current state of affairs and to recover the reality principle. What Baudrillard actually





the theoretical impossibility of the existence of reality. In political terms this stance
basically amounts to an acquiescence to the current state of affairs. In fact
Baudrillard makes clearly this point in his recent book "The Masses", where he
argues that apathy is the most effective weapon against hyperreality.69 This theory's
radical scepticism leaves us with no tools or reasons to challenge the status quo. In
this sense its function is highly ideological, because it facilitates the reproduction of
the existing structures of actuality and their corresponding relations of domination.
For Baudrillard no meaningful distinction can be drawn between truth and falsehood.
What we experience in our lives is "a hyperreal henceforth sheltered from the
imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence ofmodels and the simulated
generation of difference."70 However, as Norris argues, "the fact remains that there is
a difference between what we are given to believe and what emerges from the
process of subjecting such beliefs to an informed critique of their content and modes
ofpropagation"71. And although correspondence theories of truth may not be tenable
any longer, one can still apply other criteria of truth and falsehood such as "a fairly
basic coherence-theory that would point out the various lapses, inconsistencies, non-
sequiturs, downright contradictions and so forth which suffice to undermine the
official version of events..."72 / ) i,, a . A /\ IL {Jr-iA ft ) 'A t -J rth Uod. on
Ironically enough, even Baudrillard sometimes refers to the distinction between truth
and falsehood. The examples of simulation we saw above, in a way, are premised
upon the possibility to distinguish between the real and the non-real; otherwise the
distinction between Disneyland and the world outside it would collapse. Besides, his
claim that "the media are nothing else than a marvellous instrument for destabilising
the real and the true" , also presupposes the distinction between truth and falsehood.
Hence, it seems that occasionally Baudrillard appeals "for purposes of contrastive
69 J. Baudrillard, "The Masses" in Selected Writings, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.207-219.
70 J. Baudrillard, op. cit. fn. 63, p. 167.
71 C. Norris, op. cit. fn. 61, 190-191.
72 ibid., 190-191.
73 J. Baudrillard, op.cit. fn 63, p.217.
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definition"74 to the very criteria whose theoretical validity he purports to have
75discredited.
The extreme post-modern attack on reason, according to which there are no valid
criteria of justification, but only multiple interpretations competing with one another
on the basis of the power they possess, rather than their reasoning, seems to have
gone too far. One can reject the Enlightenment obsession with the certainty offered
by meta-narratives without at the same time giving up all effort to clarify the
conditions "under which we can make reasonable judgments about the plausibility or
7ft
implausibility of an interpretation, or the justness or otherwise of an institution" .
It can be validly argued that no single theory offers an infallible method of rational
appraisal and no single normative standpoint can be valid for all societies and for all
purposes. However, this acceptance of the contextual limits of truth and rationality
does not prove theory to be inconsequential, nor does it discredit all theoretical
attempts to resist the current hyperreality. Critique may not be able to transcend the
historical context within which it has been produced, but once applied reflexively to
the social/legal/political background of its own production, it can provide reasons for
rejecting unreflective consensus or true-seeming ideological beliefs. Thus, giving up
the search for an Archimedean standpoint, does not unavoidably entail giving up all
theoretical resistance and all commitment to the values of rationality, truth and
critique77.
This chapter started with an analysis of the deeply political role of theory and it then
moved in full circle to the post-modem disenchantment with critique, according to
which there is basically no point in theory. I explained that Baudrillard's theory of
simulation gives one of the most accurate accounts of contemporary social reality,
but it is seriously flawed in terms of its normative agenda as it deprives us of any
74 C. Norris, op.cit. fn. 61, p. 379.
73
Besides, if reason does not make sense any longer, how could he ever convince us that his
arguments and his line of reasoning is correct?
76 J.B. Thompson, op. cit. fn. 44, p.26.
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argumentative grounds upon which to challenge the current state of affairs. It is this
intimate complicity with the status quo that I find very interesting, because it refers
back to the very definitional core of ideology.
Baudrillard and his post-modern companions seem to welcome the death of reality
and the consequent death of the subject as a positive development that allows us to
discard all enlightenment illusions regarding the certainty of knowledge, subjectivity
and truth. The death of this supposedly unitary reality (together with the death of its
tools of oppression) is celebrated because it raises our awareness ofmultiplicity, of
the infinite number of co-existing perspectives and their corresponding realities. The
problem, however, is that post-modern theorists, with few exceptions, fail to see the
latent connection between the current state of (non)reality and (non)subjectivity with
political economy and more particularly with commodification.
Debord was one of the first to perceive this sinister link. In his book "The Society of
the Spectacle" he announced the 'materialization of ideology' in the form of the
78
'spectacle', which is 'ideology par excellence'. Going back to Marx, he had
depicted commodity exchange as involving a representation; the recognition of one
object in the image of the object with which it is to be exchanged. At some point this
representation is objectified in the sense that the image of one object is believed to be
objectively present within the body of the object it is exchanged with. This is the
stage of commodity fetishism. Eventually the generalised use ofmoney "as the
universal commodity which secretly represents alienated human activity"79 gives rise
80
to the ideological phenomenon of 'reification' , whereby the relationship between
human beings and things, between the subject and the object, between the ideal and
the material, effectively is distorted. And of course this distortion is intricately
connected with the development of that initial representation involved in commodity
exchange.
77 Habermas for example introduces a type of transcendental pragmatics, which allows for a critique
of existing consensus values. His theory defends critical reason against a consensus view of truth and
meaning. See more about his theory in Chapters 2 and 4.
78 G. Debord, Society ofthe Spectacle, Detroit: Black &Red, 1967, p. 215.
79 D. Hawkes, Ideology, London: Routledge, 1996, p.168.
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Debord, in agreement with this Marxian/Lukacsian analysis, acknowledges that
commodity fetishism and the representation upon which this is based (Debord refers
to this as 'the spectacle') have taken over reality. His account of our current situation
is, in fact, very similar to that given by Baudrillard. " .. .the tangible world is
replaced by a selection of images which exist above it, and which at the same time
O 1
are recognised as the tangible par excellence." Furthermore, "..the real world
changes into simple images, simple images become real beings and effective
motivations of a hypnotic behaviour".82 The prevailing consumerism and
commodification of our societies means that exchange-value is much more important
than use-value or, in other words, the symbolic sphere has taken over the material
one. This distortion is, once again, supported by a very well-organised media-centred
system of advertising strategies that manipulate the needs and the desires of the
(objectified) consumer/subject.
Given his intellectual affinity with Marxism, however, Debord stresses the link
between this post-modern condition and the developments of commodity exchange.
For him the post-modern condition corresponds to a certain level of development of
economic activity, in which the products ofhuman labour, through the mechanisms
of the market, have dominated the lives of human beings. In other words, it is the
intensification of commodification that has brought about "the materialization of
ideology."83 This is why, rather than celebrating the advent of the post-modem
condition, Debord deplores it.
On a similar note, Zizek, too, underlines the link between the post-modem condition
and political economy. He agrees with Debord that advanced commodification is
84
responsible for the un-doing of reality. He then 'revives' the concept of ideology in
order to describe the malign impact of commodity fetishism on the subject. Like
80 Reification is connected mainly with the work ofG. Lukacs. See his book History and Class-
consciousness, Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press., 1971.
81 G. Debord, op.cit. fn 78, p.36.
82 ibid., p. 18.
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ibid., p.217.
84 R. Hawkes, op. cit. fn. 79. p. 177.
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Debord, he accepts that real life itself has become ideological. The problem is not
any longer that ideas do not correspond to material reality, but that material reality
itself is false; it has turned into an objectified illusion.
"Ideology is not simply a 'false consciousness', an illusory representation of reality,
it is rather this reality itselfwhich is already to be conceived as 'ideological'-
'ideological' is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of
its participants as to its essence.... 'Ideological' is not the 'false consciousness' of a
social being but this being in so far as it is supported by 'false consciousness'."85
Thus, for Zizek, the concept of ideology is still meaningful, referring not solely to a
set of ideas, but to the totality of our existence, including material practice.86 His
conclusion regarding the post-modern condition is clear: "Far from containing any
kind of subversive potentials, the dispersed, plural, constructed subject hailed by
post-modern theory...simply designates the form of subjectivity that corresponds to
late capitalism."87 By analogy one could say (and indeed this seems to be Zizek's
argument) that simulation is the ideological form that corresponds to late capitalism.
Similarly Der Derian argues that simulation has come to play the fin de siecle
ideological role once monopolised by imperialism. In his view, the proliferation of
simulation processes "represents -as imperialism did at the turn of the century- the
gravest danger and the greatest deterrent for change in the so-called new world
oo
order". And in order to establish this claim he turns to the historiography of
imperialism and simulation. In his effort to explain why, contrary to Marx's
predictions, the revolution did not take place in Western Europe, Lenin diagnosed
that Western Europe (unlike Russia) had avoided the revolution, because it had
managed, through its imperialistic expansion to the colonies to dilute the intensity of
the reactions against its own capitalist system. In other words, the colonial
imperialism of the European states managed to appease their working classes by
85 S. Zizek, The Sublime Object ofIdeology, New York: Verso, 1989, p. 21.
86
Thompson's definition indeed does not refer to ideas, but to meaning and it can thus accommodate
Zizek's conception of ideology.
87 S. Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique ofIdeology, Durham: Duke
University Press, 1993, p.216.
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exporting and rendering invisible (at least to their own proletariat) the exploitative
nature of capitalism. Simulation today plays a similar role. It dissolves the class
struggle and the commodity form into a play of signs and simulacra. In doing so, it
also brings forward the passivity of the confused masses, the "silent majorities".
In part (d ) of this chapter dissimulation was presented as a mode of operation of
ideology, establishing and sustaining relations of domination by concealing, denying
or obscuring their existence. This process of concealment and denial is obviously
also linked with legitimation. By obscuring the actual relations of domination,
dissimulation tends to represent the overall system ofpower as just and worthy of
support. Simulation, although the opposite of dissimulation, is in fact its postmodern
equivalent. In one case (dissimulation) it is the concealment of the existence of
OQ .
relations of domination that ensures their reproduction, in the other case
(simulation) it is the hyper-real (non) existence ofpolitical power in its entirety that
enables commodification and capitalism to build undisturbed their system of
"invisible" power structures. The simulated existence ofpolitical power effectively
has the same consequences as the dissimulated existence of the relations of
domination; it contributes to the legitimation of the system by presenting it as just.
Despite sharing the same aims with dissimulation, simulation is much more difficult
to decode (the simulacrum has all the signs of the real after all) and, therefore, much
more effective in its ideological function. In fact, simulation is the mode in which
ideology functions most effectively in our highly sophisticated post-modern era. The
significance ofBaudrillard's work ultimately consists in the fact that it illuminates
the present age and its political economy of the sign. By drawing our attention to the
inadequacy of the existing critical theory to analyse the current form of capitalism,
which is organised around configurations of sign value, the theory of simulation
reminds us (this is its positive side-effect, not its aim) that "the classical Marxian
critique ofpolitical economy needs to be supplemented by semiological theories of
the sign."90
88 See also the article by J. Der Derian, "Simulation: the highest stage of capitalism?" in D. Kellner
(ed) Baudrillard: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 189-209.
89 One could say that colonial imperialism relied on the dissimulation of its own relations of
domination.
90 D. Kellner, Baudrillard: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p.3.
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Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to clarify the basic methodological and theoretical
presuppositions that will inform my critique ofEU constitutionalism. I started by
explaining the meaning of immanent critique and by placing it in the centre ofmy
theoretical inquiry. I then clarified that I view theory as praxis that aims to
emancipate society. The largest part of this chapter was devoted to the concept of
ideology. After elucidating some initial terminological ambiguities, which are
connected with the concept's long history, I specified the particular conception of
ideology that I will use in my thesis. Drawing mainly on the work of Thompson,
Eagleton and Marks, I have chosen a critical, political/sociological conception that
refers to all the different "ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain
relations of domination"91.
Given, however, that, even despite discarding its epistemological premises, ideology
is still treated by some as anachronistic, the chapter ended with a quite long excursus
on the end of ideology debate. I focused mainly on the post-modernist theorists who
argue that at the current stage of hyperreality, which is a distortion and effectively an
annihilation of reality, ideology has become meaningless. I rebutted this argument by
stressing the important role commodification has played in the construction of this
hyperreality. Simulation and hyperreality were, thus, exposed to be the highest stages
of capitalism. This latent link with political economy, brought to the fore the capacity
of the hyperreal post-modern condition to sustain relations of domination and, in
doing this, it also verified the deeply ideological role of all attempts to discredit the
theoretical pertinence of ideology.
Through its different modes of operation, ideology makes the social world appear to
those who inhabit it as just, rational, reasonable or natural. Thus, ideology operates
as a defensive confirmation of the past and its practices, narrowing down the
spectrum of choices left open for the future. In what follows, I will throw the
91 J.B. Thompson, op. cit. fn. 44, p.56.
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spotlight on the historical trajectory of the EU with the intention to re-claim some
decision-making space for the future. Chapter 3 will revisit some of the orthodoxies
ofEU constitutionalism, aiming to show how the judicially driven process of
constitutionalization in the EU, conveniently masked and, thereby facilitated a
substitution ofjuridification for politicization at the heart ofEU governance. Chapter
4 will then explore the different ways in which the legal outcome of this
juridification is subordinated to the needs of advanced commodification as expressed
within the Common Market.
This double substitution of the legal for the political and of the economic for the
legal has a twofold effect. First of all, there is a general paralysis of the political in
the EU public space, so much so, that, to paraphrase Baudrillard, political power is in
essence no longer present except to conceal that there are no effective mechanisms
for the exercise ofpolitical power in the EU; the political has entered the hyper-
reality of simulation. And EU constitutionalism is the vehicle par excellence, through
which this simulation has taken place in the EU. At the same time, this simulation of
the political functions in a deeply ideological way, because by making us believe that
the existing system ofpower in the EU is the product of fully legitimated democratic
politics, it distracts our attention from (in fact it renders invisible) the existing
structures ofpolitical economy and the asymmetrical relations of domination that
have been established in one or the other way through them.
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Chapter 2
The EU as a site for democracy and constitutional debate:
theorising the symbiosis of Eros and civilization1
Whatever is given
can always be re-imagined,
however four square
it happens to be
S. Heaney (Frontiers of Writing)
Introduction
As mentioned in the preface, this thesis is a normative critique of the EU
constitutional order. The argument is that the EU, in its current shape, does not fulfil
the conditions necessary for the exercise of the political and as a consequence it
constitutes an insufficient locus for democracy. However, at the same time the
intention here is to affirm the progressive possibilities stemming from the European
project. Despite sharing the concern about the risks for democracy that loom on the
' The terminology employed by Joseph Weiler ("Legal Framework: Bread and Circus, The State of
European Union", 4 (1998) Columbia Journal ofEuropean Law, p. 246) "eros" as a signifier of the
national and "civilization" as a signifier of the universal/supranational, refers to the categories
introduced by Freud. In S. Freud, Civilisation and its discontents, London: Hogarth Press, 1949, the
main argument is that civilization is based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts.
According to Freud, culture constrains not only the societal, but also the biological existence ofman,
the basic instincts ofman, the uncontrollable Eros. This constraint is the very precondition of progress
(transformation of the pleasure principle into the reality principle). Thus, the notion that a non-
repressive civilization is impossible is a cornerstone of Freudian theory. In his book Eros and
Civilization Marcuse employs these same psychological categories as political categories, "..formerly
autonomous and identifiable psychical processes are being absorbed by the function of the individual
in the state- by his public existence. Psychological problems therefore turn into political problems.
Private disorder reflects more directly than ever before the disorder of the whole, and the cure of
personal disorder depends more directly than before on the cure of the general disorder... .the terms of
psychology become the terms of the societal forces which define the psyche. Under these
circumstances, applying psychology in the analysis of social and political events means taking an
approach which has been vitiated by these very events." The argument advanced by Marcuse breaks
this fatal union ofproductivity and destruction and affirms the possibility of using "the social wealth
for shaping man's world in accordance with his life instincts, in the concerted struggle against the
purveyors of death" (H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, London: Abacus, 1972, p. 11). Marcuse
insists that the repressive interrelation between civilisation and repression is not a necessary one, but
results from a specific historical organisation of human existence. Similarly, my argument here does
not view the interrelation between the EU project and its current un-democratic structure as
unavoidable, but as stemming from very particular historical, politico-legal choices.
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European level, I do not accept the conclusion drawn by some that the attempt to
strive for a democratic and coherent EU legal order should therefore be dropped. On
the contrary, I believe that the EU integration has the potential to create new political
arenas and that it can function as an incentive to create new strategies of governance,
which will not be frustrated by overriding economic restraints and which will change
our political self-understanding.
The reasons for the distance between the actual and the potential shape of the EU
will be analysed in detail in the following chapters. There, it will be explained that
the political and democratic deficit of the EU are intricately linked with its flawed
constitutionalisation process. Once this constitutionalising process is decoupled from
the narrative of retrospective inevitability, it will be clear that the current structure of
the EU does not constitute the only viable alternative.
Before I explore the internal inconsistencies and incoherencies of the EU
constitutional order (this will be at the centre ofmy ideology critique as exposed in
Chapter 1), I will tackle first a radically pessimistic and, therefore, debilitating,
external criticism that has been raised against the very possibility of the EU to be an
appropriate site for constitutional debate. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to show
that the reasons for the current deficits are only contingent and not inherent in the
integration project. The central argument here will be a rebuttal of the no-demos
thesis, which if true, would make my project (insofar as it aims to a democratic
reconstruction of the EU) redundant. In the heart of this thesis lies the argument that
the EU can never attain democratic legitimacy due to the absence of a European
people. The argument goes as follows: Democracy is built around the concept of
demos, that is the people or the community ofpersons who are collectively self-
governing. In other words, democracy does not exist in a vacuum, but is premised on
the existence of a demos, by whom and for whom democratic discourse takes place.
The authority and legitimacy of a majority to compel a minority exists only within
political boundaries defined by a demos. Hence, the boundaries within which
democratic governance is to be practiced are not only geographical; they also refer to
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criteria ofmembership to the citizenry/democratic body. The crucial shift in this
argument takes place when the concept of the demos is given a homogeneous twist.
According to the no-demos thesis, as exemplified in the Maastricht Judgement2 of
the German Constitutional Court, some type of homogeneity is required to bind
together the members of a polity. The identity of the people is in this case associated
with common ethnic origin, shared values, language or common cultural habits. Far
from having a single cultural identity, however, the European Union is made up of a
co-existence ofpeoples with particular, varied identities. Thus, when applied to the
project ofEuropean integration, the requirement of homogeneity among the members
of a polity, leads us to pessimistic conclusions as to the prospects of a true
community of Europeans.
In this chapter my aim is to refute the radical pessimism3 of this scenario. Its
pessimism is radical, because the deficit at the level of the demos is "irredeemably
corruptive"4, in the sense that it cannot be remedied as the EU evolves5.1 will agree
with the diagnosis of the no-demos thesis that there is no overriding cultural
convergence among the peoples of the different EU Member States. However, a
different theoretical analysis of the preconditions for the existence of a people will
lead me to a more optimistic prognosis as to the future ofEuropean integration.
2 Brunner et al. v. The European Union Treaty, 1 (1994) Common Market Law Review 51if.
3
According to Neil Walker the No-demos thesis is a characteristic case of constitutional denial.
"Various brands and shades of Euroscepticism have engaged in a symbolic practice of constitutional
denial claiming that the EU is not an appropriate subject for constitutional debate and design. The
concern that motivates this approach is that the very acceptance of the EU as an appropriate site for
constitutional debate should endow that entity with greater authority and momentum as a putative
self-standing polity than is deemed appropriate by the Eurosceptic." See his article "The Idea of
Constitutional Pluralism", 65 (2002) Modern Law Review, p. 317.
41 borrow the term from Neil Walker, op. cit. fn.3, p.321.
5 As Weiler argues "one can, more as an hypothesis than a reality, imagine that should the objective
conditions sufficiently change, and a measure of homogeneity in language, culture, shared historical
experience develop, a subjective consciousness could follow and a new Volk/nation emerge. But
realistically, these mutations are possible in a "geological" time frame-epochal, not generational (my
underlining)." "Does Europe need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht
Decision", 1 (1995) European Law Journal, p.227.
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The emergence of the EU as an "unidentified political object"6 has put into question
the map of our political universe. Resisting stubbornly the existing political dualism
(states and international organizations) and its respective categories, the project of
European integration invites us to challenge our shared political understandings. The
task is bigger than it seems, because hidden theoretical premises in political life have
the tendency to assume the status of naturalness and to transform themselves into
rigid orthodoxies. Political integration and its corollary notions of identity, loyalty,
citizenship and democratic participation have remained exclusively within the
nation-state and have not been projected to the supra/post- national level. For this
reason, there is an enduring tendency to measure the normative shortcomings of the
EU against the procrustean benchmark set by national and statist standards. It is more
than obvious, however, that the nation-state models cannot serve in any meaningful
way as interpretive schemata for a supra-national entity. By defending the viability of
democracy at the level of the EU, this chapter effectively explores the philosophical
potential of the Union to challenge the inherited forms of the state.
As Curtin puts it "the European Union can only become a conceivable or identifiable
political object at the price of a considerable effort of re-imagination or re-
conceiving of fundamental 'shared understandings'."7 In order to arrive at the
requisite effort of re-imagination, we need to separate a number of ideas and images
that have conditioned our understanding of a political culture. The conceptual
couples of state and nation, culture and political identity, nationality and citizenship,
nation and sovereignty need to be disentangled. These have remained with the
nation-state and now the challenge is to project them beyond that level. And
although the purpose of the exercise is not "to make a bonfire of the certainties" that
have accompanied our conception of a political community so far, we need to go
6 P. Thibaud, "L' Europe, Essai d' identification", Esprit, Nov. 1991, p.47.
7 See D. Curtin, Postnational Democracy, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997, p.3. In Curtin's
view this exercise of re-conceptualising the inertial frame of reference of the nation-state resembles
the exposure of the limits of the inertial frame of reference on which Newtonian physics were once
thought to depend. For Newton space was absolute, always similar and immovable. It was only in the
late 20th century that Stephen Hawking localised the applications of the Newtonian theory and
revealed the fragmentation and indeterminacy of space. The new theories are shifting old perspectives
and opening up new perspectives for the future.
8 ibid., p.5.
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beyond the limits of the nation-state9 and employ different variables in the re¬
organisation of our political space.
I will start with the "infamous"10 Brunner/Maastricht judgement of the German
Constitutional Court. It seems that since 1994, when it was passed, this judgement
has been at the centre of the theoretical debate concerning different perspectives of
European integration. To participate in this overflowing debate is a risk, because it
seems that everything has already been said one too many times. I am willing,
however, to take this risk, because I believe that this judgement offers a very good
map of the jurisprudential issues connected with the feasibility of creating a
European identity, the uncertainty about the ingredients that can be used to invent
such an identity and its compatibility with the already existing national identities.11
At this point I will limit myself to a brief exposition of the decision and I will try to
de-codify its hidden theoretical premises regarding the identity of a community. I
will then connect its underlying theory with the wider debate concerning nationalism.
This will bring me to the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism. Ethnic
nationalism is grounded in attachment to a pre-political community of descent, while
civic nationalism expresses devotion to political principles and values. Habermas's
theory of constitutional patriotism, considered to be one of the most prominent
accounts of civic nationalism, will be suggested as an alternative to the Maastricht
judgement's conceptualisation of identity. I will examine in particular whether the
sort of commitment constitutional patriotism involves, is thick enough to foster
social solidarity and to offer a satisfactory basis for the affective dimensions of
political life in the EU.
Having defended both the feasibility and the desirability of a non-cultural political
identity for the EU, I will then argue that such an identity should not be seen as a
magnified replication of the civic national ones, but as a qualitatively different,
9
See N. McCormick, "Beyond the nation-state", 56 (1993) Modern Law Review, pp. 1-18.
10 M. Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: on the necessary cunning of constitutional
reasoning", 4 (1998) European Law Journal, p.390.
" See B. Lafan, "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe", 1 (1996) Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, pp. 8Iff.
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transcendental identity, which not only re-defines actual political boundaries, but
also re-defines the very concept ofboundaries. I will, thus, suggest that any emerging
European identity should be civic and post-national. The choice ofpost-nationalism
as a theoretical framework for the EU will be based on its implications both at the
national and the sub-national level. Apart from promoting a symbiotic relationship
between the national and the supra-national (meaning that the European identity will
not effectively replace the existing national ones), by raising our sensitivity to
difference, post-nationalism also has the potential to empower sub-national, regional
and local claims to self-government.
a) The Maastricht Urteil: the hidden ethnos
1 9
Mr. Manfred Brunner and others raised a challenge to the validity ofGermany's
accession to the Maastricht Treaty on the ground that the Union Treaty was capable
of infringing the right conferred on them by Article 38(1) of the German
Constitution. According to Art. 38(1), Germans have "the individually assertable
right to participate in the election of deputies to the Bundestag (German
Parliament)". This right, which is declared by Art. 79(3), in conjunction with Art.
20(1) and (2) to be unassailable, allows the citizens to cooperate in the legitimation
of state power and to have an influence over its exercise. The constitutional
complaint in this case was that the complainants' rights as arising from article 38 of
the constitution would be infringed if the transfer of powers from the Bundestag to
the institutions of the European Union reduced the content of legitimation of state
power beyond the limits set by articles 79(3) and 23(1) of the German Constitution.13
In other words the argument was that, if the Bundestag surrendered a big part of its
functions and powers on legislation to the European organs, this would make the fore
12 "The others" in this case were Members of the European Parliament elected in Germany, who
made, however, the complaint as citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany.
13 These effectively define the substance of the guarantee provided by the right established under Art.
38. In particular Art. 23(1) of the Constitution enables the federal legislature, under the conditions
there specified, to grant the Union the right to exercise sovereign powers independently up to the
limits imposed by article 79(3), which declares the democratic principle unassailable.
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mentioned right ofMr. Brunner and every other German citizen devoid of any
substantive content.
I do not need to analyse here in detail this case, which is well known and has been
subjected to extensive commentary. I will just reconstruct the main arguments of the
German Constitutional Court, which expressed quite explicitly the view that the
nation-state is the ideal, or rather, the sole for the time being, locus for democracy.
The German Court in this case was concerned with the dangers involved in the
process ofEuropean integration, and in particular with the potential threat that the
Maastricht Treaty posed to the democratic character of the German polity. The Court
addressed the potential for democratisation of the European Union at the European
level and its conclusions were very sceptical as to any hope for the future. The
Court's scepticism was at the end of the day informed by the No-demos thesis, which
again rests on a certain constitutional understanding of the German polity.
Let us have a closer look at the arguments put forward in this case. The decision
delivered by the German Constitutional Court on the compatibility of the Maastricht
Treaty with the German Constitution interprets the principle of democracy as
requiring that each and every execution of sovereign rights derive directly from the
people of the state (Staatsvolk). Furthermore, the framing of the political will of the
people postulates the existence of a form of public opinion, which can only be
created through the free exchange of ideas and an on-going process of interaction
between social forces and interests.
"Democracy, if it is not to remain a merely formal principle of accountability, is
dependent on the presence of certain pre-legal conditions, such as a continuous free
debate opposing social forces, interests and ideas, in which political goals also
become clarified and change course, out ofwhich comes a public opinion which
forms the beginnings ofpolitical intentions. That also entails that the decision¬
making processes of the organs exercising sovereign powers and the various political
objectives pursued can be generally perceived and understood and therefore that the
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citizen entitled to vote can communicate in his own language with the sovereign
authority to which he is subject." 4
The Court observes that such factual conditions do not yet exist in the EU and this
leads the judges to the conclusion that in the meantime (until the necessary
institutional framework is put in place in the EU) democratic legitimation ultimately
stems from the parliaments of the Member States.15 According to the Court's
reasoning, and this is the interesting twist, in contrast to the EU, the Member States
satisfy the conditions of social interaction, because they enable their respective
peoples to develop and express what binds them together -"to a greater or lesser
degree of homogeneity- spiritually, socially and politically".16
The truth is that contrary to the accusations that have been levelled against it, the
German Court avoids the overt language ofnationalism17 and the vocabulary of
chauvinism. Instead it presents itself as adopting a position that guarantees the
democratic nature of the polity as framed by the German Constitution. Hence, prima
facie the German Court is not the defender ofGermany's national particularism, but
the guarantor of the universal values of democracy as expressed in the country's
constitution. The Court puts forward the idea that a democratic state is inconceivable
without a democratic society and that institutionalised opinion and will formation
processes of the demos depend on supplies coming from the informal contexts of
communication found in civil society.
14 Para CI 2b bl.
15 Besides, the Member States are viewed as the Masters of the Treaty.
16 Para C I 2b b2.
l7Anthony Smith for example argues that although modernity has changed in significant ways the
ethnic foundations of the modem nation-state, by adding important civic elements to it, ethnicity still
plays an important role. The unity of a nation is ultimately founded on the historical collective
memories and most importantly on the pre-modem myths referring to its ethnic origins. Unlike Smith,
the German Constitutional Court does not refer to ethnicity. For an analysis of Smith's arguments see
A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins ofNations, Oxford: Blackwell and A. Smith, 1986 and "National
Identity and the Idea of European Unity", 68 (1992) International Affairs, pp.55-76. Other writers,
e.g. Isensee do not consider common ethnic origin as an indispensable feature of a state, but as the
optimal condition both to the state and to democracy. I.Isensee "Abschied der Demokratie vom
Demos. Auslanderwahlrecht als Identitaetsfrage fuer Volk, Demokratie und Verfassung" in Festschrift
PaulMikat, 1989, pp. 705-740, at 109.
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The authors of the Maastricht judgement are aware that "the Staatsvolk which they
regard as the only basis for democratic authority and legitimate law-making might be
understood in the light of the elements used to define the notion ofVolk by the
romantic movement dominant at the beginning of the last century (a natural whole
having an origin and a destiny of its own)"18. They, thus, try to avoid this risk by
placing emphasis on "the indispensable nature of a political discourse and the
conditions that make it possible, that is to say a widespread and elaborate
communications system or the existence of "mediatory" agencies (political parties,
institutes of learning, interest groups of all sorts)".19 However, this endeavour fails as
is easy to see from the passage of the decision referring to the "spiritual, social and
political homogeneity"20 of the people.
According to the Maastricht judgement's line of reasoning, the people of a polity
have a subjective socio-psychological component, which is necessarily conditioned
on some objective elements. The subjective manifestation refers to the collective
feeling of social cohesion, shared identity and destiny. This, however, presupposes
and is grounded upon the existence of certain objective elements such as common
ethno-cultural criteria (common language, common history, common culture), which
express the people's "existential sameness"21.
As Christian Joerges observes, although ".. .the judgement contains Kantian passages
that are open to a further development of the EC's political system.. ..the link
between democracy and the nation-state is then constructed in such a Herderian22
18 F. Mancini, "Europe: The Case for Statehood", 4 (1998) European Law Journal, p.34.
19 ibid.
20
Op. cit. fn. 16.
21 "Existentieller Gemeinsamkeit" is the expression used by the BVerfG in the Brunner case [1994],
1CMLR at para 56.
22 Herder is a representative of the German romantic thought. His aim was to oppose the universalism
of the Enlightenment. His point of departure was quite simple: only language makes man human. Man
is defined by his language capacity. On the one hand, language can only be learnt in a community and,
on the other hand, language is synonymous with thought. But if language is thought and if it can only
be learnt in a community, it follows that each community has its own mode of thought. In fact, if each
language is a different way of expressing universal values, then it is also the manifestation of unique
values and ideas. The same logic is then applied to customs, traditions, ceremonies and the like, each
ofwhich can be considered as another sort of language. Community is, however, more than the mere
collection of all these parts; it has a unity of its own. The main theme in his theory is the quest for
authenticity. In his view language mirrors the national soul and to purge the language of alien
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way that a democratic supranationality becomes inconceivable". The insistence on
language and homogeneity in particular implies that the unity of the people is
postulated. The people as a bearer of democratic order are bound together by a
social, spiritual and political homogeneity and form a pre-given existential unity.
Turning to Europe it is obvious that the conditions required for the existence of a
political community, as described in the Maastricht Judgement, are not fulfilled. First
of all there is no European public. The decisions made at the European level are not
the outcome of a generalised European wide debate, but very often the result of
bureaucratic compromises. The European Union is far from constituting a common
European public sphere. As Meyer has put it, "...there is nothing like a European
wide discourse of the key issues of the European agenda which connects the
arguments and counter arguments, competing opinions and interpretations on a
European scale, so that arguments from various national, regional or sectoral quarters
of the EU can regularly, continually and in a sufficiently structured manner meet and
form something like a European public opinion."24
A European wide integrated public sphere entails public communication
transcending the boundaries of so far limited national public spheres. This will
include a European wide civil society with interest associations, non-governmental
organisations, citizens' movements, etc. interconnected with but at the same time
with a separate existence from the national public spheres. The creation of a
European political public sphere will involve a process of nesting smaller (national
and local) public spheres in a larger (European) one.25
impurities was to defend the national soul against subversion by foreign values. The political
implications of these ideas are easy to guess: national communities are unique formations, which may
have forgotten their true natures, but they need to recover and reclaim their true, authentic selves.
Authenticity is prior to the community and restrains any changes to its identity. For a more detailed
analysis see J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993,
pp. 56-64.
23 C. Joerges "Taking the law seriously: on political science and the role of law in the process of
European Integration", 2 (1996) European Law Journal, p. 115.
24T. Meyer, "European public sphere and societal politics" in M. Telo (ed.), Democratie et
Construction Europeenne, Brussells: Universite de Bruxelles, 1995, pp. 123, 126.
25 The emergence of civil society at the European level, although still nascent, is a significant factor in
the construction of a public sphere. Curtin suggests that the transformation of our shared
understandings may be enabled by advanced information technology. Apart from being a means of
communication that facilitates the dialogue among the citizens, cyberspace also underlines the
irrelevance of borders and thus offers an exercise in re-imagining political communities, op. cit. fn. 7,
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In Europe there has been a limited harvest in terms of social cohesion. Neither a
European public, nor a European debate, are detectable . Today such conditions
exist only within the nation-state due to its homogeneity. On such a definition there
is of course no demos at the European level, nor is there any likelihood that there will
be one in the near future. But democracy is premised on the very existence of a
demos, by whom and for whom, democratic discourse takes place. Consequently,
thus goes the German Constitutional Court's argument, democracy cannot be
constituted at the level of the EU itself, but only at the level of the individual
member-states.
The gist of this argument is that, since there is no European people now, the
European parliament is by definition not a popular representative body. As a result
an excessive transfer of functions and powers from the national level to the European
institutions will weaken democracy in the Member States. On the other hand, to
strengthen the European Parliament's powers cannot counterbalance the loss of
democracy on the national level. On the contrary, the empowerment of the European
Parliament may actually exacerbate legitimacy problems in the sense that a
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parliament without a corresponding demos is no less despotic than an emperor.
What is, however, much more alarming is that apart from the conclusions drawn by
the Court as to the existence of a European demos here and now (I would willingly
agree - in fact this is the gist ofmy argument- that in the current state of affairs
democracy cannot be sufficiently constituted at the level of the EU), the Court's
reasoning has important implications as to any attempt to conceptualise European
identity in the future. Democracy is possible in the Member States, because a
homogeneous construction renders them socially coherent. Europe lacks cultural
pp. 59-61. Similarly Weiler views the internet as the starting point for the emergence of a functioning
deliberative political community, a European "polity-cum-civic-society" and proposes the
implementation of what he calls "Lexcalibur: the European public square". See J. Weiler, The
Constitution ofEurope, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 350-353.
26 F. Mancini, op. cit. fn. 18, p. 33.
27 The Court seems to contradict itself, because it suggests that a strengthening of the powers of the
parliament will add to the democratic legitimacy of the Union. However, if it were consistent with its
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homogeneity and is therefore denied cohesion. Hence, the democratic deficit of
Europe is inborn and cannot be realistically removed, "within a timeframe, which is
other than geological".28
This so-called no-demos thesis, as expressed by the members of the German
Constitutional Court, is much more pervasive in its critique than the classical
analysis of the European democratic deficit in that one can proclaim the latter and
still accept the possibility of the emergence of a truly democratic European Union
(provided that its institutional shortcomings will be overcome), while the Maastricht
decision of the German Court rejects this possibility for as long as a relative
homogeneity is not achieved.
The position of the Court has been that in the interest of a coherent legal system it
alone has the power to review and annul Community measures on any grounds,
including lack of competences. In the same way the competence to determine the
competence of the European organs, the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz, cannot
lay within these organs. The German Constitutional Court in this decision reserved
for itself the ultimate authority in issues of democratic control of the German people
and although Mr. Brunner's challenge to the validity of the German ratification of
the Treaty failed, future challenges might actually be upheld, should the European
organs adopt an expansionist view of their competences. Strangely enough, it is
because the Court adopts a uni-dimensional approach and sees sovereignty as still
lying on the national level that it rejected Mr. Brunner's claim. It is in my view
surprising and at the same time ironic that the Court's final approval of the already
existing European Community can be seen as compatible with the non-existence of a
European demos.
A further, very important implication of the above judgement is that one cannot think
of a European demos without the replacement of the various Member States demoi.
Hence the future ofEuropean integration poses a huge threat for the existing
own line of reasoning (negation of a European demos), it should be denouncing the representation of
the peoples of the individual states by a European parliament as an exercise of hollow rhetoric.
28 J. Weiler, op. cit. fn.5, p. 227.
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European nations. If the only way to think of a demos is in terms of homogeneity,
this fear is inevitable. It seems that on the judges' reading there are only two options
available: either a European state or a Union of states. This attitude clearly precludes
a simultaneity ofmultiple identities which would be based on polycentric thinking.
b) From ethnic to civic nationalism
From a theoretical point of view, there are two opposing conceptions ofnation,
which have been the basis for the development of two different types ofnationalism.
According to the classical usage, nations are communities ofpeople of the same
descent, who are integrated geographically in the form of settlements or
neighbourhoods and culturally by their common language, customs and traditions,
but who are not yet politically integrated through the organisational form of the
state.29 This is the organic conception of a nation, which has given birth to ethnic
nationalism.
On the other hand, the French revolution transformed the meaning of nation from a
pre-political quantity into a constitutive feature of the political identity of the citizens
of a democratic polity. From that point in history onwards the intentional democratic
community has taken the place of the ethnic complex. The nation of citizens finds its
identity not in ethnic and cultural commonalities but in the practice of citizens who
actively exercise their rights to participation and communication. This change
marked the passing from ascribed nationality to an achieved one, which demanded a
high degree ofpersonal commitment and was, thus, a conscious product of one's
own efforts30.
29 J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe", 12
(1992) Praxis International, pp. 3-6.
30 For a civic formulation of the nation see E. Renan, "What is a nation?" in A. Zimmern (ed.) Modern
Political Doctrines, London: Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 9-10. According to Renan's classical
description the state is a daily plebiscite. Corresponding to the two different conceptions of nation
(ethnic-civic), the formulation of the modem state as a nation-state has accordingly taken two
extremely different meanings, whose ideal types are best represented by France and Germany.
According to the French concept the nation is a purely political community; it consists of the active
citizenry. In the German (and East-European) model, the nation is viewed as a pre-political
community of individuals who are bound to each other on the basis of their natural (blood) or cultural
(language, history, literature or religion) particularities.
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This civic form of nationalism has in its turn been given two different formulations
in the liberal and the republican traditions. According to the former, the element of
commonality required for the existence of a community, stems from the consensus of
its members upon a set ofprocedural rules, which in our pluralistic societies are
expressed in the constitution. In contrast to the liberal view, the republican one puts
the emphasis on the self-organisation of the community through its citizens' exercise
of their rights to participation and communication. On this republican reading, it is
the very participation in self-rule and not the granting ofpolitical rights that is of
essence for freedom and for cohesion. Hence, liberalism understands the dignity of a
person in terms of human rights, while republicanism understands it in terms of self-
rule. Liberalism conceives of society as made up of individuals with life plans, based
on their conceptions of the good but without a commonly held conception espoused
by the society itself. In republicanism the citizens have a deeper patriotic
identification with their regime. This patriotism involves, beyond convergent values,
a love of the particular. It is a common identification with a historical community
founded on certain values.
Ifwe try to locate the German Constitutional Court's position within this theoretical
framework, we are confronted with a problem. The Court's reasoning seems to be
defying the clear-cut distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism.31 On the one
hand it uses the language of civic nationalism by resorting to the symbolically laden
vocabulary of democracy32 and, on the other, it appeals to a linguistic (and therefore
cultural) homogeneity, an existential unity.
31 C. Laborde dismisses the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism as simplistic and
unhelpful. In her view national identity is a complex, multi-layered phenomenon, which eludes any
either-or approach. She identifies instead four layers of identity in a national community. The first one
is that of ethnic, primordial links based on birth and kinship. The second is that of the broad culture,
language, ways of life and social customs characteristic of a particular community. The third is that of
the political culture embodied in political institutions, practices, symbols, ideological and rhetorical
traditions and so forth. The fourth level finally is that of abstract, universalist political ideals and
procedures usually expressed in the form of general principles outlined in the constitution. Laborde
argues that levels two and three of the pyramid of identity provide a better account of what in practice
binds people together than either levels one and four, upon which ethnic and civic accounts
concentrate exclusively. C. Laborde, "From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism", paper delivered in the
Exeter Colloquium, 24-25 November 2000.
32
Strangely enough, to set as a pre-condition for the framing of the political will the formation of
public opinion through the free exchange of ideas and an ongoing process of interaction between
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Dieter Grimm (a member himselfof the Federal Constitutional Court ofGermany)
offers a civic interpretation of the Maastricht Judgement and rejects a European
Constitution on the basis that there is, as yet, no European demos.33 His arguments
seem to offer an expanded and more sophisticated version of the German
constitutional decision. It is thus useful to follow them a little closer and see if they
offer a satisfactory answer to the objections raised earlier.
Grimm hastily distances himself from the concept of a homogeneous in organic
terms "Volksgemeinschaft". He clarifies that the people of any democracy do not
constitute a community with a pre-given unity and will, but are permeated by
divergences of opinion and interest. Consequently, a mediation process is needed in
order to reach a temporary unity, expressed by a majority decision. However, the
parliamentary process does not by itself guarantee democratic structures. Given that
the voters' individual preferences are not adequately expressed in the electoral option
between vaguely defined parties, the party-recruited parliament cannot reflect the
multiplicity of social interests. Hence, the parliamentary process needs to be
grounded on a social process of interest mediation that enables the individuals and
the social associations to influence the decisions of the state bodies. This mediation
process, guaranteeing constant interaction between people and state is enabled
through a communication system, which creates the public needed for any general
opinion forming and democratic participation. The success of democratic institutions
does not only depend upon the intrinsic excellence of their regulation, but also upon
the external conditions for their effectiveness. Without the constant interaction
between people and the state the democratic substance is lacking even if its forms
(e.g. function of the parliament) are present. At the European level these mediatory
social forces and interests is a very Habermasian approach. Besides, the judges refer to Herman Heller
as an authority for their proposition regarding the homogeneity of the Demos. In Weiler's terms, given
that Heller was "socialist, anti-fascist, Jew, critic of Schmitf', this choice amounts to an attempt to
find "a kosher seal of approval for this late Twentieth Century version, albeit anaemic and racially
neutral of what in far away times fed the slogan ofBlood (Volk) and Soil (Staat)". See J. Weiler, op.
cit. fn. 5, p.223.
33 D. Grimm, "Does Europe need a Constitution?", 1 (1995) European Law Journal, p. 288.
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mechanisms seem to be completely absent. There is no European system ofparties,
no European associations or citizens' movements34 and no European media.
According to Grimm, the prospects for Europeanisation of the communication
system are absolutely non-existent. This is due to the fact that communication is
bound up with language35 and so is the participation in democratic procedures. The
co-existence of so many different languages and the absence of one language
covering a majority of the population imply that the majority of community citizens
do not have a direct understanding in a Europe-wide communication. "They are
instead participatively restricted and therefore disadvantaged in the European
opinion-forming and interest-mediation process, which suffers much more than any
national one from remoteness from its base."36 Thus, Grimm downplays in his
analysis the requirement of cultural homogeneity viewed as a prerequisite for the
existence of a demos by the German Constitutional Court and attempts to restrict it to
linguistic homogeneity, viewed in its turn as a sine qua non for the development of
the political identity of the people it refers to.
The existence ofmultilingual states like Switzerland, Belgium or Finland does not
provide for Grimm sufficient evidence that a European communication system can
be feasible. He firmly believes that linguistic diversity is an insuperable impediment
to the formation of a European communication system and a corresponding European
political discourse. His argument appeals to quantitative differences (the European
Union has 370 million inhabitants and more than 12 official languages) and
differences ofhistorical context (e.g. Switzerland had formed a national identity well
34
Paradoxically enough, the first such movement seems to be the anti-globalisation movement.
Although not strictly European andmainly opposed to the idea of globalisation, it views the EU as a
major player in the game of globalisation and its recent massive demonstrations in Gothenborg and
Genova mobilised mainly the European public. In this sense it is ironic that the first movement that
seems to be able to transcend the political and linguistic borders in Europe is directed against the EU.
Could it be that the significant other in opposition to which the European people will gain a sense of
identity will be none else but the EU herself?
35
Similarly Smith argues that "given the multiplicity of language groups and ethnic heritages in
Europe it is reasonable to expect the persistence of strong ethnic sentiments.. .fuelled by the quest for
ethnic traditions and cultural heritages of distinctive myths, memories and symbols" in "National
Identity and the Idea of European Unity", 68 (1992) International Affairs, pp. 65, 74.
36 J. Weiler, op. cit. fn. 5, p. 205.
60
before constitutionalisation and could thus relate its multilingual political discourse
to it).
As for the quantitative difference, this does not substantiate any incommensurability
between the EU and any other multi-lingual state. The co-existence of so many
European languages may make things more difficult or more costly, but does not
preclude the emergence of a European communication system (either respecting the
existing linguistic diversity or promoting some lingua franca for the EU citizens
alongside their mother tongues). As for the historical reasons, these could establish
some qualitative incommensurability, if only they were grounded on solid theoretical
analysis. However, this is not the case here as Grimm only mentions en passant the
case of Switzerland's pre-constitutional formation of national identity and there is no
account for the existence of other multi-lingual countries. Therefore, I do not think
that the reasons given by Grimm are conclusive as to the impossibility of creating a
European communication system.
Interestingly enough, Karl Deutsch uses the very same example of Switzerland to
illustrate how the co-existence of different languages is not an obstacle to the
development of a sense of community. Deutsch articulated a theory according to
which social communication is the key factor to building and sustaining
communities. For him, "membership in a people essentially consists in wide
complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate
more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects with members of one large
T 7
group than with outsiders". Deutsch accepts the role of language, territorial
residence, traditions, habits, historical memories and the like in the enhancement of a
people's communication ability. At the same time, however, he points out certain
empirical examples (the linguistic diversity of Switzerland is one of these), which
belie the necessary connection of any of these features with nationhood. He
37 K.W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An inquiry into thefoundations of
Nationality, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966, p.97.
61
concludes that no simple factor's presence or absence can guarantee the development
TO
of a sense of community.
This theory, unlike the one put forward by the German Constitutional Court or
Grimm, does not view linguistic homogeneity as a sine qua non for communication
and, hence, offers a more optimistic prospective about European integration.
Effectively, it views an increased quantity of communication within the EU
combined with a set of "learned memories, symbols, habits, operating preferences
TQ
and facilities" as an adequate integrative element. A wider European community is
bound to grow out of the separate ethno-national groups over a long-term process.
Paul Howe40, on the other hand, raises the objection that people can develop the
sense ofbelonging to the European community without necessarily dissociating
themselves from their particular national features and developing a European nation.
Deutsch's theory fails to capture the very essence of communication in the modern
liberal community. For Deutsch the ability to a high degree of communication is
constitutive of community, whereas for Howe the ability to communicate is
reflective of our human solidarity and only secondarily formative of integration. In
other words the quality of our communication is affected by our perception of the
boundaries of our community. Swiss people communicate efficiently, because they
believe they are members of the same community and not vice-versa. Of course the
establishment of a good network of communication contributes to a further forging
of the sense ofbelongingness to the same group, but it cannot create it ex nihilo.
There is another serious objection against Grimm's arguments. Ifwe take language
to be the basis for the collective identity of a people, despite our insistence on
38
J. Breuilly challenges this view. He remarks that intensified communications between individuals
and groups can as often lead to an increase in internal conflict as to an increase in solidarity. For a
more detailed analysis see J. Breuilly, op. cit. fn. 22, pp. 406-407. If a community's cohesion is based
on its communication ability, then it becomes clear that superior communication networks are of vital
importance. Deutsch does not clarify though whether the superiority of the communication networks
consists in the size of their quantity, the level of their quality or an optimum equilibrium between the
two.
39 K.W. Deutsch, op. cit. fn. 37, p. 174.
40 P. Howe, "A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings", 1 (1995) Journal of
Common Market Studies, pp. 35-42.
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democratic discourse, we automatically make this identity dependent upon
something existing prior to the democratic process itself. So in a way, we premise the
feeling of belongingness on a pre-political substrate, something already shared
between the members of a community before they even obtain membership.
Habermas makes this point very clear in his comment on Grimm's "communicative
approach". "To be sure, a politically constituted context of solidarity among citizens
who despite remaining strangers to one another are supposed to stand up for each
other is a communicative context rich in prerequisites. On this point there is no
dissent".41 But then he describes the prerequisites for the communicative context as
follows: "The core is formed by a political public sphere which enables citizens to
take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance.. ..This
public sphere must be embedded in the context of a freedom-valuing political culture
and be supported by a liberal associational structure of a civil society. Socially
relevant experience from still intact private spheres must flow into such a civil
society so that they may be processed there for public treatment. The political parties
-not state-dependent- must remain rooted in this complex so as to mediate between
the spheres of informal public communication, on the one hand, and the
institutionalised deliberation and decision processes, on the other."42 Hence the
functional requirements of democratic will formation, as identified in the above
citation, are: a political public sphere embedded in a political culture that values
freedom and a system ofpolitical parties that allows the interaction between civil
society and public decision-making processes.
Habermas accepts that the fulfilment of these criteria is scarce in the nation-state
framework and is even more problematic for Europe. He insists, however, that to
regard a pre-political collective identity/substrate (such is language) as necessary for
democratic procedures, amounts to accepting a very concretistic understanding of the
people and ultimately rests upon some type of cultural homogeneity. He concludes
that the political self-understanding of citizens in a democratic community should not
be taken as a historical-cultural a priori, but should be seen as generated by political




institutions 43 Therefore it is to be expected that the political institutions to be created
by a European constitution would have an inducing effect in the framing of a EU
political will. Under this approach, there is no reason why a EU constitution could
not generate the political communicative context necessary for a democracy.
This view obviously reverses the pessimism of the no-demos thesis, since it regards
the emergence of a European demos as independent of any cultural substrata and as
solely connected with the framing of a European Constitution. Grimm's fear of a
European constitution is premised upon his acceptance of the impossibility of
political self-constitution at the European level. Habermas on the other hand, grounds
the very possibility of creating a European demos on the framing of a EU
constitution. More about the EU constitution will be said in the next chapters. I will
now turn to the theory of constitutional patriotism, which, although not explicitly
mentioned in the Habermasian critique ofGrimm's exposition, informs the above
thoughts.
c) The model of constitutional patriotism
The concept of constitutional patriotism has been developed within the context of the
recently emerged debate between ethnic nationalists and communitarians, on the one
hand, and civic nationalists, on the other.44 Ethnic nationalists and communitarians
argue that a commitment to the cultural community and its way of life is required for
social integration. This expresses the need for a commitment to the people viewed as
an ethnos. In opposition to this, civic nationalists argue in favour of an attachment to
the demos and a commitment to the universalistic political principles of the nation-
43 ibid.
44
For the arguments of the ethnic nationalists and communitarians see among others H. van
Gunsteren, "Admission to Citizenship", 98 (1988) Ethics, pp.731-741, C. Taylor "The Politics of
Recognition" in A. Gutman (ed) Multiculturalism and the Politics ofRecognition, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994, pp.25-75, M. Walzer, Spheres ofJustice, New York: Basic Books,
1983. Representatives of the other camp are J. Cohen, "Changing Paradigms ofCitizenship and the
Exclusiveness of the Demos", 14 (1999) International Sociology, pp.245-268, S. Benhabib, "Citizens,
Residents and Aliens in a changing world: Political Membership in the Global Era", 66 (1999) Social
Research, pp.709-744, A. Appadurai, "Full Attachment", 10 (1998) Public Culture, pp.443-449.
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state. Civic nationalism thus intends to increase social inclusiveness and open a space
for cultural pluralism in our highly heterogeneous societies.
It is against this background45 that Habermas46 argues in favour of the attachment to
the political culture47. His idea of constitutional patriotism is taken to be a
commitment to abstract universal principles that can serve as a least common
denominator among a "diversity of cultural life-forms, ethnic groups, religions and
40 # t ,
world-views". Such an approach, unlike other forms ofpatriotism and nationalism
puts the emphasis on a set of universal norms rather than a concrete historical
community. In doing so, it does not generate irrational hostility toward people and
groups whom it positions as its others49 and it renders political affect safe for
(liberal) democracy. In the context of the EU, constitutional patriotism urges us to
explore the possibility of a political union held together by willing subscription to a
system of authority created and maintained by a constitution.50
The concept of constitutional patriotism as expressed in Habermas's writings has
been the object of a very animated debate. Built upon a set of universal norms rather
than a historical community, it is accepted that constitutional patriotism avoids the
excesses ofpolitical affect as associated with the pre-political unity of the
Volksnation. But if its abstract universal principles are insulated from historical and
45 For a comprehensive, critical overview of the different theories on nationalism see U. Ozkirimli,
Theories ofNationalism, A critical Introduction, London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000.
46 The term constitutional patriotism does not appear in Habermas's work until the 80s when he
participated in the Historikerstreit. For more information see below in this chapter p. 67.
47 Habermas's "discourse theory of law and democracy" (see for example his book Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw and Democracy, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT
Press, 1996) is a reworking of Kant's effort to reconcile universalistic aspirations with the diversity of
national cultures. Having had the benefit of two hundred years' hindsight, Habermas manages to alter
Kant's project of conceptual reconciliation in important aspects. For an account ofKant's views on
cosmopolitanism and nationalism see H. Reiss (ed) Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991 and especially the essays "Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan
purpose", "On the common saying: this may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice"and
"Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch".
48 J. Habermas, "The European Nation State. Its Achievements and its Limitations. On the Past and
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", 9 (1996) Ratio Juris, pp.125-137. On the abstract and
procedural character of constitutional patriotism, see J. Habermas " Historical consciousness and post-
traditional identity" inNicholsen (ed) New Conservatism, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, p.261.
49 See P. Markell "On Constitutional Patriotism", 28 (2000) Political Theory, p.44.
50 A. Ingram "Constitutional Patriotism", 22 (1996) Philosophy and Social Criticism, p.2, J.
Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: some reflections on the future of Europe", 12 (1992)
Praxis International, p.17.
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cultural context, the question then becomes whether these can provide a sufficient
basis for identification and passionate attachment with a concrete historical
community. This seems to be the argument around which most criticisms against
constitutional patriotism converge; it is too thin to provide a solid basis for the
affective dimensions ofpolitical life and thus to foster social solidarity. The
exchange of "the dangerous romance ofpolis and patria for the calm certitudes of
reason"51 has been rejected as unsustainable, because abstract principles cannot
possibly serve as a foundation ofnational pride and collective self-esteem. Or at least
so goes the argument.
But before I analyse any further the criticisms concerning the ability of constitutional
patriotism to sustain the cohesion of a community, it is useful to situate constitutional
patriotism in the context ofHabermas's wider opus. Going as back as 1974,
Habermas is interested in the conditions of rationality, which are imposed by
modernity. His concern seems to be that modernity "introduces an inevitable
cleavage between ego-identity derived from universalistic structures and collective
identity bound up with a particular community".52 On the one hand, the entities
possessing an identity-forming power (e.g. family, tribe, city, state, nation) cannot
justify their boundaries on the basis of universalistic norms and, on the other hand, if
these loci ofpassionate identification ceased to exist, "universalistic morality, in the
same way as the ego structures consistent with it, would remain a mere postulate".53
Habermas's solution to the above tension is an optimistic one. He suggests that the
basic norms of rational discourse, upon which the universalistic morality of
modernity rests, could themselves become the foundation of a new form of collective
identity through which universal principles would acquire effectiveness and social
reality.54 This marks the passage from a stage of conventional, blind identification
with traditional groups and corresponding roles (the individual secures identity only
51 P. Markell, op. cit. fn.49, p.38.
52 J. Habermas "Koennen komplexe Gesellschaften eine rationale Identitaet ausbilden?" in Zur
Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976, p. 101. An





at the cost ofblindly accepting the traditional roles assigned to him by others) to a
stage ofpost-conventional identification55, in which the individual develops a critical
view of the social expectations he/she is confronted with. And although the
individual can never position himself/herself outside society, the dimension of
intersubjectivity in the post-conventional stage takes a different meaning.
In Habermas's essay "Individuation through Socialization: On Mead's theory of
subjectivity"56 the individual's identity is presented as autonomously formed. It
appeals to the other subjects for recognition, but it is not unilaterally determined by
their demands. By analogy Habermas applies the same argument regarding the
formation of the individual's identity to the development of collective identities.
Hence, while conventional collective identities are grounded in fixed attributes such
as kinship, ethnicity and territory, the post-conventional identity would "no longer
require fixed contents", but a "consciousness of universal and equal opportunity to
participate in value and norm-forming processes".57
Viewed in the light of the above, constitutional patriotism can no longer be seen as
pure attachment to abstract principles, but responds to the need to overcome the
cleavage between universalistic structures and particularism. Hence, ifpost-
conventional ego-identity refers to the stage of development of a mature individual
who has overcome the certitudes of tradition and social convention, constitutional
patriotism is correspondingly the appropriate form of affect for a mature politics that
CO
has overcome the need for a pre-political ground . Thus, rather than referring
outside politics to "a prior homogeneity of descent or form of life" constitutional
55 On post-conventional ego-identity, see J. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity" in
Communication and the Evolution ofSociety (translated by Thomas McCarthy), Boston: Beacon,
1979. Habermas does not actually use the term "post-conventional" to characterize collective identity
in this essay, but the usage seems consistent with his intentions in this piece. On the postconventional
as a stage in the history of social organisation see J. Habermas The Theory ofCommunicative Action,
vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A critique ofFunctionalsit Reason (translated by Thomas McCarthy),
Boston: Beacon, 1987, pp. 153-197.
56
J. Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization: On Mead's Theory of Subjectivity" in
Postmetaphysical thinking: philosophical essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, pp.183-188.
57 P. Markell, op.cit. fn. 49, pp. 40-41.
58 ibid., p.43.
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patriotism directs citizens allegiance toward the nation now conceived simply as "a
self- determining political community".59
Habermas's position is that "a liberal political culture is only the common
denominator for a constitutional [not a cultural] patriotism.. .that heightens an
awareness ofboth the diversity and the integrity of the different forms of life co¬
existing in a multi-cultural society."60 He believes that multi-cultural societies should
be premised on common legal principles. His nation of citizens pivots on the exercise
of citizenship rights rather than on similarities of cultural or ethnic identity. His
reason for objecting to the requirement of commitment to a society's cultural way of
life is that this would protect the "ethnic-cultural substance of the particular form of
life" connecting citizenship with historically specific cultural identities.61
Amy Bartholomew62 offers a similar reading of constitutional patriotism according to
which the insulation of constitutional patriotism from concrete historical contexts is
not necessary. Her argument is based on the following: In "Struggles for
Recognition"63 Habermas argues that social solidarity can only be achieved, and
(once achieved) maintained, by a constitutional patriotism that integrates citizens
politically rather than ethically. In order to mutually recognize all forms of life
(provided these are compatible with constitutional democracy), we need to
distinguish between ethical/cultural and political integration. On the other hand, and
this is the interesting aspect of this theory, Habermas argues that political integration
is also ethically64 permeated, because political culture is based upon a constitution
and a legal system which are embedded in particular historical contexts. These are
59 J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity", Appendix II to Between Facts and Norms:





62 A. Bartholomew, "Constitutional Patriotism and Social Inclusiveness: Justice for Immigrants?",
paper presented at the Exeter Colloquium, 24-25 November 2000.
63 J. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State", in Amy Gutmann
(ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics ofRecognition, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994, p. 134.
64
According to Habermas "ethical issues are those that come up when we are concerned with
questions ofmy or our own plan of life, questions of the good life, while moral issues are at stake
when we wish to solve interprersonal conflicts in concordance with the interests of everybody
involved and affected." See his article "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and
Republican Versions", 7 (1994) Ratio Juris, p. 3.
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inescapably permeated by ethical considerations since they are the expression of the
community's (political) history. Hence constitutional patriotism has an ethical
component, a "politico-cultural context"65, which depends upon a certain nation's
"historical experience"66.
It is also interesting to note that the very term "constitutional patriotism" does not
appear in Habermas's work until the 80s when he participated in the Historikerstreit
(historians debate). This was a heated debate concerning the public use ofhistory.
The controversy was triggered in 1985 when Reagan was visiting West Germany (in
his official capacity as President of the USA) at Chancellor Kohl's invitation. His
itinerary included among other places a German military cemetery at Bitsburg, where
members of the SS and the Wehrmacht were buried. Although, Reagan's official
visit also included a concentration camp, it was argued by Habermas and others that
by presenting the two visits as symmetrical, if not equivalent, the German state was
downplaying the importance of the Holocaust and was attempting to rehabilitate its
national history. The historians' debate ultimately concerned the interpretation of the
Nazi past and centred on the problematic relationship between historical
consciousness and contemporary self-understanding.
In his intervention in the Historikerstreit67, Habermas argued that constitutional
patriotism requires a commitment to abstract and universalist principles whose
legitimacy is not based upon "the concrete totality of the nation".68 At the same time,
however, this very same intervention underlined the importance of the historical past
and the obligation of remembrance this imposes on us. Hence, universalist principles
upon which constitutional patriotism rests, must be seen in the light of the historical
past (constitutional and other) of a specific country.
65 J. Habermas, op. cit. fn.59, p.513.
66 J. Habermas, op. cit. fn. 63, p. 134.
67
For Habermas' stance in the Historikerstreit see his articles "Defusing the Past: a politico-cultural
tract" in Hartman (ed) Bitsburg in Moral and Political Perspective , p.46 and "Apologetic
Tendencies" in Nicholsen (ed) The New Conservatism, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989 and the
essays collected in his book The Past as Future (translated by Max Pensky), Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1994.
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In his article "The European Nation-State: On the past and the future of sovereignty
and citizenship" Habermas repeats his main thesis that the political culture of a
country crystallises around its constitution: He furthermore clarifies that "each
national culture develops a distinctive interpretation of those constitutional principles
that are equally embodied in other republican constitutions- such as popular
sovereignty and human rights- in light of its own national history". 69 This shows
clearly that constitutional patriotism is not an abstract commitment to political
values. It is a commitment to the historically constituted ethical-political culture,
rather than to the ethical-cultural ways of life.70
Besides, in his recent book "Between Facts and Norms" Habermas suggests that it is
the creation ofpositive law and the coercive state that provide the necessary
supplements to the normative principles of a legal order. The universal principles of
modernity only acquire binding force and become effective if they are embodied in a
particular system ofpositive law. And again the particularity of this cannot be
defined by norms, but is provided by the element of facticity. Habermas is very clear
on this: "The identity of a person, of a group, of a nation or of a region is always
something concrete, something particular and it can never consist merely in general
moral orientations and characteristics, which are shared by all alike".71
Habermas, thus, views constitutional patriotism as involving an on-going
interpretation of a particular historical tradition that is embedded in the political
culture72. He insists that the political culture of a polity is ethically permeated, but
68 J. Torpey quoting Habermas, "Introduction: Habermas and the Historians", 44 (1998) New German
Critique, p. 18.
69 J. Habermas, "The European Nation-state: on the Past and the Future of Sovereignty and
Citizenship" in P. de Greiff (ed) The Inclusion ofthe Other, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1998,
p. 118.
70 J. Habermas, op. cit. fn. 63, p. 138.
71 J. Habermas, "The limits of neo-historicism" in P. Dews (ed) Autonomy and solidarity: interviews
with Jurgen Habermas, London: Verso, 1996, p.239
72 For a different interpretation of constitutional patriotism, see C. Laborde, op. cit. fn. 31. In her view
the patriotic commitment implied by constitutional patriotism is detached from particular cultural
contexts. She argues that this strategy of complete insulation ofpolitics from culture is self-defeating.
She puts forward instead the concept of civic patriotism, which recognises the role of particularist
political cultures in grounding universalist principles. Her idea of civic patriotism acknowledges that
the boundaries between the cultural and political levels of identity are porous (political institutions
70
that the ethical substance of constitutional patriotism cannot be permitted to
undermine the constitution and the legal system's neutrality or impartiality toward
cultural forms of life that are ethically integrated around their own conceptions of the
good. He distinguishes between ethical and political integration and between the
political culture that is ethically permeated in the sense ofbeing constituted by more
than just universal rights (including the history of interpretation of the constitution)73
and amajority culture that would allow a particular hegemonic ethical culture to
prevail.
Effectively, Habermas's patriotism is based upon the interpretation of constitutional
principles within the context of a particular national history and tradition. This type
of constitutional loyalty can be expected if citizens are in a position to adopt what he
calls the "we perspective of active self-determination"74 and conceive the
constitutional state as an achievement of their own history. For this to be possible
universalist principles must be woven into the fabric of local conversations in ways
that resonate with the political self-understanding of the society in question.75 The
constitution is treated as an open-ended process, such that can endure only as an on¬
going interpretation.76
and practices cannot be entirely separated from their wider political context) and is aligned with the
interpretation of constitutional patriotism as put forward here.
73 Habermas uses the term "ethical" in somewhat the same way Hegel used "sittlich" and
"Sittlichkeit" to represent cultures and forms of life from a normative and evaluative perspective.
74 J. Habermas, op. cit. fn. 59, p.263.
75 C. Laborde, op. cit. fn. 31, p.5.
76
Similarly, Attracta Ingram argues that the post-national identity is "a political identity founded on
recognition of democratic values and human rights as these are contextualised in a particular
constitutional tradition." A. Ingram, op. cit. fn. 50, p.9. Ingram associates constitutional patriotism
with liberalism and the idea that the state is the source of unity of the body politic. She defends the
capacity of liberal unity to establish a collective identity. In her opinion the charge against liberal
unity's ability to foster solidarity and a sense ofbelongingness rests upon the mistaken belief that
"collectives can only be spawned by previous collectives". According to her argument, which
employs Searle's account of social phenomena on the basis of intentional causation, both nations and
states are similarly constructed phenomena; they are both produced by "collective intentionality" (this
is a primitive individual capacity of identifying with others similarly equipped as parts of a collective
"we"). Similar arguments emphasising the socio-culturally constructed (as opposed to the natural)
character of nations have been put forward before. Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities" and
Max Weber's "imagined communalities" show that national consciousness typically includes "a belief
by the members of the national community that they share some distinct subset of such "objective"
features as common descent, language, culture, homeland, customs, traditions, religion, history,
destiny or the like. But these commonalities are as often fictive as real." T. McCarthy, "On
Reconciling Cosmopolitan Unity and National Diversity", 11 (1999) Public Culture, p.177.
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The analysis so far has aimed to show that constitutional patriotism is not as thin as
some theorists have claimed it is and that its embeddedness in a particular political
culture can provide the basis for identification with a political community. One of the
main accusations levelled against constitutional patriotism is that, ifwe found our
political allegiances upon universalist principles, we cannot reasonably defend the
existence of any boundaries other than the global ones. I believe that the
interpretation of constitutional patriotism presented above shows how the universal
principles can be perfectly compatible with different, specific spatial and temporal
boundaries.
At this point one could argue, however, that the conception of constitutional
patriotism I have presented here is actually too thick rather than too thin, because by
being situated in the constitutional history of a particular political community, it
invokes "a historical community of descent that imposes unchosen and inescapable
obligations on its members"77. Going to the opposite end of the spectrum, could it be
that, given its embeddedness, constitutional patriotism expresses an unreflexive
loyalty to the predominant political culture?
78
The term banal nationalism has been employed by Billig to signify the continual
"flagging" or reminding of nationhood, which is so discreet as to be found in the
daily rhetoric of "we", in the embodied habits of social life. Could it be that
constitutional patriotism is too attached to its particularistic heritage? Can
constitutional patriotism challenge those expressions ofbanal (civic) patriotism,
which may be found to be offensive or alienating to certain groups in society? Can
constitutional patriotism be sensitive to the ways in which certain expressions of its
particularism alienate cultural minorities? Can it manage to dissociate itself from the
majority's culture and to contribute to sustaining feelings of solidarity between all
citizens?
77 P. Markell, op. cit. fn. 49, p.53.
78 As Billig contends "our" nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously
irrational, surplus and alien; it is presented as "patriotism" which is good and beneficial. Could it be
that constitutional patriotism is as embedded in historical particularity (and therefore irrationality) as
any other type of nationalism? See M. Billig, Banal Nationalism, London: Sage, 1995.
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The ability of constitutional patriotism to resist an unreflexive attachment to the
existing political culture can be affirmed through reference to another event in the
recent political life ofGermany. In the aftermath of a neo-nazi attack against
foreigners in the newly unified Germany79, people organised massive demonstrations
against violence. In an article published in Die Zeit on 11th December, Habermas
greeted these demonstrations ofpublic indignation as admirable examples of
constitutional patriotism. In his view, the protests were seen as "putting a stop to the
half-hearted and ambivalent reactions on high".80 He explained that, by voicing its
protest, the people displayed empathy and democratic indignation and distinguished
itself from the official spokespersons of the state. The people's renunciation ofwhat
was trying to present itself as political normality was an admirable defence of
minoritarian, and therefore vulnerable, groups and a transcendence of Germany's
O 1
hegemonic political culture.
One can find a similar example in the work of Jacques Ranciere who wrote about
the French protests during the Algerian war: "For my generation politics in France
relied upon an impossible identification- an identification with the bodies of the
Algerians beaten to death and thrown into the Seine by the French police, in the
name of the French people, in October 1961. We could not identify with those
Algerians, but we could question our identification with the "French people" in
whose name they had been murdered. That is to say, we could act as political
subjects in the interval or gap between two identities, neither ofwhich we could
assume".82
These two historical examples illustrate how constitutional patriotism cannot simply
be identified with an unreflexive attachment to the hegemonic political culture of a
79 On 23rd November 1992, neo-nazis threw firebombs into two homes on Moelln, a town in the
northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein. As a result three people were killed. Although this was
not the first instance of violence against foreigners, this event triggered a very strong public response.
Massive demonstrations took place not only in Moelln, but also in all big cities in Germany.
80 J. Habermas, "Die zweite Lebensluege der Bundesrepublik : wir sind wieder normal geworden",
Die Zeit, December 11, 1992, p. 48.
81 ibid.
82 J. Ranciere, "Politics, Identification and Subjectivization" in J. Rajchman (ed) The Identity in
Question, New York: Routledge, 1995, p.67. See also J. Ranciere, Disagreement: Politics and
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community. On the contrary, it is usually by putting in question certain expressions
ofmajoritarian politics that it demonstrates itself and it differentiates itself from
nationalism (even in its civic form). The universal normative principles upon which
constitutional patriotism is grounded are not self-sufficient; they depend on
supplements of particularity that allow them to inspire attachment and identification;
on the other hand, constitutional patriotism resists its equivalence with any particular
set of already available universals "for the sake of the ongoing, always incomplete
and often unpredictable project of universalization."83
I will return to this incomplete and open character of the process of universalization
later. At this point suffice it to say that constitutional patriotism can be seen as
promoting a mainly political identity, whose predominantly political nature makes it
compatible with a variety ofpractices and beliefs, but whose thin particularistic
content justifies citizens' commitment to specific institutions and practices. In this
sense political culture can be defined as the loose and malleable framework, which
sustains our political conversations over time. It includes familiarity with collective
institutions, political rituals and rhetoric, types of discourses and accumulated habits
and expectations stemming from previous conversations, which does not in any way
assume substantial agreement.
Given that my analysis of constitutional patriotism was elaborated against the
background provided by the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, one
might reasonably believe that my so far arguments point to the construction of a civic
EU nationalism which will replace the national identities existing in the member
states. This scenario would have the same implications for the national identities, as
the one described by the German Constitutional Court, the only difference being that
the new European identity would be civic rather than ethnic/cultural. Having
defended the theoretical possibility of a non-cultural political identity above, at this
point I will argue that such an identity should not just be a replication of the civic
Philosophy, translated by Julie Rose, Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1999. Ranciere
does not explicitly identify this practice as an exercise of constitutional patriotism.
83 P. Marked, op. cit. fn. 49, p. 40.
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national ones. Any emerging European identity should be civic and post-national at
the same time.
Before I embark upon an analysis of supra/post-nationalism, I would like to clarify
the relationship between civic nationalism and constitutional patriotism. According
to most analyses, constitutional patriotism is taken to be either synonymous with or a
sub-category of civic nationalism. This seems quite straightforward since both civic
nationalism and constitutional patriotism refer to abstract -albeit inevitably
embedded- principles as a basis for political identification. Given, however, the
stance Habermas has taken in recent events of the German history (e.g.
demonstrations ofGerman citizens expressing their solidarity to immigrants), I think
that these taken for granted close links between constitutional patriotism and civic
nationalism are contestable.
To understand the difference between the two, one needs to exercise historical
imagination and reflect upon cases in which citizens can or have been asked to test
their political principles in a case of dramatic conflict with the national feeling. In
France for example, where the universalist principles are constitutive of a very
important aspect of the people's political identity, the French had the opportunity to
test these principles during the Algerian war. Opposition to the official French
government's foreign policy choices was a clear case of conflict between universalist
o4
principles and national feeling. Hence, the nation, even in its civic French version,
"remains within the domain of the theologico-political" and "the ethos of constitutive
84 It is interesting that Jean-Marc Ferry (in P. Thibaud, J.-M. Ferry, Discussions sur 1' Europe, Paris:
Caiman-Levy, 1992)) in exercising his historical imagination is unable to think of an example
illustrating how French national feeling came into conflict with universalist principles. He examines
the case of the French resistance to the Vichy government, but argues -quite rightly- that this
resistance was above all national, since people fought against the Nazi occupier forces in the name of
France and its territorial integrity. Of course by fighting against their occupier they were also fighting
against nationalsocialism. He concludes that in France one cannot isolate national patriotism from
constitutional patriotism, because within its republican culture the nation and democracy are
interlinked in such a way that national sovereignty has become an extension of popular sovereignty.
The same ambivalence is obviously not present in the case of the German resistance against
nationalsocialism. Intellectuals and politicians like Thomas Mann, Karl Jaspers or Konrad Adenauer,
had to choose between nationalist solidarity and constitutional patriotism. Even if they claimed that
they represented the true Germany, even if they still wanted to belong to the German nation, they still
had to break the ties with a certain part of their people, their nation, their state. As we saw above,
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submission". It has the symbolic meaning of an imaginary community and is in
search of a foundation transcending the political. It is "a singular universal",85
defining the limit beyond which the other is not regarded as a co-citizen.
To use a term from Lefort, democratic indeterminacy stops at the level of the nation.
Even though in the civic model national sovereignty has become an extension of
popular sovereignty, the nation is still a symbol with a politically ascriptive value
imputing on its members the will to live and act together. This does not mean that the
civic nation is constituted in an unreflective way. Voices against (any) civic
nationalism's mainstream expressions can indeed be raised. There is in fact a vast
bibliography on the openness of the (civic) nations and I do not intend to question its
accuracy here. My argument insists, however, that in constitutional patriotism -at
least in its most radical interpretation- there is a right to civil disobedience rather
than a simple right to contest verbally the majority expression of a political identity,
or
when this comes into conflict with universalist principles.
In an article on civil disobedience Habermas stresses that every constitutional
democracy that is sure of itself "considers civil disobedience as a normalised-because
necessary- component of its political culture"87 He is adamant that the democratic
state is not reducible to its legal order and that its legitimacy is grounded upon the
supra-legal validity of human rights. In order to protect itself against the moral
uprooting of its system, the constitutional state must protect and sustain the idea of
distrust towards itself.88 This paradox "finds its resolution in a political culture that
provides its citizens with the sensibility- with the measure ofjudgement and
willingness to take risks- which is necessary in transitional and exceptional situations
Ranciere pointedly puts things into the right perspective by reminding us the Algerian fight for
independence.
85 ibid.
861 would be tempted to say (although I don't think that this is Habermas' interpretation) that this is in
fact a duty to resistance and civil disobedience.
87 J. Habermas, "Civil disobedience: Litmus test for the democratic constitutional state", 30 (1985)
Berkeley Journal ofSociology, p. 99.
88 This distrust cannot always assume an institutionally secured form.
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to recognise the legal offences against legitimacy and if need be to act illegally out of
moral insight."
Habermas insists that "the realisation of exacting constitutional principles with
universalistic content is a long term process which historically has been by no means
linear and is instead characterised by errors, resistances and defeats."90 This means
that the constitutional state as a whole appears from this historical perspective not as
a finished product, but rather as a susceptible, precarious undertaking which is
constructed for the purpose of establishing or maintaining, renewing or broadening a
legitimate legal order under constantly changing circumstances. He concludes that
"that which is prima facie civil disobedience may soon prove to be the pace-setter for
long overdue corrections and innovations because law and policy depending on
principles are in a constant process of adaptation and revision. In these cases civil
violations of rules are morally justified experiments without which a vital republic
can retain neither its capacity for innovation nor its citizens' belief in its
legitimacy."91
Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to rebut the no-demos thesis, according to which
the current (constitutional and democratic) shortcomings of the EU are inherent and
not contingent in a multi-cultural project of this magnitude. The no-demos thesis as
expressed by the German Constitutional Court is an external criticism which puts
into question the very possibility of imagining a normatively coherent, democratic,
constitutional order in the EU. As I explained in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis is to
deconstruct the constitutional actuality of the EU. The deconstruction put forward
here, however, does not only aim to show that what already exists does not work, but
also to suggest how an alternative viable approach might be designed.
89 J. Habermas, op. cit. fn. 87, p. 103.
90 ibid., p. 104.
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The Bundesvarfassungsgericht in its Maastricht judgement challenges the political
character of the EU by reminding us that in democracy all normative relations must
be referred to the sovereign people and since in Europe there is no sovereign people
that could be represented by the European institutions (only multiple sovereign
peoples represented by the national institutions), the EU cannot constitute an
independent political order. By putting forward this argument the federal court seems
to conceive political unity as based on a certain degree of cultural homogeneity and
consequently lapses into a form of representationalism in the sense that the legal
order represents a pre-given existential unity. Its pessimistic conclusion is that the
process of European integration cannot be legitimated for the time being and the EU
cannot be a site for democracy and constitutional debate, since a culturally
homogeneous European nation has not emerged yet.
Against this background, I argued that the absence of an organically homogeneous
demos does not pose insuperable obstacles to viewing the EU as a site for democratic
decision-making and constitutional design, because the common European identity
that will provide the glue for the new political entity can be based on universal
principles rather than on cultural traits. More specifically the feasibility of
constructing a political community in the EU was defended by reference to
Habermas' theory of constitutional patriotism. Having clarified that according to the
Habermasian model, the constitution (with its universal normative principles) is the
source ofunity of the body politic, I then defended constitutional patriotism from the
two main objections raised against it on the grounds of a) political specificity and b)
contextual dependence.
According to the former, the universal principles , upon which constitutional
patriotism is based, are unable to offer the framework for a political identity (a
European political identity in our case), because they are too abstract and they cannot
justify the existence of any boundaries. The argument here is that a consistent
application of universal principles goes hand in hand with unqualified
cosmopolitanism. Against this objection, I argued that the project of universalisation
91 ibid.
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is an on-going process, open to different interpretations. The European Union, if it
were to embrace constitutional patriotism, would offer its own interpretation of the
meaning of universalism.
As far as the latter objection is concerned, this refers to the inability of any political
identity to transcend (or in Hegelian terms "Aufheben") its culture of origin. By
pointing to examples such as the French protest against the treatment of Algerians,
the German opposition to the Nazi regime or the very recent German demonstrations
renouncing any type of violence against foreigners, I showed that a transcendence of
our culture is not inconceivable. In fact it is not even a novel idea.
I am aware of the fact that both of these objections stem from the tension that
underlies the relationship between juridical universalism and cultural singularity. I do
not claim that the tension does not exist, nor that it is an easily manageable one. On
the contrary, I acknowledge the immense difficulties one is confronted with while
trying to articulate any proposal that deals with this fundamental tension. At the same
time, however, I welcome both the tension and the difficulties lying within it,




The juridification of the political: constitutional law without
constitutional politics
Memory is a snare, pure and simple: it alters,
it subtly rearranges the past to fit the present.
Mario Vargas Llosa (The storyteller)
Introduction
In Chapter 2 I defended both the feasibility and the desirability of a non-cultural, identity
for the EU. Within that context I argued that constitutional patriotism could foster social
solidarity and offer a satisfactory basis for the affective dimensions ofpolitical life in the
EU. Since the model of constitutional patriotism is grounded on the concept of a
political constitution, I will now turn to the EU constitutional order1 and explore whether
its actual institutionalisation fulfils the conditions required for the development of a
politically inspired patriotism. The conclusion drawn from this enquiry will allow me to
establish whether the present EU constitutional order can function as a matrix for social
cohesion among the peoples ofEurope.
The Convention for the future of Europe, which prepared the draft of the European
Constitution last year, triggered an intensification of the debate over the constitutional
question, which in its turn consists of a series of very fundamental questions. What does
"constitution" mean in the European context? Can we really claim that the EU Treaties
1 G. de Burca argues that there is a misfit between "the formal institutional picture presented by the
Treaties and the Court" and "the more complex and nuanced reality of the evolving EU governance
structure". De Burca argues that this gap between formality and reality can be used as an objection to the
constitutional character of the EU as a whole. G. de Burca, "The Institutional Development of the EU: A
Constitutional Analysis" in P. Craig, G. de Burca (eds.) The Evolution ofEU Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999, p. 55. Strictly speaking it is the supranational EC Treaty as opposed to the
intergovernmental second and third pillars that is constitutional. For a different opinion see also J. Shaw
"Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union", 27 (2000) Journal ofLaw and Society, pp.
4-16. Here the term "EU" will be used as an umbrella term for EU and EC.
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qualify as a constitution? And, if they do, do we need a new constitution? Apart from the
ontological question of the existence of an EU constitution, there is of course the
theoretical question about whether the EU should have a constitution at all. The answers
given by the literature are divided not only on the relevant questions of theory, but also,
and more surprisingly so, on the very questions of constitutional ontology. Given that
the proposed Constitutional Treaty, which was agreed upon and signed in the recently
concluded Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels (16-17 June), has not been ratified
yet, my critique of the EU constitutional order in this and the next chapter will not touch
upon this text. Once my argument is completed, I will turn to the work of the
Convention for the Future ofEurope and the new EU constitution and, assuming the EU
constitution is ratified, I will examine the impact of this change on my argument.
Starting from the descriptive or ontological question regarding the existence of a
'European Constitution': the European Treaties, as they stand now, initially signed as
international treaties, have already acquired a sui generis character, which distinguishes
them from international law. Although the "founding fathers" did not set up a
constitutional decree according to which the European system would develop, the EC
Treaties gradually "evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign
states into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights
and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within the sphere of
application of EC law"2.
In light of these developments, it has been suggested that "in critical aspects the
Community has evolved and behaves as if its founding instrument were not a Treaty
governed by international law but, , a constitutional charter governed by a form of
constitutional law."3 In fact, the ECJ officially introduced the concept of the Treaty as a
Constitutional Charter in its Les Verts4 judgement, while in its 1/91 opinion5
2 As quoted by J. Weiler "The Reformation ofEuropean Constitutionalism", 35 (1997) Journal of
Common Market Studies, p.97.
3 ibid., p.96.
4 Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste "Les Verts" v. Parliament [1986] ECR, p. 1339.
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it went as far as to suggest that some parts of the Treaty were of such importance that
they could not be modified at will by the Member States, thus hinting at the
irreversibility of the so-called acquis communautaire.6 The term "constitution" (as
opposed to constitutional charter) only reached the intergovernmental discourse in the
declaration adopted by the European Council in the December 2001 meeting in Laeken.
There, in the section entitled "Towards a Constitution for European citizens" the
European Council was asking "whether this simplification and reorganisation (of the
Treaty texts) might not lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the
Union."7
o
As far as the question regarding the need for a formal Constitution is concerned, there
seem to be two camps in this field. On one hand, there is the "pro-constitutional" camp,
which views an EU formal constitution as an indispensable part of a legitimate political
union. There is a wide diversity of sub-divisions within this camp, ranging from those
who welcome the advent of an EU state9 to those who prefer a novel type of federation
5 In its opinion concerning the Draft agreement relating to the creation of a European Economic Area, the
Court stated that: " The EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement
nonetheless constitutes the constitutional charter of a community based on the rule of law. The essential
characteristics of the Community legal order are its primacy over the law of the Member States and the
direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member
States". ECJ 14 December 1991, Opinion 1/91, Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of
article 228 (1) of the Treaty, "Draft Agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the
Countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European
Economic Area", O.J.E.C. 1992 C 110/1. Interestingly enough "the Court insisted on the qualitative
uniqueness of Community law even though the text of the Draft Agreement was to the last word identical
with those of the EEC Treaty" and "the qualitative difference is directly related to the role of the Court",
R. Dehousse, The European Court ofJustice, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p.36. See also E-J
Mestmaecker, "On the Legitimacy ofEuropean Law", 58 (1994) Rabelszeitung, p. 623.
6 The term "acquis communautaire" refers to the body of EC law that has been produced at any given
point of time and to the shared political/legal properties of the system. Its function is to protect the
integrity of the system. Today it is guaranteed by Article 2 TEU. For a refreshingly original analysis of the
concept of the acquis communautaire from a theoretical point of view see H. Lindahl, "Acquiring a
Community: The Acquis and the Institution of European Legal Order", 9 (2003) European Law Journal,
p.433.
7
Annexes to the Presidency conclusions- Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, SN 300/01 ADD 1, Annex I,
Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union.
8 For a review of the different functions/definitions of constitutions and a very good analysis of these
issues within the EU context see G. Frankenberg, "The return of the contract: problems and pitfalls of
European constitutionalism", 6 (2000) European Law Journal, pp. 257-276.
9 Mancini believes that the EU has already moved beyond the structures of an international organisation
and that its structures compromise the concept of democratic representation in the individual Member-
82
of states which will not be a sovereign state of its own10.
On the other hand, there is the "anti-constitutional" camp, rejecting the adoption of a
formal constitution, because this would inexorably lead to the creation of a federal
super-state, the United States of Europe, which would erode the national identities of the
Member States11. Others reject the necessity for a EU constitution on the basis that the
rigidity of a formal constitution would come into conflict with the dynamic character of
the Community legal order. Weiler is one of the most prominent representatives of the
"anti-constitutionalists", proclaiming with his usual verbal expressionism that, "if a
formal constitution is to be the European Promised Land, I think I will join Moses and
stick to the desert"12. He justifies his stance on the basis that a direct validation of the
European constitutional architecture through a process of constitutional adoption by a
European constitutional demos would, "as a matter ofboth normative political principles
and empirical social observation"13 transform the union into a federal state.
States. According to Mancini, the only way in which we could deal with the current democratic deficit in
the EU would be to take one step further and become a fully federal democratic state. "Indeed the Union is
doomed never to be truly democratic as long as not only its foreign and security policies which are openly
carried out on an intergovernmental basis, but the very management of its supranational core, the single
market, are entrusted with or without a circumscribed control by the European parliament to diplomatic
roundtables". G.F. Mancini, "Europe: The Case for Statehood", 4 (1998) European Law Journal, pp. 29ff.
10 A. Weale, "Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of Europe" in R. Bellamy, V. Buffachi and D.
Castiglione (eds) Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union ofEurope, London: Lothian
Foundation Press, 1995, pp.8 Iff. Lars Siedentop, on the other hand, is ambivalent as to the choice between
a federal state and a confederation. He starts from the premise that constitutional forms are the most
promising means of reconciling participation and representation. He continues that "a great constitutional
debate need not involve prior commitment to federalism as the most desirable outcome in Europe. It may
reveal that Europe is in the process of inventing a new political form, something more than a
confederation, but less than a federation- an association of sovereign states which pool their sovereignty
only in very restricted areas to varying degrees, an association which does not seek to have the coercive
power to act directly on individuals in the fashion of nation-states." L. Siedentop, Democracy in Europe,
London: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 1.
"
As we saw in Chapter 2, Dieter Grimm too rejects the need for a European Constitution. He does not
object to the creation of a European State on the basis that this would supersede the existing states, but
because of its inherent inability to be democratically structured. This inherent inability is linked with the
linguistic diversity of the peoples of Europe, which, according to Grimm, does not allow them to
participate in a unified democratic debate. "Since this state would not.. .have the mediatory structures
from which the democratic process lives, the community would after its full constitutionalisation be a
largely self-supporting institution, further from its base than ever". D. Grimm, "Does Europe need a
Constitution?", 1 (1995) European Law Journal, p. 299.




This animated debate between "pro-constitutionalists" and "anti-constitutionalists",
accompanied sometimes by a more detailed discussion of the substantive provisions and
institutional reforms that a new formal Constitution should contain (obviously by "pro-
constitutionalists), monopolises the focus of attention. I would like to shift the focus of
our constitutional debate to issues of constitutionalism and constitutional ethos instead.
Constitutionalism is an ideal consisting of different requirements (limited government,
adherence to the rule of law, protection of fundamental rights), while constitutions are
only the vehicles for the institutionalisation of the essential requisites of
constitutionalism. Hence, constitutionalism furnishes normative criteria for the critical
evaluation of existing constitutions.
The argument that will be put forward here is that there is already an EU constitutional
framework, which is, however, unsatisfactory. In this chapter, the emphasis will be
mainly on the procedural issues associated with its development, while in the next
chapter the focus will shift to the critique of certain substantive issues. Given its
procedural and substantive deficiencies, I will argue that the current structure is unable
to provide the proper constitutional framework for a political union and should be
replaced by a formal constitution that would break with the EU constitutional past. I will
insist, however, that neither institutional reforms nor substantive amendments of our
constitutional architecture will be successful in addressing the normative inadequacies of
the EU constitutional order, unless they are coupled with a change in constitutional
ethos. A constitution, due to its brevity and generality is an open-ended text; much more
so than any other legislative text. Its success therefore, depends not only on its
architectural arrangements, but even more so, on the historical and institutional
treatment of the constitutional text in the hands of different actors of the wider
interpretative community (consisting of judges, legislators, bureaucrats, legal scholars
etc) that flesh out its underlying principles.
This chapter starts with some brief comments concerning the role of history. Given that
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the argument put forward here challenges certain aspects of the received acquis
constitutional, the aim in this part will be to show that the construction (and
interpretation) of political and legal history is never final nor authoritative. Therefore the
fact that something has been registered in the records of history in a certain way should
not prevent us from trying to re-qualify it. Past events are not beyond change, as
traditional historiography would have it; they are always present, open to re-
interpretation. History is a palimpsest, whose original writings can be effaced to make
room for new writings. Thus, the basic premise here is that not only the present can
never be free from the past, but also that the past can never be free from the present. And
at the same time that our inherited narrative of the past may be superseded.
In the next part of this chapter, I will give a summary of the development of the EC legal
order focusing mainly on the deployment of its constitutionalisation process. And since
this development has been mainly the product of the European Court of Justice, the
history of the EU as a constitutional order has been the history of this court's case law.
The analysis of the ECJ case law does not have the ambition of exhausting the relevant
material; it will only pinpoint certain significant normative choices and identify their
underlying constitutional ethos.
In the third part the focus will shift from the descriptive to the normative analysis of the
constitutionalisation process. I will examine the self-referential character of the EU legal
order and I will analyse the reasoning of the Court in its major "constitutional" cases.
The analysis will show that the constitutionalisation of the Treaties has been a judicially
driven process, which has taken place mainly in the absence ofpolitical discourse. This
privileging of law over politics amounts to the juridification and more particularly the
judicialisation ofEU constitutionalism. The last part of this chapter will explore certain
interesting aspects of this juridification. It will be shown that the juridification/
judicialisation of the EU constitutionalisation process is connected with issues of
representation; it reflects the participation (and therefore the representation) of European
citizens in the judicial process, which is, for a number of reasons (different
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modalities/resources required), not symmetrical to participation in the political process.
This raises serious concerns about the proper exercise of constituent power and the
principle ofpopular sovereignty in the EU.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to rebut the argument of
retrospective inevitability in the Communities' development, according to which the
path of European integration that the ECJ chose (and which we are still following) was
the only available one and, on the other hand, it will show how this type of ad hoc
piecemeal, judicially driven, constitutional development has affected in a detrimental
way the present normative shape of the EU (the argument initiated here will be
completed in the next chapter). This chapter will focus on the substitution of the legal
for the political in the EU constitutionalization process. The next chapter will show how
the "juridified political" has integrated (and to a great extent has been substituted by) the
needs of the market. In the end it will be shown that this double substitution, which is by
now a structural feature of the EU, affects representation in a very fundamental way and
severs the true emancipatory potential of the European project.
a) The archaeology of EU constitutionalism
The term "constitutionalisation" in the EU context refers to the process by which "the
Community legal order has evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon
sovereign states into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially
enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private,
within the sphere of application of EC law."14 This process has been a very contested
one. Some analysts view constitutionalisation as a revolutionary break from the rules of
both international and national law and identify the ECJ as the initiator of the revolution,
while others downplay the role of the ECJ putting the emphasis on the intentions of the
14 U. Altern, "Pathos and patina: the failure and promise of constitutionalism in the European
imagination", 9 (2003) European Law Journal, p. 15.
86
founding fathers, the tacit consent of the national governments and the collaboration of
the national courts. This latter stance tends to regard the ECJ as the executor rather than
the initiator of the EC break with traditional international law.
Independently ofwhether one views constitutionalisation as preordained by the Treaties
or as an unforeseen consequence of them, the fact remains that it was the interpretation
put forward by the ECJ of the EC legal norms and of the place of those norms within the
legal system that provided the catalyst.15 That is why any account of
constitutionalisation must begin with this jurisprudence. This does not mean that the ECJ
jurisprudence alone can fully account for all constitutional developments. It is, however,
a very good starting point. My intention is not only to give a historical account ofwhat
happened, but most importantly to challenge the way in which what happened was
presented.
One could raise the objections that a) going back to the beginning of the process of
constitutionalisation is anachronistic and cannot be relevant to any contemporary
discussion (especially not after the signing of a new formal Constitution) and that b)
challenging ex post facto the process through which our constitutional acquis was
shaped is not only irrelevant to any new Constitution we may have, but also a futile
intellectual activity, since there is no way back. In fact, it has been suggested that to do
so would amount to trying to push the toothpaste back in its tube16. My answer to this, as
I suggested above, is that an evaluation of the past is necessary for the understanding of
the present and an indispensable tool for the shaping of our expectations from the future.
Our approach to the future cannot be ahistorical. Hence, ifwe want to recover the lost
"normative sanity" of our constitutional system, we will have to go back to the "original
15 A. Stone Sweet "Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community" in A.M. Slaughter, A. Stone
Sweet, J. Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts- Doctrine and Jurisprudence, Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 1997, p. 306.
16 For an analysis of this idea see J. Weiler and U. Altern, "The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order:
Through the Looking Glass" in J. Weiler, The Constitution ofEurope, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 286- 323.
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acts of sin
, this is exactly why we need to start from the "archaeology"18 of our
constitutional narrative.
The term archaeology refers to Foucault's conception of history. The Foucaultian use of
history rejects teleology. Unlike history in the traditional sense, which is built upon a
coherent, linear narrative that functions as a confirmation of the inherited "established
narrative, because it presents it as resting on firm foundations, as the rational effect of
certain causes or even necessary outcome"19, the Foucaultian conception of history
(history as archaeology or genealogy) disturbs what is taken-for-granted. History as
archaeology, brings to the surface the contingent features of history, thereby disturbing
"what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it
shows the heterogeneity ofwhat was imagined consistent with itself'20. The effect of
describing a historical event as contingent21, is to question the causal logic that may
present the emergence of this particular event as necessary.
Hence, Foucault's theory " strives to alter the position of the historian from one who
gives support to the present by collecting all the meanings of the past and tracing the line
of inevitability through which they are resolved in the present, to one who...., by
demonstrating the foreignness of the past, relativises and undercuts the legitimacy of the
present."22 Viewed in this light, history is not only a form of knowledge, but also a form
ofpower; it produces a discourse with a set ofmeanings. Historical writing can reassert
"the inevitability with which the past leads to the present" (traditional historiography) or
17
Louis Henkin employs the term "genetic defects". See his article "A New Birth of Constitutionalism:
Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects" in M. Rosenfeld (ed.) Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and
Legitimacy, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1994, p.39.
18 The term "archaeology of knowledge" is borrowed from Foucault. In his book Madness and
Civilization: a history of insanity in the age of reason, London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1989(translated
from French) Foucault draws on etymology and associates archaeology with an "arche", a beginning, an
origin. This was later rejected in his book The archaeology ofknowledge, London: Routledge, 1969.
19 S. Marks, The Riddle ofall Constitutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 135.
20 P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, London: Penguin, 1984, p.82.
21 On the contingent constitution of our memory (history necessarily depends on memory) see P. Ricoeur,
The Symbolism ofEvil, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967, p.23.
22 M. Poster, Foucault, Marxism and History, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, p.74.
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"it can undermine the present order by reversing its images of the past" (history as
archaeology/genealogy24). Depending on which of these two types of historical
investigation one chooses to pursue, history can be viewed as conserving the status quo
or subverting it.
On a similar note, Robert Cover has explored the dual character (conserving
and subversive) of a constitutional narrative. It is clear in his mind that "no set of legal
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture"25.
Cover, thus, stresses how important constitutional narratives are in legitimating a legal
order and in stabilising its actuality. This can be easily explained by reference to the
intense sympathy between narrative and democracy. As Ball has put it, "in contrast to
the language of command, which is hierarchical and distancing and therefore unsuitable
to democracy, narrative is inherently communal. A story is shared. It establishes a
relation ofmutuality between narrator and hearer. When it works, the audience becomes
a participant in the performance."26
In this chapter the focus is on the constitutional narrative of the EU. Our constitutional
narrative is in this case embroidered with a story of origins of the EU. And this story of
origin, like all stories of origin, has the tendency to be a conservative one, because "it
exerts the gravitational pull ofpast generations upon those of the present."27 As Cover,
23 ibid., p.89.
24 As for the distinction between archaeology and genealogy, as Foucault himself puts it: "Ifwe were to
characterise it in two terms, then 'archaeology' would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of
local discursivities, and 'genealogy' would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these
local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play." M.
Foucault, "Two Lectures" in C. Gordon (ed.) Michel Foucault. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews
and Other Writings 1972-1977, Brighton: Harvester, 1980, p.85. From the above extract it seems that
archaeology is the method, while genealogy is the strategic development of archaeological research. For
an analysis of this, see also G. Kendall and G. Wickham, Using Foucault's Methods, London: Sage
Publications, 1999, pp.30-32.
25 R. Cover, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative", 97 (1983) Harvard Law
Review, pp. 4-68.
26 M. Ball, "Stories ofOrigin and Constitutional Possibilities", 87 (1989) Michigan Law Review, p. 2288
27
ibid., p. 2294. This resonates Marx's discussion in the Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte of the
role of tradition in the shaping of history: "tradition from all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare
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however, also argues, it is always possible for the generations of the present to return to
the originating acts recounted in the constitutional narrative, renounce the established
narrative's claim to singularity, its monopolistic absolutes and certainties and enrich it
with new meanings.28 Every story of origins has, thus, the plasticity of a work of art; it is
never finished; its content is never static. In this sense the story of origins, the
constitutional narrative, is not only conserving, but if open to dialogue, it may also be
transforming and empowering. It is this transforming possibility that I would like to
bring to the fore by revisiting the EU constitutional narrative. Viewed in this light this
process of re-evaluation of the past and its inherited vocabulary presents some
similarities with the method followed by psychoanalysis.
In psychoanalytic therapy, one is asked to re-enact and re-experience one's own past. It
is believed that past events, whose very happening or significance we have somehow
repressed, misplaced or mislabelled in our memory, can help us understand the way we
feel and explain our current reactions to different stimuli. We, thus, need to go back, re-
qualify the certainty of (the existence or inexistence of) an event and restore its true
meaning. This process of confronting our "misremembered"29 past and dealing with all
false memories, enables us to come face to face with our responsibilities concerning not
only the identity we have so far constructed, but also its continual re-evaluation and re¬
shaping in the future. At the same time it frees us from repressed syndromes of guilt. A
brave and bias-free confrontation with our past seems to be a necessary, though not
always sufficient, condition for catharsis, which, in its turn, is a precondition for the
healthy re-making of our self-consciousness. Psychoanalysis is, thus, associated with the
subject's need to confront the narrative of his/her life, to assume the errors he/she may
have made and accept his/her flaws. In other words, ifwe hope to improve our
performances, we must confront our past, understand it and analyse it. In this, social
on the brain of the living. And just when they appear to be revolutionising themselves and their
circumstances.. .that is when they nervously summon up the spirits of the past." K. Marx, Later Political
Writings (edited and translated by T. Carver), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.32.
28
Op. cit. fn. 25, pp. 23-24.
29 On the concept of "misremembering" see J. Prager, Presenting the past, Psychoanalysis and the
sociology ofmisremembering, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998.
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transformation is very much like individual regeneration; the point of departure for a
30
new start is a re-evaluation of the past and its inherited vocabulary.
Sharing to a great extent the method and the aims ofpsychoanalysis, the revisiting of the
constitutional narrative of the EU in this chapter, will be a process of confrontation with
q 1
our mis-remembered constitutional past . To proceed to a re-evaluation of the past -
such as the one undertaken by the Convention for the Future ofEurope and the IGC(s)
that preceded the signing of the Constitutional Treaty- without having identified its
problematic aspects could only lead to their being perpetuated in the new structures. A
certain de-glorification of our constitutional past is necessary for the construction of a
better constitutional future. We can certainly not "un-live our past"32, but we can try to
re-constitute its meaning. And in re-constituting our history, we will be transforming the
European way of self-identifying and self-imagining, we will be reforming European
self-consciousness, because "to speak ofhistory" is, ultimately "to speak of our
11
accumulated social self-consciousness."
30 In his book Eros and Civilisation Marcuse transferred the insights of psychoanalysis and the arguments
about the therapeutic role ofmemory from the individual sphere to that of a political collectivity. In his
mind "the psychoanalytic liberation ofmemory explodes the rationality of the repressed individual".
Similarly at the level of social psychology "the rediscovered past yields critical standards that are tabooed
in the present". Marcuse, thus, employs memory in the service of praxis. He manages to re-politicise
memory by bringing to the surface its disruptive potential. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation, Boston:
beacon Press, 1966. Against Marcuse's faith in the possibility of recovering memory, Christodoulidis
argues that "the immemorial" (reduction ofmemory and a certain inability to redress this reduction) is
structurally embedded in law. See E. Christodoulidis, "Law's Immemorial" in E. Christodoulidis, S.
Veitch (eds.), Lethe's Law. Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation, Oxford: Hart, 2000.
31 Allott takes the metaphor ofpsychic healing even further: "To redeem and to perfect Europe's re¬
unifying is not a matter of institutional reform but ofpsychic healing. To suppose that the crisis of
European constitutionalism can be dealt with by institutional reform is like offering minor surgery to a
psychotic. And the metaphor is more than a metaphor. If one defines psychosis as the domination of the
patient by a private reality, which is life-threatening, then something very close to that is what has
happened in Europe. Official Europe- politicians and technocrats- are locked into a private reality, the so-
called European Union, which threatens the future stability and prosperity of the people and the peoples of
Europe". P. Allott, "The crisis of European Constitutionalism: Reflections on the revolution in Europe",




b) We, the Court?
i) A constitution by judicial fiat
The direct effect doctrine: penetrating national legislation
Eric Stein's classical account of the story ofEU constitutionalisation starts like this:
"Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with
benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type
structure in Europe."34 Let us follow a little more closely the fundamental moments in
the gradual construction of this so-called constitutional framework.
The first historically critical point for the separation between public international law
and European Community Law and, thus, for the constitutionalisation of the Treaties
was the Van Gend en Loos case35. The Van Gend en Loos company had imported a
quantity of chemical substance from Germany into the Netherlands. It was charged by
Customs and Excise with an import duty, which the company alleged had been increased
since the time of the coming into force of the EEC Treaty, contrary to Art. 12 of that
Treaty.
33 ibid., p.470.
34 E. Stein, "Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution", 75 (1981) American
Journal ofInternational Law, pp. l-27.For a more recent account of constitutionalisation see G. F.
Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe", 26 (1989) Common Market Law Review, pp.595-
614, K. Lenaerts, " Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism", 38 (1990) American Journal of
Comparative Law, pp. 205ff, S. Cassese, "La Costituzione Europea" (1991) Quaderni Costituzionali,
pp.487ff., J. Weiler "The Transformation of Europe" 100 (1990-1991) Yale Law Journal, pp. 2403ff. and
by the same author "The Reformation of European Constitutionalism" 35 (1997) Journal ofCommon
Market Studies, pp. 97ff. L. Hancher, "Constitutionalism, The Community Court and International Law"
25 (1994) Netherlands Book ofInternational Law, pp.259ff, compares the elements of Community
constitutionalism (direct effect, supremacy, human rights) with international law and concludes that all
these elements can also be found in international law, but their combined impact on the development of
legal remedies is much stronger at the Community level than it is at the international level.
35 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandes Administratie der Belastigen, [1963] ECR 1. According
to E-J. Mestmaecker "the chain that bound sovereignty and law together was broken when the
Luxembourg Court of Justice ruled that the Treaty conferred upon individuals the right to enforce specific
Treaty obligations of member states in their domestic courts of law." Von E-J Mestmaecker, "On the
Legitimacy of European Law", 58 (1994) Rabelszeitung, p.622.
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An appeal against payment of the duty was brought before the Dutch Tariefcommissie
and Art. 12 was raised in argument. Van Gend en Loos asked for an annulment of the
decision of the Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration on the ground that the
Netherlands had failed to comply with its Treaty obligations. In its preliminary
reference, the Tariefcommissie asked the ECJ whether article 12 of the EEC Treaty had
direct application within the territory of a Member State, in other words whether
nationals of such a state could on the basis ofArt. 12 lay claim to individual rights,
"5 C
which the Court should protect.
The texts of the EC Treaties made no reference to the effect which their provisions were
to have. It is also apparent from arguments made in the early cases before the Court that
at least some of the Member States did not envisage that the provisions of these treaties
would be any different, in terms of their domestic effect, from other international treaties
and conventions. The ECJ, however, based on the vision that the Treaties had set out to
create a certain community and that the effective creation of such a community would
necessitate a certain kind of legal system, put forward the doctrine of direct effect.
Thus, the ECJ argued that:
".. ..to ascertain whether the provisions of an international Treaty extend so far in their
effects it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those
provisions.. ..The objective of the EEC Treaty which is to establish a common market,
the functioning ofwhich is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual
obligations between the contracting parties. This view is confirmed by the Preamble to
the Treaty, which refers not only to governments but also to peoples. It is also confirmed
more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the
exercise ofwhich affects member states and also their citizens.... The conclusion to be
36 P. Craig, G. de Burca, EULaw, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1998, p. 164.
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drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law
for the benefit ofwhich the states have limited their sovereign rights albeit within
limited fields, and the subjects ofwhich comprise not only Member States but also their
nationals. Independently of the legislation ofMember States, Community law therefore
not only imposes obligations on individuals, but is also intended to confer upon them
rights, which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they
are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States
and upon the institutions of the Community."37
The three governments which intervened in the case- Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands (it is useful to remind that at that time there were only six Member States)
submitted observations according to which they obviously did not agree with this
interpretation of the obligations they had assumed when they became parties to the EEC
10
Treaty. They all argued a) that a charge ofTreaty infringement against a Member State
could be brought before the Court by the Commission or by another Member State and
could not be referred to the ECJ by a national Court unless "the legal protection" of the
state "was considerably diminished"39 (Art. 169,170, 177) and b) that even if such a
reference were admissible, this particular case concerned an internal constitutional
problem and, consequently, the ECJ had no jurisdiction under Art. 177.
According to the Court, on the other hand, its jurisdiction was well grounded since the
case in question did not concern national law as such, but the application ofArt. 12 EEC
and its effect on individuals. The contractual model ofpublic international law40,
37
Op.cit. fn.35, para. 12.
38
Belgium and the Netherlands questioned the jurisdiction of the Court expressly, while Germany only by
implication.
39 Case 26/62, [1963] ECR at 6-9.
40 The Van Gend en Loos ruling was the ECJ's way of dealing with different incorporation systems
existing in the different member states. For example in monist countries such as Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, international treaties become part of their domestic law executed like any other statute and
supersede all provisions of domestic law, whereas in countries employing a dualist system such as
Germany and Italy, international treaties become domestic law through a time-consuming legislative
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according to which the intention of the parties, as expressed in their interventions in this
case, should decide the internal or non-internal effect of certain Treaty provisions, was
rejected. Having discarded the subjective intention of the parties, the Court put the
emphasis instead on "the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of these
provisions". All of the above, according to the interpretation of the Court, pointed at the
establishment of a common market, and this objective was then interpreted to be of
direct concern to individuals41, whence the conclusion that the EC Treaty was different
from an international law agreement creating obligations based on the principle of
reciprocity between the contracting states42.
The governments were adamantly opposed not only to the introduction, but also to the
consequent, very important expansions of the direct effect doctrine. In Van Gend en
Loos the Court set the criteria for the direct effect ofTreaty provisions. A provision
could have direct effect provided that it was "clear, negative, unconditional, containing
no reservation on the part of the Member State and not dependent on any national
implementing measure."
Three years after its initial description of the direct effect doctrine, the ECJ expanded the
scope of this principle by affirming the direct effect of a provision, which imposed a
positive (rather than a negative) obligation on Member States provided that the period
procedure. On the basis of Van Gend en Loos Community law is different from international law in that it
is directly incorporated into the Member States' domestic legal orders independently of whether they have
a monist or dualist system of incorporation of international law.
41 M. Poiares-Maduro calls "subjectivation" the process by which the Court moved from a state-based
interpretation of the Treaties into an individual based interpretation. See his book We, the Court, Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 9. It is interesting to note that later on the doctrine of direct effect acquired a
legitimacy in the edifice of EC law which was independent of its original foundation. The rationale
offered later on was that the doctrine of direct effect was necessary in order to protect the community from
embarrassment if the Member States failed to implement an agreement concluded by the Community with
a third state. See D. R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European
Community, Dublin: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997.
42 In fact there have been cases of international treaties creating individual rights enforceable in national
Courts. The Permanent Court of International Justice in 1928 affirmed that the agreement between Poland
and Danzig created such rights. The Court held that the presumption against direct effect could be
overturned by explicit evidence of the intention of the parties to the contrary.
43 P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 (second edition), pp. 168-169.
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within which the states were required to act had lapsed.44 The second extension of the
direct effect principle took place when the Court held that a prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of nationality is not only applicable "to the action ofpublic authorities, but
extends likewise to rules of any other nature aimed at collectively regulating gainful
employment and services."45 In doing so, the Court accepted that legal provisions
fulfilling the conditions of direct effect, do not only have a vertical effect, but also a
horizontal one, meaning that they can be invoked by individuals against both
governmental action and/or other individuals. The last very important -and a quite
controversial one46- expansion concerned the direct effect of community measures other
than Treaty provisions. Slowly, but steadily, the Court embraced within the scope of the
direct effect doctrine all community legislation.47
The introduction of the direct effect doctrine brought about the subjectivation of the
Treaties. In other words it underlined the move from a state-based interpretation of the
Treaties into an individual-based interpretation. From that point onwards the Treaties
were not interpreted as an agreement between states, but as a social contract among the
44 In case 57/65, Alfons Luetticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, [1966] ECR 205, the ECJ held that
Art. 95, which imposed on the member states a positive obligation to abolish discriminatory internal taxes
on imports, had direct effect.
45 Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, [1974] ECR
1405. Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, [1976]
ECR 455 constituted one step further in the expansion of the horizontal dimension of direct effect. In this
case the relevant provision was Art. 119, according to which men and women should receive equal pay for
equal work. Unlike the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, Art. 119 is not one of the
fundamental objectives of the Community enumerated in Art. 3, but contains a principle to be
implemented by national legislation.
46 In France the Conseil d' Etat in its Minister ofthe Interior v. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, [1980] I CMLR, p.
543 judgement ruled against the ability of an individual to rely on a directive at national level. Claiming
that in principle no directive could have direct effect in a national legal order. In doing so, the Conseil d'
Etat defied the authority of the ECJ which had already ruled that as long as directives/decisions were by
their nature, background and wording "unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise to be capable of
producing effects in the legal relationship between the member states and those subject to their
jurisdiction", they could be invoked by an individual. See S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.122 and E. Stein, op. cit. fn. 35, p.22 .
47 In Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, [1970] ECR 825 the Court held that a Council
decision addressed to a Member State, which by its nature, background and wording was "unconditional
and sufficiently clear and precise to be capable of producing effects in the legal relationship between the
Member States and those subject to their jurisdiction", could be invoked by an individual. In Case 41/74,
Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337 the Court clearly stated again that the direct effect
doctrine included directives as well as decisions addressed to Member States.
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peoples of Europe. The introduction of the direct effect doctrine enabled Community
law to present itself as a new source of rights for the individuals of all Member States
and subsequently as the protector of these individuals vis a vis their states.
The hidden dimension of direct effect: supremacy
According to the Court's reasoning in Van Gend en Loos, the newly created Community
legal order would not merely create mutual obligations between the contracting states;
individual citizens of the Member States could also invoke the direct effect of
Community law before national courts. In this case the Court focused on the direct effect
and no explicit consideration was given to the problem the direct effect doctrine might
create for domestic courts, if they had to choose between a Community norm and a
conflicting national one.
In Costa v. Enel49 the ECJ came face to face with the constitutional implications of the
direct effect doctrine. Mr. Costa was an attorney who did not want to pay his electricity
bill claiming that the law nationalising the electricity company was in fact violating the
EEC Treaty and the Italian Constitution. As a result, the Italian judge who was assigned
the case, made references to the ECJ and the Italian Constitutional Court. The
Constitutional Court's ruling was that, since the EEC had been ratified in Italy by
ordinary law, and given that the nationalisation of the electricity industry had also taken
place by ordinary law, the national judge was confronted with a straightforward case of
conflict between two hierarchically equal norms and, as a result, the appropriate
interpretation rule to be applied was "lex posterior derogat priori". Therefore, according
to the Italian Constitutional Court, the reference to the ECJ was pointless.
The ECJ, however, took a quite different stance. It rejected the submission put forward
by Italy regarding the inadmissibility of the reference, on the basis that its ruling would
48 M. Maduro, op. cit. fn. 41, p. 11.
49 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR at 585.
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concern the validity of national law. Although it ruled that it could not decide on the
validity ofnational law, the ECJ reached the conclusion that Community law had to be
given primacy by national courts over all incompatible national law.
"By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own
legal system, which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the
legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.
By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a
transfer ofpowers from the states to the Community, the Member States have limited
their sovereign rights albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law
which binds both their nationals and themselves.
The integration into the laws of each Member State ofprovisions which derive from the
community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it
impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity.
Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal system. The executive
force of community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to
subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the
Treaty
It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an
independent source of law, could not because of its special and original nature, be
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being
called into question." 50
Once again one has to bear in mind that there was no provision for the supremacy of
50 Ibid.
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Community law in the Treaty, since this was silent on the question of the relationship
between national and Community law and that the ECJ gave its own interpretation of the
spirit and the aims of the Treaty. The ECJ's first argument was that the Treaty created its
own legal order, which immediately became integral part of the legal systems of the
Member States. This refers to and repeats the doctrine of direct effect as stated in Van
Gend en Loos. The next argument is a teleological interpretation of the spirit and the
aims of the Treaty, which cannot be realised unless uniformity and effectiveness are
secured. Since the aims of the Treaties are integration and co-operation, it would be
impossible to regard national law as superior to community law. The truth is that, even if
a Community law right was denied in a Member State, an action could always be
brought by the Commission (Art. 169) or by a Member State (art. 170) to the Court of
Justice. Eventually the non-abiding Member State would have to comply with the
declaration of the Court and uniformity could be achieved.
The Court of Justice followed once again the stance of hermeneutical/interpretative
inevitability. Costa "had to happen as a matter of the European Community legal
reasoning which Van Gend en Loos championed"51. Van Gend en Loos had established
that the national courts had to give effect to community law rights without the need of a
national lex anterior, whereas Costa established that no national lex posterior could
derogate from Community law.
It needs to be reminded here that had the judgement not accepted the independence of
the Community legal order from international law, the principles ofpacta sunt servanda
and reciprocity would have been the applicable law in this case. According to the public
international law perception, national law cannot provide a defence in international law
for the international responsibility of a contracting party to a Treaty. Although
international law does not regard itself as superior to national law, an international judge
cannot accept the conflict between national and international law as a valid reason for
the non-conformity of a state party to a treaty with the international obligations
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. . .
stemming from this very same treaty. As a result, distinguishing itself from
international law was not necessary for the Community legal order in order to achieve
uniformity and effectiveness within its sphere of application.
Defending supremacy: the protection of fundamental rights
In the original treaties there was no legal basis for human rights. Neither the Treaty of
Paris (European Coal and Steel Community), nor the Treaties ofRome (European
Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community) contained any
allusion to the protection of fundamental human rights.53 When the direct effect and the
supremacy of European law were asserted, however, it became legally and politically
imperative to find a way to vindicate fundamental human rights at the Community level.
How could one vest huge constitutional power in the political organs of the Community
without postulating embedded legal and judicial guarantees on the exercise of such
power? How could one expect the High Courts of the Member States to accept the direct
effect and the supremacy without an assurance that human rights would be protected
within the Community and that individuals would not lose any of the protections
accorded to them under national constitutions?
In fact, the German Constitutional Court in its "so lange"54 judgement declared that as
long as ("so lange" in German) the EC did not contain a catalogue of basic rights
adopted by a parliament that provided the same guarantees as the German Basic Law,
51 D. R. Phelan, op. cit. fn. 41, p.103.
52 This is explicitly stated in Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention to which all the EC/EU Member States are
parties. See also Oppenheim's International Law: "It is firmly established that a state when charged with a
breach of its international obligations cannot in international law validly plead as a defence that it was
unable to fulfil them because its national law.. .contained rules in conflict with international law; this
applies equally to a state's assertion of its inability to secure the necessary changes in its law by virtue of
some legal or constitutional requirement". Oppenheim's International Law, Volume I: Peace, London:
Longman, 1992, pp. 84-85.
53 For an analysis see M. Dauses, "The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order",
10 (1985) European Law Review, pp. 398-399 and H. Ipsen, Europaisches Gemeinschaft, Tuebingen:
Moehr, 1972, p. 721.
54 The Bundesvarfassungsgericht's first Solange decision is reported at 2 (1974) Common Market Law
Review, p.540.
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that Court reserved the right to ensure that EC law did not violate fundamental rights
contained in the Basic Law. In response to this very tangible threat that national courts
would opt for the supremacy of their own constitutional provisions on fundamental
rights55, the ECJ discovered the protection of fundamental rights as a general principle
ofEC law.56
The detailed story of the development of the ECJ's case law on general principles of
Community law and fundamental rights has been told many times and does not need to
en
be rehashed in detail here. It may be recalled briefly that the first time the issue of
55 This was later qualified by Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft, 3 (1987) Common Market Law Review, p.
225, (also known as "so lange II"), where the German Court ruled that in view of the development of a
doctrine of protection for fundamental rights "it must be held that, so long as the European Communities,
and in particular the case law of the European Court, generally ensure an effective protection of
fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be regarded as
substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no
longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation cited as
the legal basis for any acts of German Courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal
Republic of Germany, and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental
rights contained in the Constitution". For the concerns raised by the Italian courts see J. Cocco, "Una
convivenza voluta ma sofferta: il rapporto tra diritto comunitario e diritto interno", 1 (1991) Rivista
Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, p.649. All commentators seem to be in agreement that the first
phase of the development of the ECJ's human rights jurisprudence was a defensive one, that is, it
developed in response to the concerns voiced by national courts either in the cases they referred to
Luxembourg or in the positions they adopted in domestic proceedings. H. Rasmussen, H. Rasmussen, On
Law and Policy in the European Court ofJustice, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, pp. 397-
400, J.Coppel and A. O'Neill, "The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?", 29 (1992)
Common Market Law Review, pp.670-674 , F. Mancini, "A Constitution for Europe", 26 (1989) Common
Market Law Review, p. 611, D. R. Phelan, op. cit. fn. 41, p. 128, T. Hartley, The foundations ofEuropean
Community Law, Oxford: Clarendon Law Series, 1988, pp,132ff.
56 F. Mancini, "A Constitution for Europe", 26 (1989) Common Market Law Review, p. 595. As far as the
protection of general principles is concerned, there were three provisions in the original Treaty, upon
which the Court based its giving the force of law to them:
a) According to article 164 EC "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application
of this Treaty, the law is observed."
b) Article 173 EC provides that "the Court may review the legality of the acts of Community institutions
on the grounds of lack of competence, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its
application or misuse of powers." The rule of law in this case is a separate ground for judicial review of
legality, independent of the other grounds of illegality.
c) Article 215 EC recognises a source of law outside the Community texts by providing that the
contractual liability of the Community will be governed by " the general principles common to the laws of
the member states."
57 For a detailed historical analysis see M.Hilf, "The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community"
in M. Hilf, European Law and the Individual, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1976, P. Pescatore, "The
context and significance of Fundamental Rights in the Law of the European Communities", 2 (1981)
Human Rights Law Journal, p.295, A. Clapham, "A Human Rights Policy for the European Community",
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compatibility of Community law with basic rights was raised in Stork , the applicants
were seeking annulment of a decision made by the High Authority of the Coal and Steel
Community relying inter alia on articles of the German Constitution (free development
ofpersonality/ free choice of trade, occupation or profession). The ECJ, which held
itself incompetent to annul a decision on the basis ofnational, as opposed to Community
law,59 finally broke the silence of the treaty in the Stawder^judgement of 1969, where it
hinted at the fact that fundamental rights might be part of the general principles of
Community law.
In this case the Court was asked to judge whether a certain Community act (a
Commission decision) was in conflict with the right to dignity. According to the
decision in question, which was a scheme for the reduction of the surplus of butter,
social security recipients could receive subsidised butter from national traders. Given
that in Germany the beneficiaries had to reveal their names and addresses, the applicant
argued that this constituted an infringement ofhis right to dignity. The ECJ was able to
avoid the issue of the conflict, because according to its interpretation, the community
measure did not actually require identification of the recipients of subsidised butter by
name. However, in the final paragraph of its judgement, the ECJ, contrary to its previous
case law, accepted for the first time that "fundamental human rights (are) enshrined in
the general principles of community law and protected by the court."61
This was solemnly confirmed shortly afterwards in the Internationale
10 (1990) Yearbook ofEuropean Law, p.309, J.Coppel and A. O'Neill, "The European Court of Justice:
Taking Rights Seriously?", 29 (1992) Common Market Law Review, p.669 and J.Weiler and N.Lockhart,
"Taking Rights Seriously" seriously: The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence", 32
(1995) Common Market Law Review, p.51 (Part I) and p.579 (Part II).
58 Case 1/58 Stork v. High Authority, [1959] ECR 17 at 26-27 (para 4)
59
In case 40/59 of Joined cases 36-38 &40/59 Geitling and Nold v. High Authority the applicant relied on
the Grundgesetz right to private property as interpreted by the German courts and stressed the necessity of
interpreting the provisions of the Treaty establishing the ECSC in a way that would not conflict with
fundamental rights under national law, but the court rejected this argument holding that it was not for the
Court "to ensure that rules of internal law, even constitutional mles, enforced in one or other of the
member states are respected". This case must be distinguished from the case 4/73 Nold v. Commission
[1974] ECR 491.
60 Case 29/69, Stauder v. City ofUlm [1969] ECR 419, at 425.
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Handelsgesellschaft judgement. In this case the issue at stake was a council regulation
(120/67), according to which exporters had to lodge a deposit in order to obtain an
export licence. This deposit could then be forfeited, if the licensed transaction were not
carried out within the period of time set. The applicant questioned the validity of the
deposit system claiming that it was contrary to principles ofnational constitutional law
(proportionality, freedom of action and disposition, economic liberty). The Court
concluded that there had been no infringement of the rights claimed in this case. It
repeated that respect of fundamental rights formed an integral part of the general
principles and clarified that inspiration was drawn from the constitutional doctrines
common to the Member States, adding, however, that the fundamental rights protection
"must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the
Community."63
In 1974, the Nold64 case offered the occasion for the ECJ to add that also international
human rights could provide inspiration. The Court considered the ECHR and national
constitutional law as sources of inspiration in some detail in the Hauer judgment of
197965 next imp0rtant moves took place around 1990, when the ECJ stated in cases
like Wachauf66 and Elliniki Radiophonia61 that its review powers also extended to
zro
Member States' acts , but only to the extent that those acts came within the sphere of
61 ibid.
62 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, at 1134.
63 The Court's reasoning as laid out in a number of cases, makes it quite clear that the general principles of
law are to be regarded as a primary source of law. However, the common constitutional traditions of the
Member States and the international treaties for the protection of human rights, to which the ECJ resorts as
sources of inspiration, do not constitute a primary source of law in the Community legal order, but are
mere sources of recognition of law. See M. Dauses, op.cit. fn. 54, p.411.
64 Case. 4/73, Nold KG v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, at 506.
65 Case 44/79, Hauerv. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, at 3744-7.
66 Case 5/88 Wachaufv. Germany [1989] ECR 2609, at 2639.
67 Case 260/89 Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas
[1991] ECR I-2925, at 2964
68 In Cinetheque and others v. Federation Nationale des cinemas francais, the Court had accepted that:
"Although it is true that it is the duty of this court to ensure observance of fundamental rights in the field
of community law, it has no power to examine the compatibility with the European Convention of national
legislation which concerns, as in this case, an area which falls within the jurisdiction ofthe national
legislator (my emphasis)." Cases 60-1/84, [1985] ECR 2605, para 26. This was restated with a slight but




The general principle doctrine may best be summarised by quoting the account given by
the ECJ itself in Kremzow10:
"As the court has consistently held.. .fundamental rights form an integral part of the
general principles of community law whose observance the Court ensures. For that
purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the
protection ofhuman rights on which the member states have collaborated or ofwhich
they are signatories. The ECHR has special significance in that respect. As the court has
also held, it follows that measures are not acceptable in the community which are
incompatible with observance of the human rights thus recognised and guaranteed
compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of national legislation lying outside the
scope ofCommunity law (my emphasis)." Case 12/86, [1987] ECR 3719, at 3754, para 28. The Court has
also used other wider formulas to delineate its human rights jurisdiction such as Member State law that is
touched by Community law" or "influenced by Community law". The problem with these formulations is
that the reach ofCommunity competence and law has been constantly evolving and as a result "there is
simply no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke as such against the Community". See
K. Lenaerts "Constitutionalism and the many facets of federalism", 38 (1990) American Journal of
Comparative Law, pp. 205ff. at 220.
69
Coppel and O'Neill distinguish between the defensive (see fn. 56 ) and the offensive use of fundamental
rights by the ECJ. The latter refers to the extension of applying human rights not only to Community acts,
but also to the acts of the Member States. They accuse the ECJ of transgressing the jurisdictional limits of
its fundamental rights case law and they further criticise the way this jurisdiction has been exercised. Their
point is that the ECJ has been employing the human rights talk instrumentally as a means to extend its
own jurisdiction into areas previously reserved to member states' courts. Furthermore, and this is the
second part of their critique, the Court refuses to take the discourse of human rights seriously by
subordinating human rights to the end of closer economic integration in the Community. In fact "there
would appear to be two standards in operation- one standard for community acts, another standard for
individual Member States' acts derogating from Community law. In the former, human rights are
subordinated to and have to be interpreted in the light of Community objectives. In the latter, human rights
are presented as an additional hurdle which national states' acts have to negotiate in order to be accepted
as valid." And in any case "(whenever) the Court has adopted fundamental rights discourse, it has been the
general Community rule or the Community objective which has prevailed against claims as to the
violation of fundamental rights." Op.cit. fn. 58, pp.669-672. Apart from the issues of usurpation of
national sovereignty this accusation raises, it is obvious that it involves major practical problems. Since
the EU has not acceded to the ECHR, the ECJ's decisions cannot be controlled by the Court ofHuman
Rights in Strasbourg; yet if the ECJ decisions can control the compatibility of national legislation with
human rights, there is the danger of contradictory decisions passed by the ECJ and the Court in
Strasbourg, since the Member State legislation would at the same time be liable to control on the basis of
the ECHR and its institutions.
70 Case C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v. Austrian State [1997] ECR I- 2629, at 2645. See also Case 44/79
Liselotte Hauer [1979] ECR 3727 at 3744-3745, Case 4/73, NoIdKG v. Commission [1974] ECR at 491.
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It is also apparent from the Court's case law.. .that, where national legislation falls
within the scope of Community law, the Court in a reference for a preliminary ruling,
must give the national court all guidance as to interpretation necessary to enable it to
assess the compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental rights - as laid down in
particular in the convention- whose observance the Court ensures. However the Court
has no such jurisdiction with regard to national legislation lying outside the scope of
community law."
Expansion of competences
The constitutionalization ofCommunity law goes beyond the principles of direct effect
and supremacy and the recognition of fundamental rights. A very important part of the
Community's constitutional development is the expansion of its competences. The EC
Treaties established a legal order of limited powers and did not confer on it any
legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This means that unless a power is explicitly
attributed to the Community, it is reserved to the legislative competence of the Member
States and the Community is not authorised to pass legislation in a specific area. Failure
of the EC legislative institutions to point to a legal basis for action in the Treaty can be a
ground ofjudicial review, meaning that the act in question will be declared void for lack
of competence71.
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The delimitation of competences is not, however, as straightforward as one might think
for the following reasons: Apart from the fact that there may be disagreement about the
ambit of a Treaty article, or the precise division of competence between the EC and the
71 See articles 5 (1), 7 and 230 EC.
72 There is a very wide literature on the issue of EC competences. See e.g. K. Lenaerts, "Constitutionalism
and the Many Faces of Federalism", 38 (1990) American Journal ofComparative Law, pp.205ff; T.
Hartley, "Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems; the emerging Constitution of the European Community",
34 (1986) American Journal ofComparative Law, pp.229ff.; J. Temple Lang, " European Community
Constitutional Law: the division of powers between the Community and the Member States" 39 (1988)
Irish Legal Quarterly, pp.209ff; J. Usher, "The Scope ofCommunity Competence- Its recognition and
Enforcement" (1985) Journal ofCommon Market Studies, pp. 12 Iff.
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Member States in the cases where there is shared competence, things become even more
complicated because of the notion of implied powers and its expression in article 308
(ex 235). As far as the notion of implied powers is concerned, Hartley defines it as
follows: "According to the narrow formulation, the existence ofa given power implies
also the existence of any other power which is reasonably necessary for the exercise of
the former; according to the wide formulation, the existence ofa given objective or
function implies the existence of any power reasonably necessary to attain it (my
-7-3
emphasis)." Article 308, on the other hand, provides that: "If action by the Community
should prove necessary to attain in the course of the operation of the common market,
one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures." It, thus, seems
to support the wide formulation of the doctrine of implied powers.74
The wide spectrum of the Treaty objectives combined with the teleological interpretation
employed by the ECJ has meant that "it is virtually impossible to find an activity which
(can) not be brought within the objectives of the Treaty."75 Similarly, Koen Lenaerts
affirms that "there is simply no known nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States
can invoke".76 Evaluating the broadening remit ofEC competence, Weiler talked of a
veritable mutation in the constitutional structure of the Community (he identified 4
categories of "mutation": extension, absorption, incorporation and expansion), which,
given both its significance and the little attention it attracted, actually amounted to a
73 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations ofEuropean Community Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998,
?4102-
Joseph Weiler has gone as far as to suggest (ironically) that Article 308, given its wide use, could also
be used to defend the introduction of a defence policy for the EC, since the function of the Common
Market presupposes a certain freedom from external powers. J. Weiler, "The Division of Competences in
the European Union", European Parliament DG for Research Working Document, Political Series W-
261ri his eyes, article 308 is "the locus classicus of hue expansion". J. Weiler, "The Transformation of
Europe", 100 (1991) Yale Law Journal, p.2468. One could raise the objection that the expansive use of
Art. 308 is not really significant in any way, since its use presupposes a unanimous decision of all Member
States. The answer to this would be that its significance consists in the fact that expansion of EC





"silent constitutional revolution".77 Needless to say, once again, the biggest part of the
expansion of competencies occurred incrementally through the judgements of the ECJ
without any Treaty amendments. Warnings against this silent revolution can be found in
no
the so-called Maastricht Judgement of the German Constitutional Court or in the
insertion of the principle of subsidiarity by the TEU, according to which decisions must
be taken at the most appropriate level. In response to these warnings, the ECJ has started
being more cautious in its interpretation ofEC competences. It, thus, held in opinion
2/9479 that the EU could not accede to the ECHR on the basis of Art. 308 EC. Finally for
the first time in its history the ECJ annulled the Tobacco Advertising Directive80 on the
basis that the EC lacked the necessary competence.81
ii) Non-judicial constitutional input
We saw above that the documents, which were initially signed as international multi¬
partite treaties gradually acquired constitutional features, mainly through the judgements
of the European Court of Justice. Through its teleological interpretation of the EC
Treaty, the ECJ created the supranational "first pillar". The combined application of
direct effect and supremacy meant that EC law was not only part ofnational law, but
also took precedence over it (including national constitutional provisions). Later on the
principle of state liability for breach of EC law required national courts to ensure the
availability of an action for compensation against the Member State that had failed to
comply with EC law.82 This intensified the already existing organic connection between
76 K. Lenaerts, op.cit. fn. 72, p. 205.
77 J. Weiler, op. cit. fn. 74, p.2439.
78 Brunner v. European Union Treaty 1 [1994] Common Market Law Review, p.57. See also Chapter 2.
79
Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR1-1759. It has been argued of course that the self-restraint of the ECJ in this
case is connected with the fact that had the EU acceded to the ECHR, the judgements of the ECJ would be
subjected to the scrutiny of the court in Strasbourg.
80 See case C-376/98 Germany v. Council and Parliament and case C-74/99 R v. Secretary ofStatefor
health ex parte Imperial Tobacco [2000] All ER (EC), p.769.
81 On the change of attitude of the ECJ regarding the interpretation of EC competences see M. Pollack,
"The End ofCreeping Competence" 38 (2000) Journal ofCommon Market Studies, p.519.
82 See Cases C-6, C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357. The principle of state
liability in damages for loss to individuals caused by the state breaching EC law was further clarified in
cases C-46/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany and C-48/93 R. v. Secretary ofstatefor Transport, ex
107
the national and the Community judicial systems (initially established via the system of
references for preliminary rulings under Art. 234 EC). In the meantime
constitutionalization had been further enhanced by the construction of a system of
fundamental rights protection within the EU and by the incrementally evolving
competencies of the Community and its institutions.
While all these important developments were taking place at the judicial level, the
stagnation and sluggishness that followed the Luxembourg crisis83 and the consequent
de facto recourse to unanimity voting, were the main features at the political level. Most
of these "constitutional" changes took place in the absence of any textual amendments in
the original documents. The successive accessions of the new members changed the
number of their signatories, but the actual content of the Treaties remained unchanged
until the first amendment of the Treaty with the Single European Act in 1986. The SEA
set out the internal Market aim, defining the internal market as "an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured".
It shifted the focus from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism by reviving qualified
majority-voting and it added new areas of Community competence, thus codifying some
o4
of the judgements of the Court.
parte Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR1-1029. For a theoretical analysis of this issue see P. Craig,
"Francovich, Remedies and the Scope ofDamages Liability" 109 (1993) Law Quarterly Review, p. 595,
C. Harlow, "Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State", 2 (1996^European Law Journal,
p.199, M. Ross, "Beyond Francovich", 56 (1993) Modern Law Review, p.55 and T. Tridimas, "Liability
for Breach ofCommunity Law: Growing Up and Mellowing Down?", 38 (2001) Common Market Law
Review, p.301.
83 In 1965, according to the transitional provisions of the EC Treaty, the Council ofMinisters would move
to qualified-majority voting (as opposed to unanimous voting). After a failure to reach a compromise in
the Council, France refused to attend any further Council Meetings and adopted the "empty-chair" policy.
A few months later the Luxembourg accords were signed, according to which unanimity should be sought
after whenever important national interests were at stake. This effectively signified a return to
intergovernmentalism, since qualified-majority voting was re-established as the norm in the decision¬
making process in the Council. See J. Pinder, The Building of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998, p.12 and W. Nicholl, "The Luxembourg Compromise", 23 (1984) Journal of
Common Market Studies, p.35.
84 For an analysis of the SEA see K. Armstrong and S. Bulmer, The Governance ofthe Single European
Market, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998, G. Bermann, "The SEA: A New Constitution for
the European Community?", 27 (1989) Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law, p.529, A. Moravsik,
"Negotiating the Single European Act", 45 (1991) International Organisation, p.19 and P. Pescatore,
"Some Critical Remarks on the SEA", 24 (1987) Common Market Law Review, p. 9.
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In 1992 the Treaty on European Union (more commonly known as Maastricht Treaty)
further expanded the competence of the Community in fields such as culture, education
and health, set the Economic and Monetary Union as one of the objectives of the Union,
established the Union citizenship, but most importantly it introduced the three pillar
structure, according to which the first pillar included the Community Treaties, the
second pillar covered Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the third pillar was
about Justice and Home Affairs (the second and the third pillar being mainly
intergovernmental and not subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ). The common
provisions of the TEU (expressly non-justiciable) talked about human rights and the
need to safeguard the acquis communautaite
In light of the opposition raised against Maastricht during its ratification process86, the
1996 intergovernmental conference that produced the Treaty ofAmsterdam was far less
ambitious than the 1992 one. Hence the Treaty ofAmsterdam aimed at simplification
and consolidation rather than expansion of the EU powers. Article 6 TEU declared that
the Union is founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, while
Art. 6(2) declaring that the Union shall respect fundamental rights as protected by the
ECHR and the national constitutions was rendered justiciable. Other than that, the most
important change was that a big part of the third Pillar was incorporated into the EC
Treaty (its subjects touch on fundamental rights issues). As for provisions of
differentiated integration/variable geometry that had been introduced in Maastricht,
an
these were further enhanced by the Treaty ofAmsterdam .
85 D. Curtin, "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces", 33 (1993)
Common Market Law Review,p. 17.
86
Ratifying Maastricht proved to be a very difficult process. The Danish voted against it (see K. Siune and
P. Svensson, " The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: the Danish EC Referendum of June 1992", 12 (1993)
Electoral Studies, p.99) and the French gave a very narrow majority vote in favour. In Germany a case
was brought before the German Constitutional Court on the basis that the ratification ofMaastricht
violated the German Basic Law. Brunner et al. v. The European Union, 1(1994) Common Market Law
Review, p.57.
87 For a comprehensive analysis of the Amsterdam Treaty see A. Duff (ed), The Treaty ofAmsterdam,
London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997, J. Monar and W. Wessels, The European Union after the Treaty of
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Given that the Treaty ofAmsterdam had failed to make the necessary institutional
preparations for the accession of the 10 new members, the 2000 IGC in Nice (labelled as
the "Amsterdam leftovers")88 dealt with the institutional arrangements and made some
amendments to the co-operation procedure. No major constitutional changes took place;
there was in fact a constitutional disappointment since the decision on the legal status of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was postponed until the 2004 IGC.
In fact, the signing of the EU Charter ofFundamental Rights has been the most
important non-judicial development in this area so far. And although the official
rationale given for its creation was the "need.. .to establish a Charter of Fundamental
Rights in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more visible to the
RQ
Union's citizens" rather than anything else ( change, improvement etc of the existing
protection of fundamental rights), its genesis was prototypical in that it was
characterised by parliamentary predominance. The Convention, as the body responsible
for drawing up the Charter was called, included representatives of four constituencies;
the Member State governments (15), the Commission (1), the European Parliament (16)
and the national parliaments (30).90 Although there is a strong argument to be made
about the need to involve in the deliberative processes the actors within civil society as
well as the organs of the government,91 there is no doubt that the drafting of the Charter
constitutes a clear improvement in the so far records of deliberative/discursive methods
Amsterdam, New York: Continuum, 2001, D. O'Keeffe and P. Twomey, Legal Issues ofthe Amsterdam
Treaty, Oxford: Hart, 1999.
88 On the Treaty of Nice see M. Bond and K. Feus, The Treaty ofNice Explained, London: federal Trust,
2001, J. Wouters, "Institutional and Constitutional Challenges for the European Union: some reflections in
the light of the Treaty ofNice", 26 (2001) European Law Review, p. 342 and X. Yataganas, "The Treaty
ofNice: the Sharing of Power and the Institutional balance in the European Union- A Continental
Perspective", 7 (2001) European Law Journal, p.242.
89
Cologne European Council Conclusions, June 1999.U. Everling, "The Maastricht Judgement of the
German federal Constitutional Court and its Significance for the development of the European Union",
(1994) Yearbook ofEuropean Law, p.l. For an analysis of this judgement see also Chapter 2 of this thesis.
90 The Convention also included observers from the Council ofEurope and the Court of Justice.
91 See for example de Burca's comment that the drafting process " was not to be a genuinely participative
process, but one which, albeit deliberative in nature, was to be composed only of institutional
representatives from the national and European level". G. de Burca, "The drafting of the European Union
Charter of fundamental rights", 26 (2001) European Law Review, p.126.
110
followed in the EU decision-making system.
The Charter, which was solemnly proclaimed during the Intergovernmental Conference
in Nice, was supposed among other things to function as a symbol that would
"counterbalance the Euro and become part of the iconography of European integration
and contribute both to the identity of and identification with Europe"92. Due, however, to
the opposition of some prominent Member States, the Charter was not enshrined in the
Treaties. As a result, its final legal status for the time being is that of a declaratory, non-
binding document which does not confer direct and tangible benefits on the individuals,
since it lacks justiciability.
Although the courts do not have the obligation to use the Charter as a legal basis for the
cases they decide, it is anticipated that they will refer to it for simple inspiration or
confirmation of their rulings. "We can therefore look forward to the Charter becoming
binding through its being interpreted by the Court of Justice as enshrining the general
principles of law."93 Hence, the courts can use the Charter as confirmation rather than
legal basis of their rulings on fundamental rights issues94. In my opinion this is a
somehow self-defeating argument. If the charter has been created in order to address
among other things the problem of democratic legitimacy and "to provide judges with an
explicit guide to their reading of fundamental rights"95, how can we assign its becoming
binding to (one of) the institution(s), which should be bound by it?
In any case it is obvious that the declaratory character of the Charter does not have any
practical value as far as the normative status of fundamental rights within the EU is
concerned. Had the Charter been enshrined in the Treaties, it would have become
92
J.Weiler, "Does the European Union truly need a Charter of rights?", 6 (2000) European Law Journal,
editorial, p.2
93 See the official website of the EU: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/c.../welcome.htm
94
P. Eeckhout, "The proposed EU Charter: some reflections on its effects in the legal systems of the EU
and of its member-states" in K. Feus (ed) The EU Charter ofFundamental Rights, London: Federal Trust
for Education and Research, 2000, pp. 104-105.
95 Official website on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Frequently Asked Questions, Question
no.13.
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directly binding. For the time being, though, and until the ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty, which incorporates the Charter, there is no change in the
constitutional status quo. The fundamental rights are still protected on the basis that they
are an integral part of the general principles of community law96. This outcome
undermines the deliberative process through which the Charter was drafted and may
backfire by discouraging involvement in such processes in the future. After all, what is
the point of setting up open and inclusive processes, if their end-result is devoid of any
legal strength?
Putting aside, however, the thorny issue of its legal force, I would like to stress that the
Charter is a useful instrument with a number of very important (even if only potential,
for the time being) benefits. The most obvious one is that it provides a very useful point
of reference for the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order. The
jurisprudential nature of the solution adopted by the Court of Justice, although offering
the advantage of flexibility, was unable to provide a definite and coherent code of rights.
Even after the introduction ofArt.6 TEU, according to which "the Union shall respect
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States as general principles of
Community law", there was a lack of certainty concerning not only the corpus of rights,
but also the restrictions imposed upon them.97
96 For a more detailed analysis of the legal effects of the Charter see: B. Hepple, "The EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights", 30 (2001) Industrial Law Journal, pp.225ff, K. Lenaerts and E. de Smijter, "A Bill
ofRights for the European Union?", 38 (2001) Common Market Law Review, pp.273ff, J. Liisberg, "Does
the EU charter of Fundamental Rights threaten the supremacy ofCommunity Law? Article 53 of the
Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Papers 4/01, available at
HYPERLINK "http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.Org/papers/01/010401 .html"
http://www.jeanmom1etprogram.0rg/papers/Ol/010401 .html, M. Wathelet, "La Charte de droits
fondamentaux: un bonpas dans une course qui reste longue", 36 (2000) Cahiers de droit Europeen,
pp.585ff, F. Jacobs, "Human Rights in the European Union: the role of the Court of Justice", 26 (2001)
European Law Review, pp.33 Iff. and T. Kyriakou, "The impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
on the EU system ofprotection of rights: much ado about nothing?", 5(2001) Web Journal Current legal
Issues at www.vvebjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue5/kyriakou5.htm
97 This issue will be further explored in Chapter 4.
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c) With the benefit of hindsight: some glosses on legal reasoning
The above description does not, obviously, pretend to be a complete statement of the EU
constitutional architecture. It is only a brief sketch for the development of the main
concepts that enable us to talk of the Community legal order as a constitution in practice,
ifnot in form. Even such a brief sketching, however, shows clearly that most of the
major constitutional developments were initiated by the ECJ and were ex-post facto
confirmed by the intergovernmental conferences. In fact, the major part of
constitutionalization had been completed before the Community Treaties were amended
for the first time with the Single European Act in 1986. Hence, the Court, an unelected
judicial body, was the motor of constitutionalization, the process through which a new
political entity came about.
It is interesting to remind, once again, that the EC Treaties were initially concluded in
the form of international agreements and that "although including certain novel
institutional features, they were, in line with precedent, expected to be interpreted in
accordance with the normal canons ofTreaty interpretation, one ofwhich is a
Q8
presumption against loss of sovereignty by states". The recurring question then is how
was the transformation (we saw the description of this process above, now we will turn
to the normative explanation of it) of traditional multipartite international treaties into
the constitution of a quasi-federal Europe brought about?
The Court of Justice tried to ensure the effectiveness ofCommunity law (which would at
the same time secure its own effectiveness) without entering any political conflicts. Each
one of the fore-mentioned major constitutional judgements" was presented as the logical
consequence of a previous one and was thus, grounded, in settled precedent. Hence,
according to its self-descriptions, the Court functioned within the limits of a legalist
98 As quoted by Richard Kuper, The politics of the European Court ofJustice, London: Kogan Page,
1998, p.270.
99 With the exception, of course of Van Gend en Loos, which was the first case that broke with
international law. More will be said about the justification of this case in the next pages.
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world that is hermetically closed to considerations ofpower, while legal integration is
presented as a fait accompli that came about solely through the power of the law.
Joerges describes the paradox of the Community legal self-referentiality as follows: "It
is as fascinating for legal sociologists and political scientists as Baron von
Munchhausen's tale about pulling himself out of a swamp by his hair: can it really be
true that, by its own resources, the law raised itself above inter-governmental politics
and imposed its validity on sovereign states?"100
Burley and Mattli take this one step further and expose the inevitably political meaning
of the self-referential and 'politically neutral' development of Community law: "At a
minimum the margin of insulation necessary to promote integration requires that judges
themselves appear to be practising law rather than politics. Their political freedom of
action thus depends on a minimal degree of fidelity to both substantive law and the
methodological constraints imposed by legal reasoning." They conclude that "the
staunch insistence on legal realities as distinct from political realities may in fact be a
political tool".101
Given that law has its own normative criteria and that the authority of any court
judgement, lacking inherent or direct democratic legitimacy, depends primarily on its
legal justification, in this part I will start with an analysis of the legal reasoning methods
employed by the ECJ. After examining some interesting aspects of these
methodologies, I will explore the significance of the judicial development of the EU
constitutional Charter.
Since the principle of supremacy was presented as the corollary of taking the doctrine of
direct effect seriously, and then later the protection of fundamental rights was again put
forward as an indispensable means of defending the supremacy of EC law vis a vis the
100 C. Joerges, "The Law in the Process of Constitutionalising Europe", EUI Working Paper LA WNo.
2002/4, p.6.
101 A.-M. Burley and W. Mattli, "Europe before the Court: a Political Theory of Integration", 47 (1993)
International Organization, p.44.
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constitutions/ constitutionally protected rights of the Member States, it seems in a way
that the principle of direct effect was not only the first, but also the most important
building block in the process of constitutionalization. Once that step was taken,
everything else was presented as flowing from it; the process of integration was then
presented as irreversible and acquired an almost natural momentum of its own. This is
why I will not only start from, but I will also insist, to a great extent, on the analysis of
1
the justification given in Van Gend en Loos. My intention is to raise some question-
marks regarding the "naturalness" of the constitutional narrative that the ECJ has
constructed.
In Van Gend en Loos, as we saw, the Court decided that: "The Community constitutes a
new legal order of international law for the benefit ofwhich the states have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects ofwhich comprise not only
Member States, but also their nationals"(my emphasis). The Court adopted a particular
type of formal reasoning in this case (which was solemnly repeated in the consequent
cases), giving the form of a straightforward syllogism to its judgement. This model of
justification argues that the decision can be obtained from the premises. Formal
reasoning is associated with judicial neutrality and thus corresponds to the traditional
conception of the role ofjudges as appliers of pre-existing law rather than legislators. It
also denies judicial discretion and presents judicial decisions as independent of political
or any other type of non-legal considerations. This in its turn enhances the authority of
Courts and contributes to the acceptance of and compliance with their decisions by the
citizens.
In line with the ideas put forward by formalism, the legal reasoning of the ECJ is, or
102 Mancini and Keeling describe the importance of Van Gend en Loos as follows: "The epithet 'landmark'
is sometimes bestowed too frivolously on judicial decisions that do not deserve it. But surely no-one
would contest the claim of the Van Gend en Loos judgement to be described thus. It is rare that judges are
given a chance to change the course of history. But if the European Community still exists 50 or 100 years
from now, historians will look back on Van Gend en Loos as the unique judicial contribution to the
making of Europe." G.F. Mancini, D. Keeling, "Democracy and the European Court of Justice", 57 (1994)
Modem Law Review, p. 183.
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rather presents itself, as limited to deductive reasoning. Deductive argumentation,
however, "cannot guide us to the very end of the chain of justifications".103 It only
operates on an intermediate or inferential level. What deductive reasoning tells us is that
if the premises of our syllogism are true, then our conclusion/decision, ought also to be
tme. And this means that there is a further need to give reasons for the premises from
which deductive justification proceeds. 104
One does not need to explain in detail why formalism is not an accurate depiction of the
way any legal system actually works. The open texture of language, the indeterminacy
of legislative scope/aim and the inability to predict the developments in all spheres of
life indicate some of the difficulties one is confronted with in the formulation of the
premises (particularly the major premise). And it has not been just the realists who
reacted against formalism105. In light of the above mentioned difficulties, even
positivists like Hart,106 Alexy107 and MacCormick108 have accepted that the automatic
processes of syllogisms are unable to exhaust all legal reasoning.
But if legal reasoning, in general, cannot be fully contained by the processes of formal
reasoning, it is extremely unrealistic to expect that Community law could do so, since
103 J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court ofJustice, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993, p.152.
104 Bengoetxea admits, however, that our ultimate normative premisses are not the product of a chain of
logical reasonings. He continues that "once we have climbed to the initial premisses, the deductive ladder
can be dropped and an engagement is necessary, a personal and autonomous commitment to a certain
value-system postulated by no one but ourselves and to a deeper value: to participate in a discourse." Ibid.,
pp. 152-153.
105 For an analysis of the different versions of realism see J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, London: P.
Smith, 1949, J. Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice, New York: Atheneum,
1963, O.W. Holmes "The Path of the Law", 10 (1897) Harvard Law Review, p.457, K.N. Llewellyn,
"Some Realism about Realism", 44 (1931) Harvard Law Review, p. 1222, R. Pound, "The Call for a
Realist Jurisprudence, 44 (1931) Harvard Law Review, p. 697.
106 In Hart's words "it is a feature of human predicament (and so of the legislative one) that we labour
under two connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some
sphere of conduct by means of general standards to be used without further official direction on particular
occasions. The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our relative indeterminacy of
aim-" H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.125.
107 R. Alexy, A Theory ofLegal Argumentation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
108 N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
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there are so many more sources of indeterminacy at this level.109 Such problems are
exacerbated at the Community level where we have a plurality of legal systems
reflecting different legal cultures, different social values and different interests (both
national and ideological). As Lord Mackenzie Stuart, a former member of the ECJ, puts
it "it has been known for those who sought to negotiate a text and who have been unable
to agree, to settle for an ambiguous expression in the hope that the Court would one day
be able to resolve the ambiguity."110 In other words, agreement at the Community level
is very frequently reached in the form ofwords when there is no agreement on what the
words mean.111
Moving on to the formation and justification of the major premise in the ECJ
syllogisms/judgements, we can see that this involved a teleological approach to the
meaning of the Treaty. The teleological tradition "allows the 'ultimate purpose' of a
piece of legislation to be taken into consideration. This means that it is entirely
legitimate, with respect to a particular text, to take not only the exact purpose of the
words into account, but also anything that may usefully and convincingly be adduced
about the intention behind the words."112
The problem with teleological interpretation, however, lies in the possible duality or
even plurality of "teli" and the eventual identification of the right "telos". In other
words, how do we establish the telos of the legislative material to be interpreted? Do we
look at the intent of the founding fathers/legislators in order to establish the telos of a
Treaty/provision etc (subjective teleological interpretation) or does the legislative text,
situated as it is within the legal system, acquire autonomy vis a vis its authors and can
109 T. Hartley, "Five Forms of uncertainty in European Community Law", 55 (1996) Cambridge Law
Journal, p.265.
110 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities and the Rule ofLaw, London: Stevens & Sons,
1977, p.81.
111 Thus, Lord Denning argues that "the Treaty lacks precision.. .It uses words and phrases without
defining what they mean.. .All the way through the Treaty there are gaps and lacunae. They have to be
filled by the judges, or by regulations and directives. It is the European way". In Bulmer v. Bollinger
[1974] 2 WLR 202.
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raise a claim to a telos not necessarily envisaged by its drafters (objective teleological
interpretation)?113
In the Van Gend en Loos case the ECJ paid relatively little attention to the apparent
intent of the contracting parties'14 -suffice it to remind here that three of the six at the
time Member States explicitly disagreed with the interpretation put forward by the ECJ-
and postulated instead a certain conception of integration as the telos of the
communities. Having identified an ever-growing vertical integration as the raison d' etre
of the EEC, the ECJ was then able to proceed with its teleological interpretation. This
particular identification was justified by reference to the objectives stated in the
Preamble of the EC Treaty, especially the mention of a "union among the peoples of
Europe". The political and potentially simply declaratory character of these objectives115
became automatically part of the Community legal system and was then translated into
operational constitutional law.
In following this interpretative route, the Court never acknowledged the existence of any
other hermeneutic alternatives. The ideological gap between the preamble's reference to
a union among peoples (which may indeed be taken as an indication towards the
construction of a supranational entity) and Art. 100 EC Treaty, which back then
established the requirement of unconditional unanimity in the decision-making processes
of the Council (thus emphasising the intergovernmental character of the Community)
was conveniently silenced. This silencing enabled the ECJ to present its own reasoning
112 T. Bainbridge and A. Teasdale, The Penguin Companion to European Law, London: Penguin, 1995,
pp.99-100.
113 For the distinction between the two see S. Douglas Scott, Constitutional Law ofthe European Union,
Essex: Pearson Education, 2002, p.208. Douglas Scott refers to the subjective teleological interpretation as
the "historical interpretation."
'14 Besides, the work ofAlan Milward has established beyond reasonable doubt that according to the
founding fathers' intention and despite the limitations of national sovereignty this would entail, the EC
Treaty did not represent "the intellectual counter-current to European nationalism, which it is so often said
to represent, but....a further stage in the reassertion of the role of the nation-state. The common policies of
the European Community came into being in the attempt to uphold and stabilise the post-war consensus on
which the European nation state was rebuilt. They were a part of the rescue of the nation-state." A.
Milward, The European Rescue ofthe Nation-State, London: Routledge, 1992.
115 It is useful to remind that the preamble is not justiciable.
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as devoid of any elements of judicial discretion.
This point is a very interesting one especially ifwe take into consideration the different
levels ofjustification that should be present in a judicial decision of this type. At the first
level we identify what is a valid answer in a legal system. Since, however, there may be
more than one valid answer, we need to proceed to the second level ofjustification that
will enable us to choose the most appropriate answer.116 The existence ofmore than one
valid answer already affirms in a way judicial discretion. At this level of second-order
justification, deductive reasoning is to no avail. This does not necessarily mean that the
judge is free to choose any of the available valid answers (as, for example, a theory like
Hart's might suggest),117 nor that there is only one acceptable answer (as Dworkin
insists).118 There are theorists who acknowledge the existence ofjudicial discretion, yet
try to tame it through the use of certain criteria/rules ofjustification.
According to MacCormick, judges do have a scope of discretion, but they also have the
duty to give only such decisions as can be justified by a good justificatory argument119
and they can only exercise their discretion in accordance with constraints posed by the
legal system as a whole. Thus, in cases where problems of interpretation or classification
of the rules are raised, then the justification of decision must look beyond the rules; "if
there is no relevant principle or analogy to support a decision, that decision lacks legal
justification; and if there is a relevant principle or analogy the decision supported
thereby is a justifiable decision- but the adduction of the principle or analogy, although
116 Compare H.L.A. Hart, op. cit. fn. 106, R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998 and
N. MacCormick, op. cit. fn. 108.
117 According to Hart, rules have a core of certainty and a penumbra of vagueness and open texture, so in
cases outside the core of certainty (hard cases), judges "must exercise a discretion, and there is no
possibility of treating the question raised by the various cases as if there were one uniquely correct answer
to be found, as distinct from an answer which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting
interests", op. cit. fn. 106, pp.123-128.
118 According to Dworkin, a constructive interpretation based on principles can yield "the one right
answer" that fits and justifies the legal system as a whole and it can consequently eliminate the judicial
discretion that positivists like Hart have affirmed in hard cases. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,
London: Duckworth, 1977 and R. Dworkin, op.cit. fn. 116, pp.225ff.
119 N. MacCormick, op. cit. fn. 108, p.250.
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necessary to is not sufficient for a complete justification of the decision."120
He continues that "the ruling which directly governs the case must be tested by
consequentialist argument as well as by the argument from coherence involved in the
appeal to principle and analogy. And just as the absence of any supporting principle or
analogy renders a decision impermissible, so the test for consistency must be applied: it
must be shown that the ruling in question does not controvert any established rule of
law, given a proper interpretation or explanation of such a rule in the light ofprinciple
and policy."121 The discretion then allowed to judges is a limited one and it is a
discretion to give the decision which is best justified within the existing requirements of
the system the judges purport to serve.
MacCormick, however, unlike Dworkin, accepts that the requirements of the legal
system can only offer modes of argument to justify a decision, but that these do not
settle what decision is in the end completely justified. There is, in his view, an
inexhaustibly residual area ofpure practical disagreement. At the level of second-order
justification, as opposed to a simple deductive (or first-level) justification, there are
different, competing, but equally well justified answers to the same question. At this
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level one needs to justify choices between rival possible rulings.
This second order justification seems to be absent from the ECJ case law. The Court of
Justice has been presenting its rulings as a logical consequence of the Treaty rules
without even acknowledging its exercise of judicial discretion or the different conflicts
of values involved in the cases it decides.123 The application and interpretation of law
120 ibid.
121 ibid. It would be interesting to see, for example, if the ruling in Van Gend en Loos case came into
conflict with prior constitutional rules of the Member States regarding national sovereignty etc.
122 ibid., p. 101.
123 Miguel Poiares-Maduro gives a very good example of the Court's tendency to silence such a conflict of
values arising from the application of free movement rules to a large area of national economic, social and
cultural policies. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 731 which is the leading case in
free movement of goods is a clear example of formal reasoning. The main issue in this case was " the
validity under Community law of a Belgian provision requiring that imported goods bearing a designation
120
has always been presented as fitting perfectly the patterns of syllogistic reasoning.124
This adoption of formal reasoning has helped the ECJ preserve an image of neutrality
and impartiality and thus establish its judicial authority.125 Since the Court ignored
conflicts of values and presented its own judgements as "the inevitable working out of
the correct implications of the constitutional text",126 the specific internal logic of legal
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rules became "the determinant factor of interpretation, independent of the context".
However, as Holmes (and other realists) had long ago stressed, the fact that "judges
themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty ofweighing considerations of
social advantage" does not do away with the problem, as "the duty is inevitable, and the
result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is
simply to leave the very ground and foundation ofjudgements inarticulate, and often
unconscious."128
It is interesting, however, to turn to the way the judges themselves have viewed
interpretation within the context of the EC/EU. Judge Kakouris insists that the Court is a
selfless reflection of the conscience of Europe; it never makes law, but always finds it in
the "Idea of Law"129. Kutscher (president of the Court elected in 1976), on the other
hand, connects teleological interpretation with a certain dynamism: "The principle of
progressive integration of the Member States in order to attain the objectives of the
of origin should be accompanied by a certificate of origin." The Court stated: "All trading rules enacted by
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions".
The Court presented this as the only possible legal decision. It did not acknowledge at any point its
judicial discretion and the fact that Art. 30 provided a choice among different major premises. See M.
Poiares-Maduro, We, the Court, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998, p.21.
124 For a different opinion see J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning ofthe European Court ofJustice,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
125 J. Weiler, "Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European
Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration", 31 (1993) Journal ofCommon Market Studies,
p.432.
126 M. Shapiro, "Comparative Law and Comparative Politics", 53 (1980) Southern California Law Review,
p.538.
127 M. Poiares Maduro, op. cit. fn. 123, p.23.
128 O.W. Holmes, "The Path of Law", 10 (1897) Harvard Law Review, p.467.
129 And he continues that "the peoples of Europe expect from the Court the concretisation of values that
come from the Absolute, from the idea of Law". See C. Kakouris, "La Cour de Justice des Communautes
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Treaty does not only comprise a political requirement; it amounts rather to a Community
legal principle which the Court of Justice has to bear in mind when interpreting
Community law, if it is to discharge in a proper manner its allotted task of upholding the
law when it interprets and applies the Treaties."130 Similarly Judge Pescatore views the
objective of economic and political union "as the completion of a conception left
incomplete in the Treaty ofRome. Even if this project still seems far from achievement,
it has the advantage of enabling us henceforth to envisage the evolution of the
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Community in the light of a coherent and complete plan."
Judge Mancini goes even further arguing that: "The preference for Europe is determined
by the genetic code transmitted to the Court by the founding fathers, who entrusted to it
the task of ensuring that the law is observed in the application of a Treaty whose primary
objective is an 'ever closer union among the peoples ofEurope'."132 The use of the
genetic code analogy expresses very well the stance of the Court, which goes beyond
rationalisation and embraces the naturalization of the constitutional development of the
Community.133
The message is clear. " Im Zweifel fur Europa."134 "Tucked away in the fairyland
Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed with benign neglect by the powers that be and the
mass media"135 the Court has viewed the Treaties as "an embryonic federation
Europeennes comme Cour Constitutionnelle: Trois observations" in O. Due, M. Lutter and J. Schwarze
(eds) Festschriftfur Ulrich Everting, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1995, p.629 ff.
130 In 1976 when the President of the ECJ, Robert Lecourt, announced his intention to retire, the Court
called a Judicial and Academic Conference. The above is from H. Kutscher's paper, which was presented
in that conference, as quoted by H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court ofJustice,
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, p. 179.
131 P. Pescatore, The Law ofIntegration: Emergence ofa new phenomenon in International Relations
based on the experience ofthe European Communities, Leiden: A.J. Sijthoff, 1974, pp.22-23.
132 G.F. Mancini and D. Keeling, op. cit. fn. 102, p. 186.
133 Hartley gives examples of judgements in which the ECJ has not only refused to accept the natural
meaning ofTreaty provisions, but has also proceeded to interpretation contrary to the text. T. Hartley,
"The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union", 112 (1996) Law
Quarterly Review, pp. 95ff.
134 There was an article with this title (meaning "when in doubt, opt for Europe") in the Frankfurter
Rundschau of December 7, 1992.
135 E. Stein, "Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution", 75 (1981) American
Journal ofInternational Law, p.l.
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inherently committed to a process of growth by which it will become an actual
federation."136 As a result the objective of incremental integration has been postulated as
the telos of the Community/Union. In light of this postulation, the Court resorts very
often to apagogic argument (argumentum ad absurdum), the use ofwhich allows it to
eliminate the alternative meanings of a provision. In Van Gend en Loos, for example, the
direct effect ofArt. 12 EC was affirmed on the basis that had a different effect been
ascribed to this provision, the consequences would have been undesirable for and, thus,
incompatible with the (postulated) aim of incremental integration.137
In a similar vein, the Court has regularly argued that the EC system can only retain its
integrity as long as its supremacy over conflicting national law is safeguarded. The
implication is that without supremacy, integration would necessarily be destroyed.
"Even one breach in the dam would be too many, for one fissure would inevitably breed
others."138 This is usually referred to as " the ruin argument". The ruin argument goes
like that: unless the acquis communautaire is kept intact, unless the doctrines of direct
effect and supremacy retain their validity, the Communitywill disintegrate.
Furthermore, the integration project cannot stay still; it needs to constantly move
forward. This gives a quite interesting twist to the ruin argument. Somek calls it "the
bicycle theory of integration", according to which falling down can only be avoided by
constantly moving forward. "What gives life to the integration process and what
indirectly lends coherence to that which has already been achieved is that it is constantly
136 T. Hartley, op. cit. fn. 133, p. 109.
137 Derrida, commenting on Benjamin's Critique of Violence, uses the grammatical category of the future
anterior to explain the process through which law is in effect only legitimated retrospectively. A new legal
order is always inaugurated in violence (symbolic, if not physical). This violence has also been present in
the case of the establishment of the Community legal order. The Court postulated the creation of a certain
Community and this postulation relied on the use of future anterior. The use of future anterior modifies the
present to describe the symbolic violence in progress. "Those who say 'our time', while thinking 'our
present' in light of a future anterior present do not know very well, by definition, what they are saying. It
is precisely in this ignorance that the eventness of the event consists, what we naively call its presence." J.
Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation ofAuthority' " in D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D.
Gray Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice, New York/London : Routledge, 1992,
p.35.
138 S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 104.
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challenged by ambitious goals."139 This is a mentality widely shared among the
members of the Court and has been- as we saw above- the main justification for the
developments that came after the introduction of the doctrine of direct effect. Supremacy
was introduced, because otherwise direct effect would be meaningless and then later
fundamental rights had to be protected, because otherwise the supremacy of Community
law would be at a risk. The judges had "une certaine idee de 1' Europe"140 of their own
and they were determined to accord to Community law a status different from that of
international law.
It seems that the Court has viewed from the very beginning the process of integration as
legally irreversible. Thus, this particular conception of integration premised upon the
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy has been postulated as a teleological
inevitability. The founders aimed, according to the Court's interpretation, at incremental
integration, the Court as the guardian of the Treaties had to make sure that integration
would be legally brought about and new generations ofpoliticians and citizens are
deprived of the right to control the pace of the movement toward the ultimate common
goal, which is sacrosanct and therefore untouchable. Not only is the process of
integration irreversible, but the particular conception of integration that happened to
materialise has emerged as the only acceptable type of integration. Whoever puts in
question the current shape of the EC/EU, is taken to be a narrow-minded Eurosceptic
who wants to turn back the Community clock in order to favour the old schemas of the
nation-state.
It is within this context then that Shapiro caustically comments on the auto-poetic self-
descriptions of the Community legal order: "the Community as a juristic idea; the
written constitution as a sacred text; the professional commentary as a legal truth; the
case law as the inevitable working out of correct implications of the constitutional text;
139 A. Somek, "On Supranationality", European Integration online papers (EIOP) Vol.5 (2001) No 3;
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-003a.htm, p.l.
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and the constitutional court as a disembodied voice of right reason and constitutional
teleology."141
Some theorists, like Rasmussen142 and Phelan143, have analysed the argumentative
strategy of the ECJ in an effort to question the legitimacy of the Community legal order
140 The expression was used by Judge Pescatore, who observed that "the reasoning of the Court shows that
the judges had une certaine idee de 1' Europe of their own" in "The Doctrine ofDirect Effect: an infant
disease ofCommunity law", 8 (1983) European Law Review, p. 157.
141 M. Shapiro, "Comparative Law and Comparative Politics", 53 (1980) Southern California Law Review,
p.538.
142 In 1986 Hjalte Rasmussen was one of the first critics of the Community legal order. He argued that the
decisions made by the ECJ surpassed the acceptable limits of judicial power and that the ECJ actually
engaged in judicial activism. Being the first one to put in question the integrationist orthodoxy and the
formal rationality of the Court he was accused of launching a crusade against the European project. His
argument based on very systematic and extensive analyses of the ECJ case-law, was that the Court's
federalising of the EC took place in disrespect of the "legal commands of the Treaty's texts" and the
"founders' intentions", until this eventually led to a decline of the Court's judicial authority and
legitimacy. As a result of this decline, the Member States "lost their trust in the neutrality of the Court"
and the Court was dragged into judicial restraint. H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European
Court ofJustice, Dordrecht: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1986. For reviews of this book see A. G. Toth,
"Book Review", 7 (1987) Yearbook ofEuropean Law, p.411, M. Cappelletti, "Is the European Court of
Justice mnning wild?", 12 (1987)European Law Review, p.3 and J. H.H. Weiler, "The Court of Justice on
Trial", 24 (1987) Common Market Law Review, p.555. In his 1998 book (H. Rasmussen, The European
Court ofJustice, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), responding to Joseph Weiler's review of his earlier book,
Rasmussen argues that "the judicial role ought to shrink to the point where the Court's law and politics
accomplish nothing more than to compensate for what the political processes and institutions unlawfully
left undone". For a review of this book see H. Schepel, "Reconstructing Constitutionalization: Law and
Politics in the European Court of Justice", 20 (2000) Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies, p.457.
143 Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, like Rasmussen, also scrutinises the "constitutional" jurisprudence of the ECJ
and finds it contentious. He confronts the doctrines of constitutionalisation with the doctrines ofpublic
international law and he argues that the development of the Community legal order as a sui generis order
(effectuated through the rulings of the ECJ) lacked the explicit consent of the Member States and was
illegitimate to the extent that it contributed to a corrosion of the sovereignty of the Member States. Rossa
Phelan's analysis focuses on the fact that the ECJ views the supremacy of Community law as arising
directly from the Community legal order, while the national courts view the same principle as deriving
from their own national constitutions, since these enabled the member States to join the EC in the first
place. As a result, the constitutional/supreme courts of the Member States are faced with an impossible
dilemma, that of choosing between fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities under their national
constitution and following the authoritative interpretations of the ECJ. Rossa Phelan presents this as being
ultimately a dilemma of revolt (against the Community legal order) or revolution (against the national
constitutional order). His proposal is that" a European Community law constitutional rule [ought to be]
adopted to the effect that the integration of European Community law into national law is limited to the
extent necessary to avoid a legal revolution in national law. The extent to which such limitation is
necessary is to be finally determined by national constitutional authorities in accordance with the essential
commitments of the national legal order, not by the Court of Justice." D. R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution:
the Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, Dublin: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p. 417. For
a review of the same book see N. MacCormick, "Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?", 18 (1998)
Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies, p.517 and M. Poiares Maduro, "The Heteronyms ofEuropean Law", 5
(1999) European Law Journal, p.60.
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and to ensure that sovereignty is not usurped from the national level. The intention here
is not to question the legitimacy of the Community legal order; the aim is to challenge
the naturalness of its constitutional narrative. There are objections against the peculiar
combination of formal-teleological reasoning that has been employed by the Court, but
this does not necessarily mean that the Court's decisions were arbitrary144; only that their
justification was not complete. Contrary to the Court's statements, theirs was not the
only valid choice; it was just one of the valid interpretative choices which were open to
the Court and it was certainly not a natural or inevitable one. By questioning the
naturalness and the inevitability of the particular conception of integration that has been
followed so far, my intention is to re-claim some decision-making space from the past
for the present and the future.
Going back, however, to the competing, equally valid, interpretations (and justifications)
among which the Court could actually choose, one is confronted with the following
dilemma: Why was there (with very few exceptions) no serious questioning of the
Court's choices from the national courts or the political actors of the Member States at
the time? Given that the transformation brought about was a profound structural one and
that this was not, as I showed above, the one "irresistibly" right choice, why was
acquiescence and reception so easy?145 There are various explanations146 for the
144 MacCormick and Poiares Maduro (op.cit. fn. 143) agree with Rasmussen and Phelan that
constitutionalisation was not "the logical causality" of the Treaties, but they reject the objection of
illegitimacy (connected with the lack of explicit national consent) by arguing that the Member States
could have reversed the constitutionalisation process "through treaty provision or by evading the
application of community law". Besides, as MacCormick puts it, "for states such as the UK and Ireland,
which acceded to the Communities only some time subsequently to such decisions as Costa and Van
Gend, this is not quite convincing". Op. cit. fn. 143, p.525.
145 Of course there have been some 'pockets of resistance' to this quiet revolution, but not many. Weiler
distinguishes between two periods in the relationship of the ECJ with its main interlocutors: the first one,
until the SEA, was a period of extended honeymoon, and the post-SEA period, which is one with "all the
ups and downs of a mature marriage" in J. Weiler, "Journey to an Unknown Destination: a Retrospective
and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration", 31 (1993) Journal
ofCommon Market Studies, pp. 426, 433-434. For a comprehensive analysis of the reception of the
constitutional doctrines in the member States, see H.G. Schermers and D. Waelbroeck, Judicial
Protection in the European Communities, Deveneter/Boston: Kluwer, 1992.
146 See F. Snyder, "The effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and
Techniques", 56 (1993) Modern Law Review, p.19, M. Volcansek, "Judges, Courts and Policy-making in
Western Europe", 15 (1992) West European Politics, p. 1, J. Gibson and G. Caldeira, "The Legitimacy of
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paradoxical, albeit persistent, triumph ofEU law.
Starting from the national courts, whose willingness to collaborate with the ECJ seems
to have been a sine qua non of the development of the Community legal order147 not
only because they submit references under Art. 177, but also because they have the
monopoly on the execution of the Court's judgements148. Despite their vast
heterogeneity, all these courts are expressions and products ofparticular national legal
traditions, which one would normally expect them to defend. How did they overcome
their national allegiances? Why did they show such a high degree of deference to the
Court's doctrines? According to one explanation based on group relations analysis149,
the reason for this is a shared judicial identity, a common consciousness for all judges,
or even 'a similarity of species'150; this is built around the use of a common legal
discourse151. The ECJ used "the language of reasoned interpretation.. .the artefacts
which national courts would rely upon to enlist obedience within their own national
orders."152
On the other hand, there is the very important issue ofjudicial empowerment. Lower
national courts were immensely empowered through the references for preliminary
Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support and the European Court of Justice" 39 (1995)
American Political Science Review, p.459. For a more general analysis see T. Tyler, Why People Follow
the Law: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Compliance, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
147 On the dialogue between the ECJ and the national courts, see A.-M. Slaughter, M. Shapiro, A. Stone
and J. Weiler, The European Court and National Courts- Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in
its Social Context, A. Stone Sweet, ConstitutionalDialogues in the European Community, Florence:
European University Institute, 1995.
148 Weiler comments that: "When European Community law is spoken through the mouths of the national
judiciary it will also have the teeth that can be found in such a mouth and will usually enjoy whatever
enforcement value that national law will have on that occasion", op. cit. fn. 145, p.422.
149 See D. Chalmers, "Judicial Preferences and the Community Legal Order" 60 (1997) Modern Law
Review, pp.176-178.
150 Weiler, op.cit. note 145, p.425.
151 Formalism is one important aspect of this discourse. When the ECJ interpretation on the direct effect of
directives (case Van Duyn ) did not follow the conventions of formalistic reasoning, the national
judiciaries reacted negatively. The ECJ qualified its original reasoning in subsequent cases (Ratti, Becker
and Marshall). For a discussion of this, see J. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe", 100 (1991) Yale
Law Journal, p.2403.
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rulings and the dialogue established thereby between them and the ECJ. Even in
countries in which the concept ofjudicial review was non-existent, lower courts were
given power ofjudicial review over the executive and the legislative powers. This was a
novelty in some countries because the concept ofjudicial review was non-existent prior
to the development of the Community legal order, while in others where the concept
(and the practice) existed, it was mainly reserved to the highest courts. Thus, the
enthusiastic acceptance of the Community constitutional doctrines by the national
(lower) courts can be viewed as a way of challenging their own national hierarchies153.
As far as the acquiescence of the political actors is concerned, one needs to keep in mind
that EU law is highly technical and therefore obscure to the non-specialists. Legal
processes are conducted in an insular, specialised discourse meaningfully distinct from
the "normal", power and interest based language ofpolitics and political science. Put
baldly, governments could not predict the full spectrum of the ECJ decisions at the time
these were given and " did not understand what was happening until it was too late,
presumably until the costs of changing the system had risen to unacceptably high
levels."154 Weiler himself admits that the constitutional revolution was not immediately
apparent even to relatively informed audiences.155 Besides, the legal principles put
forward by the Court in its decisions were only given full effect in decisions following
those in which they were initially introduced. Reactions were understandably softened
by the time delay and by the compliance of their national judiciary (as respect for the
rule of law is a deeply rooted principle in European legal culture). The non-resistance of
the national governments was further facilitated by the fact that even though the Court
was occasionally perceived to be policy driven, it meticulously abstained from inter-
152 J. Weiler, "Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European
Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration" 31 (1993) Journal ofCommon Market Studies,
pp.424-425.
153 There is also the argument based on reciprocity and trans-national judicial cross-fertilisation, according
to which judges working in a transnational context are interested in what their colleagues on other
Member-States are doing. Once a trend of acceptance is established, it is difficult for a judge to resist what
other judges have accepted.
154 For an analysis of this argument see W. Mattli and A-M. Slaughter, "Law and Politics in the European
Union: a reply to Garett", 49 (1995) International Organisation, pp.183-190.
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state politics and was neutral, not favouring in its judgements any particular Member
State.
It has also been argued that the "informed audiences" wishing to further integration
actually welcomed the silencing of the conflicts offered by the legal authority of the
Court judgements. According to this explanation the political actors themselves desired
the developments put forward by the ECJ and consciously looked the other way as the
Community expanded. At a point when political supranationalism was weak and the
capacity to reach decisions in the political forum was limited, it was easier to achieve
integration through law rather than politics. By letting the court make policy choices, the
supranational political actors could avoid conflicts that might undermine the impetus of
integration.
Game theory analysts,156 on the other hand, have suggested that the governments of the
individual member-states welcomed the development of the Community legal order and
the consequent growing power of the ECJ on the basis that a strong, independent Court
would ensure the even application ofCommunity law, thus advancing their collective
agenda and saving individual governments the trouble to worry about the compliance of
their partners with their contractual obligations. As Chalmers puts it "the development of
the Community legal order has solved the prisoner's dilemma for most governments;
namely the problem of complying with EC law without being able to ensure that others
will do so."157
I will not enter any further analysis158 of the empirical reasons for which this de facto
155 J. Weiler, op. cit. fn. 152.
156 See for example G. Garett, " International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European
Community's Internal Market", 46 (1992) International Organization, pp. 557-558.
157 D. Chalmers, "Judicial Preferences and the Community Legal Order" in 60 (1997) Modern Law
Review, p. 173.
158 For an analysis for example of the role academia has played in the acceptance of the ECJ's
coJistitutional doctrines, see D. Chalmers, "Community Trade mark Courts: the Renaissance of an
ppistemic Community?" in J. Lonbay and A. Biondi (eds) Remedies for Breach ofEC Law, Chichester:
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constitutionalization prevailed in the end. If I have briefly touched upon them, it is only
because I want to clarify that my intention is not to attribute to the ECJ exclusive
responsibility for the juridification of the EU constitutional process159. For the purposes
ofmy argument it is important that the constitutionalization process took place in the
absence of a political debate; it is not important to identify "the guilty parts".
Let us now shift the focus from the singularity of our inherited EU constitutional
vocabulary to analysing the significance of the fact that this vocabulary was judicially,
rather than politically, constructed. Before I explore the latent meanings ofjuridification
and given that in the preceding paragraphs I accepted that the deployment of
constitutionalization involved multiple interlocutors, let me briefly reiterate why I insist
that the constitutionalization process took place in the absence of any public political
debate. We saw that most constitutional changes were introduced through the ECJ's
case-law and were later confirmed (sometimes under the general umbrella "respect of
the acquis communautaire") or further enhanced by the intergovernmental conferences.
One could claim that the intergovernmental conferences, preceding all official
amendments of the Treaties, offered the political forum within which such a public
political debate could, and actually did, take place. Or, indeed, that the ratification of the
amended Treaties, taking place in each Member State according to their own
constitutional provisions, is an expression of the Member States' democratic institutions
(or the European electorate's in the cases in which there is the requirement of a
referendum) and, thus, a perfectly authentic political process, capable of re-balancing the
initial political deficit of the process.
As far as the temporal reversal of praxis and deliberation is concerned (first the Court
John Wiley, 1997 and J. Weiler, "A quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors"
26 (1994) Comparative Political Studies, p.510.
159 The Member States governments could have, if they so wished, reversed the developments put forward
by the ECJ by amending the Treaties. They could have equally easily changed the function and the role of
the ECJ through amendment of the relevant Treaty provisions (e.g. limitation of its jurisdiction).
According to one reading, the Treaty on the European Union, with the introduction of the two
intergovernmental pillars, upon which the ECJ enjoys a very limited monitoring role, can be viewed as an
attempt to put limits to the ECJ's (self) expanding competence.
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develops aspects of the EU constitution and then the political actors participate in a
debate about it), I will just refer back to the objections raised in Chapter 1 (see Weiler's
suggestion that "we do and then we hearken"). I argued there that the very meaning of
deliberation consists in enlightening the participating subjects and in enabling them to
reach an understanding of each other's positions and to make the best decisions. If the
decision-making process precedes deliberation, then the latter can only be used
functionally as a method of rationalisation (and thus legitimation) of the decisions that
have already been made. "The work of the public mind is logically and practically prior
to the process through which a society determines its collective willing and acting".160
Putting aside for the time being the fundamental importance of this temporal reversal,
however, ifwe were to concentrate on the intergovernmental conferences as the source
for the political input of the constitutionalization process, we would still be facing a
major disappointment. The intergovernmental conferences are based on negotiation of
interests rather than deliberation. To make things worse, this negotiation of interests,
following the secretive routes and rules of diplomacy, is not open to public scrutiny (not
to mention participation of the wider civil society)161. Openness, inclusiveness and
transparency are absent from the state-dominated IGCs, while tough bargaining and
closed diplomacy are the rules of the game. Allott is adamant that ".. .the infinitely
complex phenomenon known as politics, which is at the heart of the process ofwill
formation in a democracy can (not) be transmuted and subsumed in a bargaining process
among the controllers of the respective public realms, spuriously legitimated by
mobilizing the ante-hoc or post-hoc consent of this or that institution within the member
States."162 He, thus, denounces as one of the major fallacies of the EU the idea that
democracy can be conducted as if it were a species of diplomacy.
160 P. Allott, "The crisis of European Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Revolution in Europe", 34
(1997) Common Market Law Review, p.489.
161 Jon Elster observes that it is common in consociational political regimes that politics takes the form of
elite negotiations behind closed doors and that members of the elites reach agreement among themselves
without any further popular consultations. J. Elster, "Ways of constitution-making" in A. Hadenius (ed.),





On the other hand, the ratification processes taking place at the national level have a
take-it- or-leave-it character, which means that the ambit of any deliberative process
they are associated with, is materially seriously limited from the very beginning.
Participation in the debate concerning ratification ofTreaty amendments cannot affect
the actual substance of these amendments. The substantive part of the amendments is
formulated by the executive branches of the member States, who in their turn depend
upon the high technical competence of civil servants. Needless to say, the fragmented
strictly national character of the ratifying processes is not in any case conducive to the
creation of a European-wide forum.
Besides, ifwe were to accept, for the sake of the argument, that the post hoc approval of
the judicial initiatives, through their adoption by the IGCs as Treaty amendments and the
ratifying processes at the national level fulfil the conditions of exercise of the political
and the requirements ofpolitical consent, we would be, yet again, confronted with
another interesting reversal. The voting procedure for Treaty amendments at
intergovernmental conferences is unanimity; unless all Member States agree, Treaty
Amendments cannot take place. If, however, the Court passes a judgement which
effectively amends the Treaties (and most of its constitutional judgements have done so),
this judgement can only be reversed by a unanimous decision of the Member States at
the IGC; one Member State could block this reversal. So in a way, Treaty amendments
effectuated through the Court's judgements seem to be procedurally privileged vis a vis
their political counter-part (Treaty amendments put forward by the Member States at
intergovernmental conferences). In one case amendments require unanimity, in the
other, it is their reversal that requires unanimity.
132
d) The significance of juridification in the EU context
So far I have argued that the EU has a constitutional charter (albeit one without some of
the classical conditions of constitutionalism) and that despite the occasional post-hoc
political confirmation, this constitutional charter has been judicially built in the absence
of a political debate. Thus, the synopsis of the first two parts could be "constitutional
law without constitutional politics". This means that we have witnessed a judicialisation
of our constitutional life in the EU. The EU has substituted to a great extent litigation for
legislation and formal constitutional amendment. Furthermore, it has substituted
litigation for public deliberation and for the exercise ofprimary constituent power. In
this part I will examine the significance of this substitution.
Judicialization is an expression of juridification. Juridification is the process through
which the social sphere is almost exclusively regulated by law, and judicialisation is the
particular type ofjuridification that privileges the judicial/litigious expression of law.
Juridification signifies a privileging of law over politics163, while judicialisation is
associated with a further shift ofpower from the legislative to the judicial branch. But let
us take things gradually.
Juridification has been described as signifying among other things a 'legal pollution'164,
the bureaucratization of the world165, the colonization of the life world by law166. In his
1 f\l
article "Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions" , Teubner gives a brief
but comprehensive account of the phenomenon168. He distinguishes between three
163 There is the tendency to identify the law-making process with the political process. However, the
former is only one moment (the final moment) of the decision-making process and cannot in any case
exhaust its meaning.
164 T. Ehrlich, "Legal Pollution", New York Times Magazine (February 8), 1976, p. 17.
165 H. Jacoby, Die Burocratisierung der Welt.Ein Beitrag zur Problemgeschichte, Neuwied: Luchterland,
1969.
166 J. Habermas, "Law as Medium and Law as Institution" in G. Teubner (ed.) Dilemmas ofLaw in the
Welfare State, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1985, p.203.
167 G. Teubner, "Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions" in G. Teubner (ed) Juridification of
Social Spheres, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987.
168 For a critical analysis of Teubner's article see E. Christodoulidis, Law andReflexive Politics,
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, pp.97-101.
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different accounts ofjuridification. According to the first one, juridification
(Verrechtlichung) subsumes all tendencies towards an extension and intensification of
law, "a legal explosion", "an inflation ofnorms". Being a purely descriptive and
quantitative approach, this is not very useful as it relies upon the further definition of the
tolerable threshold of acceptable quantity of law.
According to the second approach, juridification is the expropriation of conflict. In this
view, juridification is the "process in which human conflicts are torn through
formalization out of their living context and distorted by being subjected to legal
processes"169. Juridification is the process which decontextualises social/political
conflicts and subjects them to the rationality of law. The objection is that the rationality
/language of law reduces political conflict to a legal case and applies to it legally specific
criteria of right and wrong, thereby neutralising it and excluding the possibility of a
socially rewarding resolution in the future170. "Social conflicts trigger processes in law
which formulate legally specific conflicts of expectations.. ..social conflicts are not
merely translated into legal terminology; they are reconstructed as autonomous legal
conflicts within the legal system"171. In this way, juridification functions as the
expropriation of conflict.
Those who rely on the concept ofjuridification as expropriation of conflict, usually
embrace the delegalisation movement ( delegalisation being the remedy to the
expropriation of conflict) and focus on alternatives to law172, such as arbitration, out of
court proceedings, community courts, etc. Teubner rejects this return to informal justice,
169 G. Teubner, op.cit. fn. 167, pp. 7-8.
170 For a further analysis of this argument see E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics, Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. For the incomparability and incompatibility of different 'sectoral'
rationalities and their corresponding languages see J.-F. Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988 and for a more specific application of the concept of
"differend" in the relationship between law and politics see E. Christodoulidis, S. Veitch, "The Ignominy
ofUnredeemed Politics: Revolutionary Speech as Differend", 29 (1997) International Journal of the
Semiotics ofLaw, pp. 141-157.
171 G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoetic System, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p.58.
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because it ends up "surrendering conflict to the existing power constellations." And
since he rejects the suggested strategy of dealing with the dysfunctional problems of
juridification as expropriation of conflict, he also finds this particular conception of
juridification wanting.
The third account ofjuridification analysed by Teubner is that of depoliticisation.
Focusing mainly on labour law, Teubner explains that "juridification reinforces co¬
operative trade union policies.. .at the expense of conflictive trade union policy"174. On
this account, juridification "tends to de-politicise social conflicts by drastically limiting
the labour unions' possibilities ofmilitant action"175. So in a way, the fear is that
institutionalisation of labour law relations will neutralise genuine political class
conflict176 and will "petrify the political dynamics of the working class movement."177
Once again, Teubner finds this particular concept wanting, because "it is restricted to the
politics of organised labour" and, thus, "abstains from socio-structural explanations".178
Teubner is convinced that legal sociologists have been misguided in their assessment of
juridification, by focusing on partial aspects of the phenomenon. He accepts that
juridification cannot be analysed as a universal historical phenomenon and focuses his
analysis on the juridification ofmodem regulatory law, which he then relates to Weber's
concept ofmaterialisation of formal law179. Legal explosion, expropriation of conflict
and depoliticisation are all viewed as different expressions of the juridification that has
172 For an overview of different delegalisation strategies see R. Abel (ed) The Politics ofInformal Justice,
New York: American Press, 1982 and M. Galanter, "Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and
Indigenous Law" in M. Cappelletti (ed.), Access to Justice and the Welfare State, Alphen: Sijthoff, 1981.
173 G. Teubner, op. cit. fn. 167, p.8.
174 ibid., p.9. For a further analysis of this conception of juridification see R. Erd, Verrechtichung
inclustrieller Konflikte. Normative Rahmenbedingungen des dualen Systems der Industrie, Frankfurt a.M.:
Campus, 1978.
175 G. Teubner, op. cit., fn. 167, p.9.
176 O. Kirchheimer, "Verfassungsreform und Sozialdemokratie" in O. Kirchheimer (ed.) Funktionen des
Stages und der Verfassung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972, p.79 as quoted by G. Teubner, op.cit., fn. 167,
p.9-
177 E. Fraenkel, "Die Politische Bedeutung des Arbeitsrechts" in T. Ramm (ed.), Arbeitsrecht und Politik,
Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1966, p.255, as quoted by G. Teubner, op. cit. fn. 167, p.9.
178 G.Teubner, op. cit. fn. 167, p. 10.
179 M. Weber, Economy and Society, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1978, pp. 644ff.
135
taken place in modern welfare states.180 Idraw from Teubner s analysis some
insights, which are very useful in the context ofjuridification ofEU constitutionalism.
Unlike Teubner, Christodoulidis believes that it is a mistake to reject certain definitions
ofjuridification on the basis that "they do not suggest feasible or desirable counter-
strategies".181 Christodoulidis maintains that juridification is the expropriation of
conflict. He further argues that the distinction between expropriation of conflict and
depoliticisation cannot be maintained, because the expropriation of conflict is its
depoliticisation. Hence, his account of juridification is a combination of expropriation of
conflict and depoliticisation, the latter not being restricted solely to the field of labour
law.
Christodoulidis argues that the re-enactment of conflict from law's point of view
• • • 189
inevitably expropriates and de-politicises conflict. Drawing on Luhmann , he shows
that the appropriation of conflict by the law means that conflict is institutionally
domesticated; on the one hand, external third parties (judges) enter the conflictual
interaction. On the other hand, the choice of legitimate means employed for the
resolution of the conflict is significantly restricted. Furthermore, there is a significant
filtering ofwhat can qualify as a legal conflict, since not all conflicts are litigable or
worth litigating. "Law allows for conflict selectively, by setting the thresholds of valid
dissensus, the when and how ofpossible conflict."183 Hence, legal conflict is necessarily
reduced conflict. This reduction does not only structurally change conflicts, but it
furthermore does not allow all conflicts to register.
Christodoulidis is adamant that all constitutionalism severs the reflexivity ofpolitics and
1801 will not analyse any further Teubner's concept ofmaterialisation of law, because it refers to a
particular context, the welfare state. The EU, not having a welfare policy of its own, but mostly relying on
the welfare policies of its Member States, does not, in my opinion, fit the requirements of this context.
181 E. Christodoulidis, op. cit. fn. 170, p.100.
182 The reference here is mainly to Luhmann's article "Interaction, Organisation and Society" in N.
Luhmann, The Differentiation ofSociety, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, pp. 82ff.
183 E. Christodoulidis, op. cit. fn. 170, p. xv.
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he employs systems theory to explain the incommunicability between law and politics.
Law and politics are two different systems with different functions. Law's function is to
achieve normative closure, while politics is about the on-going and reflexive process of
articulating the always changing common good. Christodoulidis views the constitution
as the vehicle that allows the systemic exigencies of law to take over the public sphere
and imbue it with their logic. His target is what he calls "the containment thesis" of the
republicans, according to which "the constitution contains the deliberative practice of a
community, the dialogue of all about all"184. The republican thesis is that
constitutionalism provides the institutional form ofpolitical communication through
freedom of speech, press etc and, hence, the constitution is the home for political
deliberation.
In my opinion the containment thesis, as reconstructed by Christodoulidis, does not do
justice to the republican ideal of the internal connection between law and politics,
because it focuses on the way law/the Constitution defines the space ofpolitical
possibility and understates the fact that the Constitution itself should be seen, according
to the republicans (at least some of them) as the continuously changing -and, therefore,
eternally temporary- outcome of an on-going process of political contestation. Politics
depends upon law because it is exercised within the legal framework set by the
constitution. At the same time, however, law's legitimacy, according to the same
republican view that Christodoulidis rebuts, relies upon a democratic process of
jurisgenesis.
Teubner argues, and I will agree with him, that juridification is part of a great historical
process185 and cannot be reversed as such. What we can do is try to compensate for its
184
ibid., pp. 61-69.
185 Habermas gives the wider historical context ofjuridification. He distinguishes between four different
thrusts of juridification, which are actually described as counter-movements to the differentiation of the
economic and political system. The first thrust led to the bourgeois state, which in West Europe
developed in the form of absolutism. The next one brought about the rule of law. In a further thrust the
democratisation of the constitutionalised power of the state was introduced by law. The last thrust, which
occurred in the social state, brought about the constitutionalisation of the economic system. The social
state controls the economic system in a similar fashion to that in which the two previous thrusts of
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negative side-effects. He accepts the inevitability of interaction between law and politics
and he suggests that we should focus our efforts on defining the conditions of a
successful structural coupling between the two systems. Teubner's approach is, hence,
premised upon the fact that a certain extent ofjuridification is the inevitable outcome of
the historical process that has given rise to constitutionalism. He realises, however, that
to denounce constitutionalism in abstracto as ideology186- and this is what
Christodoulidis does- does not do justice to the emancipatory potential of constitutional
law187.
A constitution is the intersection of law and politics. It is a legal text as much as it is a
political one. Being the intersection of two different systems, it is bound to reflect the
tension between these systems' different rationalities and aspirations. I will agree with
Christodoulidis that usually constitutions are unreflexive, fixed, perfectionist
articulations of the common good (in its procedural or substantive formulation) that
resist political change by rendering the amendment of their norms particularly difficult.
And in doing so they sometimes end up sustaining the political status quo. But this is not
a reason why we should give up on constitutionalism. There is also the possibility of
viewing the constitution as the on-going interpretation and instantiation ofpolitical
praxis and desire as articulated within a particular political culture.
Christodoulidis argues that the intersection ofpolitical decision-making and legal norm-
making that inevitably takes place through constitutional law amounts to a de facto
juridification of our political life. Some political changes never reach society, because
they disappear when they are translated into law. In this he is right. The answer to the
juridification controlled the political system. For a detailed analysis of the historical development of
juridification see J. Habermas, The Theory ofCommunicative Action, Cambridge: Polity, 1984 and J.
Habermas, "Law as Medium and Law as Institution" in G. Teubner (ed.) Dilemmas ofLaw in the Welfare
State, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1985, p.208.
186 E. Christodoulidis, op. cit. fn. 170, p. xiii where Christodoulidis announces: "I will attempt to make a
case for the critique of legal ideology".
187 See Chapter 1, where it was argued that ideology is a matter of context and cannot be diagnosed in
abstracto. Depending on the way different symbolic forms are deployed they may be ideological or
revolutionary.
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problem, however, is not to denounce constitutionalism and the possibility of adequate
communication between different systems, but to define the conditions for a successful
structural coupling against which we can evaluate particular instances of interaction
between law and politics. It is true that constitutions set out the legal conditions of
exercise ofpolitical power and they specify the procedures through which closure can be
attained, binding decisions can be made. Therefore constitutionalism legalises political
processes to a certain extent. However, the successful structural coupling of law and
politics respects the limits of the respective self-reproduction of these two different
sectors (law and politics). Depending on whether these limits are observed, we can
distinguish between different qualitative levels of constitutionalism. To reject the
constitutional project as such in the absence of any feasible alternatives would leave no
room for any qualitative stipulation as to the structure and content of the constitutional
and legal order before us. This reduction of our critical leverage vis a vis constitutional
reality would end up being disempowering rather than emancipatory. In this light,
constitutionalism, even if far from perfectly reflexive, may actually secure the reflexivity
ofpolitics in a more durable or a more workable way than any available alternative.
Christodoulidis believes that politics is about relativising givens in the light of
alternatives188.1 fully agree with him. In fact this thesis is about relativising the givens
of EU constitutionalism in the light of its alternatives. What Christodoulidis fails to do,
however, is to suggest an alternative to constitutionalism. His argument is theoretically
solid. Since, however, it is an argument about the emancipatory character ofpolitics and
given that emancipation is achieved at the level ofpraxis, not theory, the argument's
effectiveness cannot be judged against its theoretical integrity alone. I will agree with
Teubner's more pragmatic approach, according to which sometimes theoretical
arguments must be judged on the basis of the remedies/alternatives they suggest to
overcome the very problem they diagnose.
Ending this detour on juridification, let me reiterate that the concept will be used here in
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a critical sense. When I refer to the juridification of the EU constitutionalisation process,
I do not refer to the inevitable, to a certain extent, legalisation ofpolitical power that
aims at the production ofbinding decisions, but to the over-stepping of the boundaries of
self-production of the political. The argument here is that the EU constitution is an
instance of unsuccessful coupling of law and politics, because, by exercising primary
constituent power, the ECJ and the Community legal order, as a whole, did not respect
the limits of self-production ofpolitics. Let me explain why.
According to its own declarations, the EU claims to be based on the principle of
democracy (Article 6 EU Treaty). Democracy, on the other hand, is connected with
popular sovereignty18 , which signifies that the people, the demos, are placed under their
own political agency, their own rule190. In line with the above, the constituent power,
being inseparably connected with the principle of democratic sovereignty, is the power
of a collective body to exercise (through the very fundamental act of constitution giving)
its right to self-rule.191 Given a number ofpractical restrictions, the democratic ideal of
188 Op. cit. fn. 170, p. 284.
189 J. Waldron maintains, however, that the two (democracy and popular sovereignty) are not co¬
terminous. As he explains, the principle of popular sovereignty requires that the people should have
whatever constitution, whatever form of government they want, while democracy is one of the forms of
government from which the people can choose. According to this approach, popular sovereignty is
connected with the founding moment of a polity, signifying a democratic method of constitutional choice
while democracy refers to the decision procedures that will be employed in all subsequent political
decision-making. The difficulty, however, is that it is not always prima-facie obvious what the
constitutional moments of a polity are, as "these may be woven into the fabric of ordinary political life".
Thus, the attribution of popular sovereignty becomes a matter of theoretical judgement, because it requires
a decision as to what counts as constitutive of the polity in question. See J. Waldron, "Precommitment and
Disagreement" in L. Alexander (ed.) Constitutionalism, Philosophical Foundations, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 271-277.
190 This in its turn "springs from the natural law assumption that all men are by nature equally free, since
all voluntary act of free men could justify their duty to comply to any kind of human rule. Hence, only the
collective acts of free men could be accepted as the legitimate source ofpolitical rule." U. Preuss,
"Constitutional Power-making for the new polity: some deliberations on the relations between constituent
power and the Constitution" in M. Rosenfeld (ed.) Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy,
Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1994, p. 143. To the extent that the constituent power springs
from natural law, it is the secularised equivalent of the divine power to create the world ex nihilo. See C.
Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept ofSovereignty (translated by George Schwab),
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985.
191 Ulrich Preuss (ibid. pp. 143-144) distinguishes between the active making of a new order and its
gradual emergence in the course of a continual historical development. The former stance grounds the
constitution in men's will, while the latter in tradition, historical teleology or simply facticity. Edmund
Burke was one of the proponents of the latter approach, claiming that constitutions are "made by the
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popular sovereignty operates within the schemes of representative government in which
the actual production of the people's political will does not always involve their express
political exertion. But then the pressing question is can we have representation at the
constitutional level? How can we attest a constitutional system's fidelity to the
constitutional will of the people? What counts as the will of the people at this level? Can
it be that a decision by the people is equated with the vote ofmajority of their
representatives?
Bruce Ackerman's work focuses on what counts as an expression of a people's
constitutional will192. He accepts that this can never be corporately or instantaneously
present, but can only be represented by time-extended courses ofpolitical events.
He, thus, draws our attention to events disclosing the existence of a "mobilised
majority"193 in favour of a major constitutional change. In which way is a "mobilised
majority" different from one based on a simple tally of votes? It is a clear, strong,
sustained and committed majority that arises, consolidates and persists over a time
during which the fundamental, constitutional matters in question are publicly
controverted at a high level of energy and concern. During this period ofmobilized
deliberation, which is energetic and multi-vocal "apathy gives way to concern, ignorance
to information, selfishness to serious reflection on the country's future."194 There is a
great deal ofpassion and personality, action as well as argument, drama as well as
debate. The contending parties have an energetic exchange ofpublic views, they address
each other's critiques as they seek to mobilize deeper and broader support from the
peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the
people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time". Edmund Burke, Speech in the House of
Commons against Pitt's proposal for a committee to consider parliamentary reform (May 7, 1782), in D.B.
Horn & M. Ransome (eds) English Historical Documents 1714-1783, 1957, p. 226, as quoted by Preuss. It
seems that EU constitutionalism has relied more on "the peculiar circumstances" rather than on the will of
the people. In a similar vein Heidrun Abromeit and Tanja Hitzel-Cassagnes discuss the difference between
"creeping constitutionalisation", which is a process not fully politically controlled, and active
constitutional engineering. H. Abromeit and T. Hitzel- Cassagnes, "Constitutional Change and Contractual
Revision: Principles and Procedures", 5 (1999) European Law Journal, p.26.
192 B. Ackerman, We, the People: Foundations, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991.




Constitutional law is, Ackerman continues, "a conversation between generations"196,
each generation being obligated to honour the "sound and fury" ofprevious generations.
His conclusion is clear: what reveals the constitutional will of the people is their
mobilized political action. Our "reception" of constitutional law can only be based on its
being the expression of the political mobilization of the self-legislating people. This is
the ultimate criterion of constitutional authority and bindingness.
Ifwe turn to EU constitutionalism, we are confronted with judicialisation (as an
expression ofjuridification) and its concomitant depoliticization of the
constitutionalization process. Not only is the existence of a "mobilised majority" absent,
since the development of the EU constitution has failed (has not even tried?) to capture
the imagination of the political body, but also the existence of a simple vote-majority
may be questionable, since the Constitution was actually shaped by the workings of an
unelected judicial body rather than by the representatives of the political body.197
Hence, the ECJ's initiative to exercise constituent power by transforming what was
initially signed as an international treaty into a constitutional charter is problematic, due
to the fact that only the non-constituted power, namely the people, can own the
constituent power. 198
Ackerman adopts the decisional approach as far as constitutional bindingness is
195 ibid.
196 B. Ackerman, "Generation ofBetrayal", article delivered at a conference titled "Fidelity in
Constitutional Theory", pp.1519-50 (of the conference proceedings, as quoted by F. Michelman,
"Constitutional Authorship" in L. Alexander (ed.) Constitutionalism, Philosophical Foundations, pp.76-
77.
197 It is important, however, to underline at this point that when we are talking about the political body in
the EU we cannot only refer to the citizens of the Member States; as long as we want to keep the
individual identities of the European peoples intact, the Member States themselves will have their own
standing as participants in a second-order political body, co-existent to the first one that consists of the
unified European citizenry.
198 U. Preuss, "Constitutional Power-making for the new polity: some deliberations on the relations
between constituent power and the constitution" in M. Rosenfeld (ed.) Constitutionalism, Identity,
Difference and Legitimacy, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 159-160.
142
concerned. According to this, the constitution gains its bindingness and consequently its
authority by the fact that it is the intentional production of the sovereign people's will. If
we take this to be our guiding principle in constitutionalism, then constitutional legal
authority depends on constitutional legal authorship. This underlying link between
authority and authorship emphasises the political aspect of the constitution and resists
Christodoulidis' reading of all constitutionalism as an unqualified privileging of law
over politics.
This is not, however, the only theoretical possibility of attributing bindingness to the
Constitution. Constitutional bindingness may also be existential (a constitution is
binding just because it is accepted as the Country's constitution) or rational (the
constitution is binding as a product of right reason). In this chapter I have questioned the
bindingness of the EU constitution on the basis of its judicial, non-democratic
authorship. In the next chapter I will turn to the possibility of its being binding as an
expression of right reason (rational bindingness). Anticipating at this point much ofwhat
is to come, let me say that in the next chapter it will be shown that the EU constitution
can only claim the normative force of the factual. The EU constitution fulfils the
requirements of neither decisional nor rational bindingness; it can only claim to be
binding on the existential basis of its having been accepted as binding.
Not everyone, however, agrees with Ackerman's populist approach, which locates the
deliberative practice in the constitutional mobilisation of the citizenry. Even republicans
such as Michelman and Sunstein rely on more elitistic institutional solutions. For
Sunstein the best forum for constitutional politics is the legislative body, because
"representatives.. ..have the time and temperament to engage in a form of collective
reasoning."199 Furthermore, Sunstein puts forward a number of institutional safeguards
that will ensure the representatives' independence from their constituents'/lobbyists'
influence and will enhance their predisposition toward deliberation from which the
199 C. Sunstein, "Interest Groups in American Public Law", 38 (1985) Stanford Law Review, p.140.
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common good will emerge.200
Michelman, on the other hand, although acknowledging Ackerman's project as "the
most deeply populist and genuinely republican one", dismisses the criterion ofpopular
mobilisation on the basis that actual episodes of constitutional politics are rare.
In Ackerman's theory the court's interpretative choices are defined by prior
jurisgenerative constitutional moments, which in their turn are expressions ofprior
popular mobilisation. This means that "the judiciary is cast as the agent of our
constitutional past... it cannot also be a spontaneous agent of our future.. .the judiciary's
role in the process of constitutional change is benedictory rather than prophetic."201
Michelman wishes to enhance the Court's ability to play a prophetic role by becoming
the very bearer of constitutional transformation. This is a case of virtual representation;
the nine members of the US Supreme Court, prior to reaching a decision they engage in
a dialogue that represents the missing dialogue of the people.202 Under this approach the
counter-majoritarian paradox ofjudicial review is reversed; the judge's role is not
restricting but facilitating the political process.
This view is very close to the ECJ's self-declarations as to its own role within the
Community legal order. In the absence of popular/political participation, the ECJ has
taken it on itself to keep the dialogue about the Community going. The problem is that
by assuming this role and by "offering" this institutional solution to the lack of
participatory politics, the ECJ has contributed to the very institutionalisation of the
absence of participation. And this is exactly the crux of elitist approaches, such as these
that have been put forward by Sunstein and Michelman. It is very difficult, ifnot
impossible for them, to argue persuasively in favour of self-rule and autonomy, when
their point of departure is one of distrust of the outcome ofparticipatory democracy.
The first objection to the judicial constitution-making that has taken place in the EU, as
201 F. Michelman, "Law's Republic", 97 (1988) Yale Law Journal, p. 1521.
described above, is that it has happened in the absence of a genuine political debate, and,
consequently, without the participation of the people, thus defying the principle of
popular sovereignty. One could, however, argue that the citizens have actually
contributed indirectly in the incremental building of the EU constitution by participating
in the litigation before the Court of Justice. In fact, members of the Court have attempted
to rebut the objection regarding the procedural lack of democratic legitimacy in the
construction of the EU constitution, by presenting the subjectivation of the Treaties as
the mode of legitimation par excellence, which allowed the citizens to participate in the
shaping of the EU constitutional order. In their analysis of Van Gend en Loos, Mancini
and Keeling insist that: "The effect of Van Gend en Loos was to take community law out
of the hands ofpoliticians and bureaucrats and to give it to the people. Of all the Court's
democratising achievements none can rank so highly in practical terms..." The
argument is that the combined effect of the principle of direct effect and the use ofArt.
177 EC (preliminary rulings) has broadened considerably the possibilities for all private
persons to participate in the European legal discourse and thereby influence its shaping.
According to this approach, participation and representation in the European judicial
process was the substitute for participation in the political process.
Against this stance, I will argue that participation in the judicial process is not an
adequate substitute for participation in the political process. Furthermore, I will maintain
that this particular substitution is responsible for the biased structuring of the EU
constitution. As far as my first claim is concerned, the one regarding the inadequacy of
the substitution of litigation for politics, this is based on the following: participating in
the political process contrary to what the liberals may suggest, is not just about
bargaining within a framework of constitutional procedural rules. To go back to Arendt
"the realm ofpolitics is the organisation of the people as it arises out of acting and
speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this
202 F. Michelman, "Foreword: Traces of self-government, 100 (1986) Harvard Law Review, p.77.
203 G.F. Mancini and D.T. Keeling, "Democracy and the European Court of Justice", 57 (1994) Modern
Law Review, p. 183.
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purpose "204 This stance brings to the fore the constitutive element of the political
process. It is in the very process ofpolitical participation that the citizens engage with
one another and their feeling ofbelongingness to the same political community is
forged. Obviously litigation cannot claim any such formative character as it polarises the
participating parties. The litigants are opponents; they do not try to reach a common
understanding of the issues at stake; they are simply trying to persuade the judge/jury
about the rightness of their own claims. Hence, communication gives way to persuasion.
I mentioned earlier that to view participation in the judicial process as a substitute for
participation in the political process severs the constitutive character ofpolitics. I further
claimed that this particular substitution is responsible for the biased structuring of the
EU constitution. Let me explain why. The institutional complexity of the EU in
combination with the lack of other alternative political proceedings usually initiated by
political parties have intensified the juridification of the EU political process. As a result
of this generalised juridification, "many actors, both public and private, view the legal
sphere as a battleground where they can secure results unattainable through more
classical political channels."205 As far as the use of litigation by public actors is
concerned, the best example can be found in the inter-institutional disputes that
eventually enabled the Parliament to acquire locus standi and to safeguard its
prerogatives.206
Similarly, in the private sphere, juridification is reflected in the strategic use of litigation
by individual actors. Private individuals realised that participating in the EU judicial
process (rather than the EU political process) was a more efficient way ofpursuing their
204 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958, p. 198.
205 R. Dehousse, "Integration through Law revisited: some thoughts on the Juridification of the European
Political Process" in F. Snyder (ed.) The Europeanisation ofLaw: The Legal Effects ofEuropean
Integration, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 16. See also R. Dehousse, The European Court ofJustice-
The Politics ofJudicial Integration, London: MacMillan Press, 1998.
206 Failing to wrest a Treaty revision from the Member States, the Parliament endeavoured to convince the
Court that it ought to have similar prerogatives to the Council or the Commission. On the saga of the
judicial expansion of the European Parliament's prerogatives see the following cases: Roquette Freres v.
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interests. This led to the emergence of "repeat players", actors who have the necessary
resources and experience to face legal battles with the intention to draw the attention of
public opinion to a problem and thus achieve their objectives in the long term.207 Given,
however, how long and costly such strategic utilisation of the legal procedure can be, it
is not surprising that the majority of repeat players in the EU sphere are big financial
908
companies or interest groups . As a result, the voice given to individual participants is
not the same. Powerful corporations can participate in the judicial process to a higher
degree than other individuals. Companies have actually initiated a big part of the
litigation that has led to some of the most important constitutional judgements passed by
the ECJ. As Poiares Maduro puts it, "litigation actors have given life to a constitutional
body created by the Court, but in doing this they have also impacted on its soul"209.
One can validly claim that this is the standard outcome of formal equality when it is not
accompanied by substantive equality. The situation, however, seems to be more
complicated at the EU level, where this uneven participation in the judicial process
contributes to the creation of the constitutional instrument, which is supposed to be
setting out, among other things, the conditions ofparticipation in the political process.
So, in a way, citizens (or companies) of a higher economic status have been structurally
privileged through their indirect participation to the EU constitution shaping.
In light of these, it is fair to conclude with Dehousse that juridification aggravates the
already existing political deficit of the EU and that it helps replace "the citizen's
Commission, Case 138/79, Parliament v. Council, Case 13/83, Parliament v. Council, Case 302/87 and
Parliament v. Council, Case C-70/88.
207 For a further analysis of the significance of repeat players see M. Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come
out ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change", 8 (1974) Law and Society, pp.95-160.
208 On issues regarding litigation strategies and access to the ECJ see C. Barnard, "A European Litigation
Strategy: The Case of the Equal Opportunities Commission" in J. Shaw and G.Moore (eds.), Legal
Dynamics ofEuropean Union, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 253-272, C. Harding, "Who goes to
Court in Europe? An analysis of Litigation against the European Community", 17 (1992) European Law
Review, pp. 104-125 and C. Harlow, "Towards a Theory ofAccess to the European Court of Justice", 12
(1992) Yearbook ofEuropean Law, pp.213-248.
209 M. Poiares-Maduro.op. cit. fn.123.
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democracy founded on universal suffrage by a form ofjudicial democracy".
A considerable number of decisions has been withdrawn from the political power to pass
under the control of the judiciary. By replacing conflicts of interests with matters of
principle, judicial politics clearly contribute to de-politicise the political process.
Partisan conflict is transformed into supposedly non-controversial questions about the
proper interpretation of the Treaty. This signifies a transformation of the nature of
political debate from contingent struggle to an absolute zero-sum-game.
Another objection against the judicialisation/juridification ofEU constitutionalism is
connected with the concept of the rule of law. The ECJ often justified its recourse to
teleological reasoning whenever the Treaty was silent on an issue by reference to Art.
164 EC Treaty, according to which "the European Court is to ensure that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed." This article was
interpreted as establishing the principle of legality and as mandating the Court to
develop, or rather extrapolate the principles, which correspond to the notion of the rule
of law.211
Pescatore defends teleological interpretation as the method of interpretation par
excellence within the context of the EC and maintains that: "Contrary to a widespread
idea, this is not simply 'one method among others'. The rule oflaw being by its nature a
provision with a certain objective, the teleological method is, in the last analysis, the
decisive criterion of every legal interpretation. This is doubly true in the context of
Treaties which proceed by laying down objectives rather than substantive rules."212
The rule of law is an aspiration; it denotes an ideal state of affairs. It is widely accepted
as a fundamental requirement of any modern system of democratic government, but
210
R. Dehousse, op.cit. fn. 205, p. 27. For a similar argument see also J.-P. Chevenement, "Cinq Ans
Apres" in J.-P. Chevenement, Le Betisier de Maastricht, Paris: Arlea, 1997, pp.7-34.
211 For an analysis of the concept within the EU context see K. Bradley and A. Sutton, "European Union
and the Rule of Law" in A. Duff, J. Pinder and R. Pryce (eds) Maastricht and Beyond, London/New York:
Routledge, 1994.
212 P. Pescatore, op. cit. fn.131, p. 88.
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there is no clear consensus as to its exact content. Thus, the answers to the question what
the rule of law is cross the political spectrum from right to left. A minimalist definition
of the rule of law would be that law should consist of rules and that the government
should act in accordance with fixed and identifiable rules and principles. However, if
citizens and the government are to be ruled by the law, that means that the law must be
capable of being obeyed and of guiding action, which brings to the fore the requirement
of legal certainty. The piecemeal and incremental character of the constitutionalisation
process, as undertaken by the ECJ, has offered the advantage of flexibility, but at the
• . . . 91T
same time it is characterised by a certain lack of clarity and coherence , which
undermine the certainty required by the rule of law. This is one of the cases in which
irony seems to become a key feature ofEU action; the very same move that aims to
promote the rule of law, ends up undermining it. Similarly, we saw above that the
subjectivation of the Treaties, which took place in the absence ofpopular sovereignty,
was presented as democratically empowering the EU citizens.
Conclusions
Part Four of John Steinbeck's book East ofEden starts like this: "there is one story in the
world and only one". On a similar line, EU orthodoxy has claimed that "there is one
constitutional story in the EU and only one". And according to this story the Treaty was
meant to be the Constitution all along. The Court simply brought to the surface the text's
one and only one underlying telos. In doing so it never crossed the boundaries of
acceptable judicial power. It never undermined popular sovereignty; it only faithfully
served it. Until very recently the story that there were no alternatives to the course of the
EU constitutionalisation process monopolised theoretical accounts of the Community
legal order. By dissecting some of the constitutional moments of the EU history, I joined
the league of "the EU heretics" and showed that this stubborn claim to narrative
213 The development of the fundamental rights protection illustrates this very clearly. In Stork fundamental
rights were not recognised as part of the Community legal order, while later in Stauder they became part
of the general principles of law. See pp. 101-104 of this chapter.
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singularity may be questioned.
After clarifying that revisiting the past is a necessary task for the designing of our future,
I focused on the major constitutional judgements of the ECJ. I pointed out that these
initiated the constitutionalisation process in the EU by breaking with the usual methods
of interpretation of international law. I then turned to their justification and I found it
unsatisfactory, in that, although employing teleology, the Court never discussed the
possible choice between rival, equally valid rulings.
My intention at this point was not to question the validity of the ECJ rulings, but the
adequacy of the ECJ reasoning. It was, however, this peculiar combination of formal and
teleological reasoning that allowed Community law, basically relying on its self-
referentiality, to expand and to effectively penetrate the national legal systems.
Through its rulings, the ECJ set the course for a process that proceeded in the familiar
categories of law without ever allowing the political alternatives to be the object of a
public discussion. This signified the juridification of the constitutionalisation process in
the EU.
Drawing on Christodoulidis and Teubner's analyses, I explained that for the purposes of
my thesis, juridification does not refer to the inevitable, to a certain extent, legalisation
ofpolitics that takes place through the function of a constitution. I restrict its use,
instead, to the pathological overstepping of the boundaries between the political and the
legal systems, according to which law does not respect the limits of self-reproduction of
politics. My main concern is that the procedure of constitutionalisation in the EU never
won any genuine political dynamic of its own. The limited non-judicial constitutional
input came from the proceedings of the intergovernmental conferences, which are
mostly structured on the basis of the rules of diplomacy rather than those of deliberation.
A broad popular participation or a "mobilised majority" have been absent from the
constitutional moments of the EU. As a result, at no point has the current EU
constitutional framework been understood as the normatively willed act of the EU
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citizens.
Apart from the serious issues of legal certainty and popular sovereignty that this
piecemeal judicial process raises, it has also impacted upon the content of the EU
Constitutional Charter. The analysis of the substantive shortcomings of the EU
constitution will be given in the next chapter, where it will be shown that the particular
conception of fundamental rights that has developed in the EU, has incorporated the
logic of the market. In this part I only highlighted the fact that the
judicialisation/juridification of the EU constitution put forward the substitution of
participation in litigation for participation in the political process. Given, however, the
possibility of a strategic use of litigation by repeat players (heavily relying on
resources), participation in litigation is not always symmetrical to participation in the
political process. Therefore, this substitution, which is by now a structural feature of our
current constitutional framework in the EU, creates asymmetries in participation.
An endnote
In a speech delivered in Oxford some years ago, Delors did not hesitate to acclaim the
primacy of law in the Community, justifying it as follows: "The primacy of law in the
construction of Europe stemmed, of course, from the founding fathers' original
determination to substitute decisions based on law for those based on might, to settle
conflicts henceforward not by arms but by a rule of law accepted by all. In other words
to make law the ultima ratio regis of our continent."
This is a fine example of the rhetorical fabric ofCommunity law. The emotionally laden
use of vocabulary such as "the founding fathers", combined with a very subtle and
elegant reminder of the atrocities of the second-world war make a strong case for
juridification. It all seems very noble at first sight. Law is inimical to excesses; it speaks
the sober language of rationality. Might, on the other hand, is blindly competitive and
therefore irrational. It settles conflicts by arms, not arguments and is responsible for
disastrous havocs of the magnitude of the second world war. The antithesis between law
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and might works very well and it obviously works in favour of law.
As we saw earlier, this is a familiar tactic usually incorporated by the ruin argument214;
the alternative to integration through law is non-integration with all the dangers of intra¬
national competitions looming at the background. Here the emphasis is on integration.
The existence of different types of integration (integration through law/through politics,
integration of different paces) is conveniently silenced.
Politics, however, is not, as Delors' statement may subtly suggest, identified with pure
might; it refers to the exercise ofpower, but this exercise ofpower is actually
circumscribed by constitutional norms. And, of course, constitutional norms are legal
norms, but their content is politically defined and decided. This is the paradox, which
lies in the heart of constitutionalism. A constitution is the meeting point for the legal and
the political system. Law is politically produced, yet it limits political power.
The depiction ofpolitics as violent might that tends to be aggressive to its enemies is
very close to Carl Schmitt's conception of politics, according to which the specific
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that
between friend and enemy215. But then again Schmitt's definition of the political is not
the most widely accepted one. Yet, ironically enough, this underlying link with Schmitt,
if further pursued, would bring to the surface a very profound critique of the EU
juridification and the primacy of law over politics.
214 See pp. 123-124 of this Chapter.
215 C. Schmitt, The Concept ofthe Political, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996, p.26.
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Chapter 4
The marketisation of the Community legal order
The bourgeoisie has resolved personal worth into
exchange value, and in place of the numberless
indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single,
unconscionable freedom- Free Trade.
Marx and Engels (The Communist Manifesto)
Introduction
The theoretical analysis in Chapter 3 re-visited the official narrative of the
development of the EU constitutional order. It was shown that the EU
constitutionalising process was judicially driven and took place largely in the
absence of a political debate. This signified the juridification, and more particularly,
the judicialisation of EU constitutionalism. As a result, political conflicts of interest
have been remoulded as legal conflicts within the EU. In light of the inherent
structural features of litigation, this substitution of the legal for the political conflict
has had a significant impact upon the access and the participation ofEU citizens in
the shaping of the EU constitutional order.
In the previous chapter I alluded to three different possible sources of constitutional
bindingness: one based on authorship, one grounded on reason and one stemming
from pure performativity. The analysis in the previous chapter showed that the EU
constitution cannot claim any bindingness on the basis of democratic authorship as it
developed through the Court's case-law, without the participation of the appropriate
political forces. In this chapter I will turn to the argument that the EU constitutional
charter can claim its bindingness from reason.
In response to the criticisms raised against the judicial impetus of the EU
constitutionalisation process, a number of theorists have argued that the
constitutional initiative of the Court can draw its legitimacy from the fact that the
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Court's jurisprudence granted fundamental rights to individuals. Deirdre Curtin
defends the Court's constitutionalising enterprise as follows:
"The guarantee ofjudicial control by a court concerned to protect the rights of
individuals and their fundamental freedoms may be essential to fulfil the
characteristics of the EC Treaty as a constitutional Charter based on the rule of law.
It is also much too simplistic to believe that the only valid form of legitimacy in the
context of the Community is that of the democratic system. The rule of law and the
protection of fundamental rights, which constitute fundamental elements of any
political legitimacy do not emanate from democracy as such, but from the
independence of the judiciary. It is precisely the function of an independent judiciary
to guard the unique legal system it has been so instrumental in constituting."1
Here Curtin argues that human rights constitute a sufficient basis ofpolitical
legitimacy quite independently from the democratic or non-democratic structure of
the polity in question. Besides, her contention in the same article that "lawyers may,
after all, be better equipped than politicians for the kind ofwork the European
integration process involves"2, illustrates explicitly how, in her view, issues of
democratic representation are not necessarily insuperable impediments for the
legitimacy of the EU. It seems that for Curtin -and she is hardly alone in claiming
this3- human rights, which underlie any political legitimacy, can compensate for an
incomplete political constitution. In other words, the protection of fundamental rights
is considered to be capable of counterbalancing the democratic and political deficit
of the Union.
1 D. Curtin, "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces", 17 (1993)
Common Market Law Review, pp.65-66.
2 ibid.
3 For similar arguments in the context of the EU see also G.-F. Mancini and D.T. Keeling,
"Democracy and the European Court of Justice", 57 (1994) Modern Law Review, p. 183 and N. Reich,
"A European Constitution for Citizens: reflections on the Rethinking ofUnion and Community Law",
3 (1997) European Law Journal, pp.131-164. For amore theoretical analysis of the opposition
between the reason of rights and the passion of politics see, among others, J. Elster, Ulysses and the
Sirens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979 (where the self-binding of the people in a
democracy through the constraints of rights is likened to the binding ofUlysses to the mast of his boat
in his effort to resist the invitations of the Sirens) and S. Holmes, Passion and Constraint: on the
Theory ofLiberal Democracy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995.
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In this chapter the focus will no longer be the problematic process ofEU
constitutionalisation, but its substantive outcome. My critique will concentrate on the
actual content of the EU constitutional charter with particular emphasis on the
concept of fundamental rights. The aim of the analysis is to show that, due to the
specific conditions of their development, fundamental rights in the EU have
incorporated commodification within their inner structure and have been
conceptually subordinated to the economic objectives of the Treaties. As a result, the
EU legal/constitutional system has not only appropriated the sphere of the political
(as analysed in Chapter 3), but it has furthermore integrated the logic of the market
(as will be analysed in this chapter). This is a fundamental structural substitution that
allows the logic of the market to penetrate the Community legal order and, through
it, effectively to colonise the EU conception of the political.
In the first part of this chapter, attention will be centred on the normative evaluation
of the human rights protection in the EU. This inquiry will focus on the more specific
issue of the normative force of human rights within the Community legal order.
According to most national constitutional systems, human rights are treated as the
hierarchically highest rules ofvalidation against which other rules of law are to be
measured, whereas in the EC/EU these same rights have been assigned the status of
the general principles of law. I will explore the normative significance of this
difference.
A further analysis of the way in which the term "fundamental rights" is being used
within the EU will clarify that the initial solely economic focus of the Community
has influenced its gradual evolution into a political entity and has kept its current
political character bound and subordinated to economic definitions. This part will
reflect on some of the broader theoretical questions concerning the role of
fundamental rights in a democratic context.
According to theoretical orthodoxy, human rights are supposed to give priority to
certain interests of individuals and to insulate them from the vicissitudes of
majoritarian-based decision-making processes. I will argue that within the EC/EU
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context, human rights have not been an effective barrier to aggregate-utility
rationales, but have in fact been conceptually subordinated to the Community
objectives, interpreted as expressing ipso facto the common good of the EU.
After a brief exploration of the incomplete character of the newly established EU
citizenship and its hitherto inability to overcome the pre-existing economic
orientations ofEU fundamental rights, in the last part of this chapter I will turn to the
arguments of those who maintain that the market can be a pivotal element of
cohesion for the European Union and that it can meaningfully express the logic of
representation. I will argue that economic integration cannot offer a satisfactory basis
for representation, because it is associated with a fixed idea of usefulness, which
cannot exhaust the concept of the political. I will argue that to regard economics as
an end and politics as a means to that end constitutes a very substantive reversal,
which unavoidably affects the coherence of the legal system.
a) The marketisation of EU fundamental rights
As we saw in the previous chapter, in the original Treaties there was no legal basis
for human rights4. In response, however, to the threat that the national Courts would
opt for the supremacy of their own constitutional provisions on fundamental rights,
the ECJ recognised fundamental rights as part of the general principles of
Community law and gradually put in place an unwritten Bill ofRights5 against which
it could examine the legality ofCommunity legislation.
4 The historical reasons for such silence are well-known. Under the Draft Treaty for a European
Political Community of 1953, a prominent role was envisaged for human rights: Section I of the
European Convention ofHuman Rights and the First Protocol were to be applied in that Community
as part of its basic law. However, the project "foundered on political rocks" (namely the French
National Assembly failed to ratify the European Defence Treaty) and the three Communities set much
less ambitious goals, aiming not at creating a new form of society (at least initially), but more
modestly at regulating economic issues. Their scope was primarily economic and social aspirations
only entered the picture sporadically. For a discussion of this see A. H. Robertson, "The European
Political Community" in 29 (1952) British Yearbook ofInternational Law, p.383.
5 See Chapter 3, pp.. 100-105.
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This state ofprotection of fundamental rights in the Communities has been
repeatedly the subject of scepticism and disapproval. It has been contended that the
jurisprudential development of the rights as adopted by the ECJ was inconsistent
with the notion of fundamental rights as constituent factors of a society which claims
to be based on the rule of law and that in a pluralistic society the protection of
fundamental rights can only be provided by representative institutions with
democratic legitimacy.6
There are two important issues raised here. The first issue is that of democratic
legitimacy. Human rights are part of the constitutional structure of a polity and the
regulation of their protection is connected with the exercise of constituent power.
Essentially the constituent power is the power of a collective body to exercise
through the very act of constitution-giving its right to self-rule and is, therefore,
inseparably connected with the principle of democratic sovereignty (see previous
chapter). The second issue raised above (also explored in Chapter 3) is connected
with the concept of the rule of law. The ad hoc jurisprudential development of a
community rights corpus was by definition unsystematic and has not been able to
offer legal certainty in the sphere of protection of rights in EC law.
In view of the above criticisms7 and in the absence of accession of the Union to the
ECHR,8 which meant that the EU institutions were not directly bound by any
international human rights treaties,9 the EU Charter ofFundamental Rights was
6 M. Dauses, "The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order", 10 (1985)
Legal Issues ofEuropean Integration, p.413.
7 The decision to draft a Charter ofFundamental Rights has also been viewed as connected with the
specific legitimacy and credibility problems that the EU was facing at the time e.g. resignation of the
Commission because of allegations of corruption.
8
Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759, makes clear that the European Community
has no human rights competence, express or implied, on which specific measures can be taken. It is
not clear if the Charter of Fundamental Rights has changed this. Accession of the EU to the European
Convention could only take place after amendment to the Convention, since article 66(1) permits
accession by members of the Council ofEurope, membership of which is comprised of states only.
Alternatively, accession could take place if the EU became a state itself.
9 This again means that the individual's rights of recourse against EU institutions are more limited
than they are against national authorities. The individual has no recourse to Strasbourg in the case of
breaches of the ECHR by Union or Community Institutions. The ECJ, on the other hand, will consider
allegations of breaches of the ECHR by Union or Community institutions only in the context of a
breach ofCommunity law.
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signed.10 Given, however, that it has not been incorporated in the Treaties1', it is only
1 7 1 ^
a soft-law instrument that lacks justiciability. The Charter gives a codified
catalogue of the existing rights and raises their visibility, contributing at the same
time to their invocability by the subjects of the EU legal order14. It furthermore gives
the judicial enforcement of fundamental rights in the EU a legally more stable
foundation15 and it, thus, remedies to a certain extent the lack of clarity regarding the
corpus ofEU fundamental rights.16 Nevertheless, for the time being there is no
change in the constitutional status quo. It is true that the enumeration of fundamental
rights has now become clearer, in the sense that the rights protected by the Charter
are obviously considered to be fundamental. However, even after the signing of the
Charter, the legal status of fundamental rights in the EU has not changed and these
are still protected on the basis that they are an integral part of the general principles
ofCommunity law.
Unlike what happens in the Community legal order, where fundamental rights are
protected as general principles of law, at the national and international level these
same rights usually take the form of rules. The difference between principles and
rules is at the centre of the old jurisprudential debate concerning legal reasoning and
10 The Charter was signed during the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice.
11 This will change after the ratification of the Constitutional treaty.
12
J. Liisberg, "Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights threaten the supremacy ofCommunity
Law? Art. 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?", Harvard Jean Monnet Working
Papers 4/01, available at http://www.jeamnonnetprogram.Org/papers/01/010401 .html. On the legal
effects of the Charter see also: P. Eeckhout, "The proposed EU Charter: some reflections on its effects
in the legal systems of the EU and of its Member-States", K. Feus (ed.) The EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000, p. 104 and M.
Wathelet, "La Charte des Droits Fondamentaux: un bon pas dans une course qui reste longue", 36
(2000) Cahiers de droit Europeen, p.591.
13 The Charter has already been cited in opinions by Advocates General of the Court. See Opinion of
March 22,2001, by Advocate General Jacobs in case 270/00P, Z. v. European parliament, para. 40
where it is stated that "the Charter while itself not legally binding, proclaims a generally recognised
principle" on the right to have affairs handled by the institutions within a reasonable time. Also
opinion of February 8, 2001, by Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-173/99, BECTU, paras. 26-28:
"Formally the Charter is not in itself binding, but it includes statements which appear in large measure
to reaffirm rights which are enshrined in other instruments.. .Accordingly I consider that the Charter
provides us with the most reliable and definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to paid annual
leave constitutes a fundamental right."
14 K. Lenaerts and E. de Smitjer, " A Bill of Rights for the European Union?", 38 (2001) Common
Market Law Review, p.281.
15
ibid., p. 274.
16 The rights comprised in the Charter are without doubt fundamental rights. It could be, however, that
this list of rights is not exhaustive.
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judicial discretion. Dworkin's theory, in particular is the most prominent attempt to
bring to the fore the importance of principles. In response to Hart's theory, Dworkin
has argued that the representation of law as a system of rules fails to account for the
principles. Unlike rules, which have an all or nothing character, meaning that if they
are valid, they either determine a decision or contribute nothing to it, principles have
a dimension ofweight and may compete with each other without their validity being
put into question. Principles give arguments in this direction rather than the other
one, but do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically from them. "All
that is meant when we say that a particular principle is a principle of our law, is that
the principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a
consideration inclining in one direction or another."17 Thus, prima facie, different
particular results can be compatible with the same principle.
Similarly, Joxerramon Bengoetxea explains that both rules and principles fall under
the category of norms, but while rules "have a specific binary structure: a) a protasis
which foresees the operative facts and b) an apodosis which provides the legal
consequences of those operative facts"18, legal principles lack this binary structure
and "they do not enter into logical relations as readily as legal rules do."19 In other
words, principles are articulated at a higher level of abstraction and they operate to
rationalise rules, but do not yet determine specific outcomes. What is significant in
the EU context is that the determinatio ofprinciples takes place against the
framework of the objectives of the Community20 and it leads (as will be shown
17 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth, 1978, p.24.
18 J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning ofthe European Court ofJustice, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993, pp.60-61.
19 ibid. In the same vein Pescatore argues that principles are too general, too abstract, too broad, too
vague in order to serve as premises of a legal deduction. P. Pescatore, Introduction a la Science de
Droit, Luxembourg: Office des Imprimes de 1' Etat, 1960, p.120.
20 In his analysis of the ECJ fundamental rights case law, Manfred Dauses explains that the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States and the international treaties for the protection of
human rights, to which the ECJ resorts as sources of inspiration, do not constitute a primary source of
law in the Community legal order, but are mere sources of recognition of law (fontes cognescendi).
This means that although these sources offer inspiration and guidance and can help to ascertain the
fundamental rights of the Community legal order, the EC/EU protection of fundamental rights is,
however, autonomous, in the sense that its interpretation has to be also consistent with the distinct
characteristics and needs of the Community legal order. M. Dauses, op. cit. fn. 6, p. 411. Similarly
Clapham argues that the characterisation of fundamental rights as general principles of law enables the
ECJ "to selectively distil common practices from some Member States" and to treat them as mere
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below) to their commodification. Hence, the elasticity which is connected with the
classification of fundamental rights as general principles of law does not favour their
... 91
operation as genuine subjective rights.
The protection of rights in the EU differs from the national and international
standards not only in terms of the conceptual difference between principles and rules,
but also from a (very subtle) terminological point of view. Instead of the term
22"human rights" usually employed by national constitutional and international law ,
Community law uses the term "fundamental rights". The term "fundamental rights"
may not be a novel one, but it is the abbreviated version of "fundamental human
rights" one usually encounters outside the scope ofCommunity law as an alternative
to the standardised use of "human rights". In fact the terminological deviation is such
a subtle one that it has not to my knowledge attracted any theoretical analysis so far.
Sharing at this point a deconstructivisf s obsession with language, I believe that the
avoidance of the adjective "human" from the EU vocabulary of rights is not as casual
as it may seem. I will support this claim by reference mainly to the marketisation of
the EU conception of fundamental rights. I will argue that the incorporation of the
logic of the market by the Community legal order has brought about an
objectification of the EU conception of rights, which entails among other things that
fundamental rights are not accorded to individuals on the basis of their human
substance, but they are somehow dependent on the ability of the individuals to
establish some connection with an economic activity.
The marketisation of rights can be described as a three step process; i) elevation of
the market freedoms to the status of fundamental rights, ii) restriction of fundamental
guidelines. A. Clapham, Human Rights and the European Community: a Critical overview, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1991, pp.50-51.
21 S. O' Leary, "The Relationship between Community Citizenship and the Protection of Fundamental
Rights in Community Law", 32 (1995) Common Market Law Review, p.543. See also S. Douglas-
Scott, Constitutional Law ofthe European Union, Essex: Longman, 2002, p. 453. Besides, in
Wachauf Case 5/88 [1989] ECR at 2639-2640, the Court stated that "Member States must, as far as
possible, apply those rules in accordance with the requirements of fundamental rights protection". For
Coppel and O' Neill the use of the words "as far as possible" is a clear indication that human rights
are principles of interpretation rather than validation. J. Coppel and A. O' Neill, "The European Court
of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?", 29 (1992) Common Market Law Review, pp. 689-690.
22 Droits de 1' homme, derechos umanos, diritti dell' uomo, Menschenrechte (also, however,
Grundrechte).
160
rights in the name of the market and iii) establishment of an economic nexus as a
criterion for distribution of rights to the EU citizens.
i) The elevation ofmarket freedoms to the status of fundamental rights
As we saw above , the initial treaties were silent about fundamental rights. In fact
the only rights specifically mentioned in the Treaty were the four market freedoms
(free movement ofpersons, services, goods and capital). In Procureur de la
Republique v. ADBHU the Court stated that "it should be bome in mind that the
principles of free movement of goods and freedom of competition together with
freedom of trade as a fundamental right are general principles ofCommunity law of
which the Court ensures observance."24 Although it is not explicitly stated that the
free movement of goods and the freedom of competition are fundamental rights (in
fact it is only the freedom of trade that is defined as a fundamental right), it seems
that they are treated as general principles enjoying the same status as (the general
principles of) fundamental rights. This is one of the first cases in which the Court
flirted with the idea of raising market freedoms to the level of fundamental rights.
Three years later in UNECTEF v. Heylens, a case concerning national rules on the
possession of diplomas for admission to certain occupations, the Court further
established this line of reasoning as follows: "since free access to employment is a
fundamental right which the Treaty confers individually on each worker of the
Community, the existence of a remedy of a judicial nature against any decision of a
national authority refusing the benefit of that right is essential in order to secure for
the individual effective protection for this right."25 Once again the free movement of
persons, or rather ofworkers, is treated as a fundamental right. It is not unreasonable
76
to follow Coppel's and O' Neill's interpretation of this case , according to which all
four market freedoms (free movement ofworkers, services, goods and capital) are
translated into fundamental rights.
23 See p. 150 of this Chapter and pp. 96-98 ofChapter 3.
24 Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. ADBHU, [1985] ECR 520 at 531.
25 Case 222/86 UNECTEF v. Heylens, [1987] ECR 4098 at 4117, para 14.
26 J. Coppel and A. O' Neill, op. cit. fn. 21, pp. 689-690.
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This elevation of the market freedoms to the status of fundamental rights entails a
huge conceptual difficulty for the Community legal order. If the market rights, upon
which all (secondary) community law is in one or the other way grounded, are indeed
treated as fundamental rights, one cannot speak of any hierarchical relationship
between secondary Community law and the basic human rights as known from the
national constitutions and the European Convention on Human Rights, because any
potential conflict between the two may be represented as a conflict between
fundamental rights.
Within national legal orders the specific constitutional provisions, which incorporate
a statement or bill of rights are usually given the status of fundamental law. These
are then regarded as superior to ordinary legislation and are used to render invalid
any legislative action, which is held to run counter to the listed rights. Thus,
according to theoretical orthodoxy, when a legal order recognises a right as
fundamental, this means that the public authorities have the burden to justify
restrictions upon it, or to use Dworkinian terminology, the individual has a trump
card27 against public authorities given to him/her by the law.
As Coppel and O' Neill pointedly argue, within the EU legal order "the invocation of
the idea of fundamental rights by the European Court does not set essential limits to
lawful executive action, because executive action which has as its object the
promotion of the four market freedoms is itself in the vocabulary of the European
Court, instantiating a fundamental right. A claim to violation of certain fundamental
human rights hence ceases to be a trump-card against executive action. It is no longer
possible to speak of a validation of a lower norm by a higher norm. Instead two
28
norms of equal qualitative significance are balanced against each other."
27 R. Dworkin, op. cit. fn. 17, pp. 184-206.
28 J. Coppel and A. O'Neill, op. cit. fn.21, p. 690.
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Weiler and Lockhart object that this is "a colossal non-sequitur"29, an unjustified leap
from a simple lexical equivalence to normative equivalence. They insist that just
because the Court uses the term "fundamental" to describe two different types of
rights, this should not be taken as an indication that these different types of rights are
normatively equal. Weiler and Lockhart thus claim that a legal regime can have more
than one concept ofwhat is a fundamental right/ principle. If, indeed, as Weiler and
Lockhart claim, the Court of Justice uses the term "fundamental" for rights of
different normative value, then this raises some very serious issues about the clarity
and the consistency of the fundamental rights terminology employed by the ECJ.
Ward opines that by treating as fundamental "all manner of supposed rights, from the
most revered fundamental rights to human dignity, to life and to liberty, to the
altogether more prosaic rights to access ombudsmen, to conduct a business and to a
high level of consumer protection", 0 the Community legal order is in danger of
"losing sight what a human right is really supposed to be". He seems to suggest that
the proliferation ofwhat is termed "fundamental rights" in combination with "the
lack of conceptual distinction between the right to fish and the right not to be
subjected to torture"31 leads to a trivialisation of the concept ofEU fundamental
rights.
Drawing on Barthes and on semiology, one could actually maintain that within the
EU the term "fundamental rights" is used as an empty signifier , that is as a signifier
without any fixed content, one that can be used in many different ways. Semiology
postulates a relationship between two terms, a signifier and a signified. The
correlation that unites the signified and the signifier is the sign, the associative total
of the first two terms. Barthes uses the example of a black pebble (a signifier) and a
death sentence in an anonymous vote (a signified). The black pebble on its own is an
empty signifier that may be given different meanings. It is only in its correlation with
a definite signified that it becomes meaningful (as in "full ofmeaning"), a sign with
29 J. Weiler and N. Lockhart, " 'Taking Rights Seriously' Seriously: the European Court and its
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence" part II, 32 (1995) Common Market Law Review, p.595.
301. Ward, A Critical Introduction to European Law, London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2003, p. 89.
31
ibid., p.88.
32 R. Barthes, Mythologies (translated by J.Cape Ltd), London: Vintage, 1972, p. 113.
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functional implications.33 Ifwe accepted Weiler's and Lockhart's contentions about
the non-significance of lexical equivalence between different types of fundamental
rights, then we would have to treat the term "fundamental rights" as an empty
signifier that would only become a sign full ofmeaning in its correlation with a
particular signified. It is obvious that such an approach undermines the fundamental
character of the (truly) fundamental rights, since, by making the assignment of
meaning dependent upon a second-order semiological correlation, the term
"fundamental rights" is no longer the sign for the highest rule of validation; it is only
a signifier, which depending on the signified it is correlated with, may or may not be
a rule of validation.34
In conclusion, the relationship of lexical equivalence between market freedoms and
fundamental rights amounts to either a normative equivalence between the two
(which is problematic because it effectively undermines the role of fundamental
rights as rules of validation of secondary Community law) or to a confused and
inconsistent use of the term "fundamental rights" (which is equally problematic
because once again it puts into question the conceptual underpinning and the
normative weight of the term "fundamental rights" in the Community legal order).
The choice between the two interpretations is almost indifferent, because they are
both equally undermining in one or the other way the protection of fundamental
rights in the EU.
ii) Restricting fundamental rights by reference to the needs of the market
We saw above that human rights as trump cards are rules of validation creating an
area of freedom for the individual, which has to be respected by public authorities.
But even if viewed as trump cards, the exercise of fundamental rights is not without
33 ibid.
34 It is interesting to compare the argument about the non-significance of lexical equivalence with the
theories by Dworkin and Rawls regarding the lexical priority of rights over other aggregate interests.
In Rawls's theory for example it is explicitly stated that the equal liberty principle is lexically prior to
the difference principle. J. Rawls, Theory ofJustice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp.37-38,
53.
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limits; restrictions may be introduced in order to safeguard other fundamental values.
An important aspect of the human rights protection, however, is that the possibilities
of limiting the exercise of human rights are themselves restricted. In general,
restrictions on the exercise of human rights must be prescribed by law and be
necessary in a democratic society to safeguard such values as the rights and freedoms
of the others, public safety, health or morals and in accordance with the principle of
proportionality.
Similarly, the ECJ has confirmed that a person's rights may be restricted provided
that the restrictions correspond to objectives of general public interest and do not
constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the very substance of
the right protected. However, in the absence of limitations prescribed by law, legal
certainty cannot be guaranteed merely by decisions of the ECJ. It is worth noting
here that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has no provisions on the permitted
restrictions to fundamental rights. Hence, even after the ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty, which has incorporated the EU Charter ofFundamental
Rights, this uncertainty regarding restrictions will not be effectively removed from
the EU system ofprotection of fundamental rights.
Putting aside, however, the issue of legal certainty that cannot be warranted by the
jurisprudential and therefore ad hoc development of the permitted restrictions, let us
have a closer look at the way in which the ECJ has actually handled the issue of
fundamental rights' limitations. In Nold v. Commission, in which a coal wholesaler
challenged a decision taken under the ECSC as being in breach of the company's
fundamental right to the free pursuit ofbusiness activity, the Court made clear that
fundamental rights had meaning in European Community law only so far as they
were fitted into the Community framework. The protection of rights "is always
subject to limitations laid down in accordance with the public interest" and "within
the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights should, if
necessary be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by
35 These are the general criteria provided by the ECHR (Article 10).
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36the Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched".
In this quote the Court affirms the possibility to introduce limitations to the exercise
of fundamental rights. It furthermore specifies that such limitations are justified by
reference to the concept ofpublic interest. The interesting twist is in the fact that the
objectives of the Community are put forward as criteria for the concretisation of the
abstract notion of "public interest". In 1974, when this case was decided, the
common market was at the centre of the objectives of the Community (as stipulated
by Art. 2 EC Treaty). Hence, although not explicitly stated, the Court in Nold v.
Commission effectively argues that fundamental rights' restrictions can be justified
by reference to the needs and the organisation of the Common Market.
The underlying premises of the above approach were spelled out and further
strengthened in Wachauf, a case concerning the correct interpretation of a
Commission regulation governing the transfer ofmilk producing agricultural units.
The issue raised by the preliminary reference from a lower German Court was
whether the lessee of agricultural land was entitled to compensation for the milk
quotas that had been achieved during his lease. In this case, the ECJ stated that:
"The fundamental rights recognised by the court are not absolute, however, but must
be considered in relation to their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be
imposed on the exercise of those rights, in particular in the context of a common
organisation of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with
regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing
the very substance of those rights".37 Here the public interest is presented in terms of
"a social function" and the market is clearly pinned down as the paramount criterion
of social function.
The combined effect of elevating the market freedoms to the status of fundamental
rights and of restricting fundamental rights in view of the Community's objectives
(namely the Common Market) practically amounts to a neutralisation of the deeper
36 Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission, [1974] ECR 491, at 508, para 14. Although this case was not
successful, the Court asserted strongly its commitment to fundamental rights.
37 Case 5/88 [1989] ECR 2639, para 18.
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structure of fundamental rights as entitlements to protection from collective invasion.
For the purposes of the EU the common good (because the public interest is
necessarily an expression of the common good) is identified with the common
market and the common market in its expression as the four market freedoms
acquires the status of fundamental rights. Through this double equation (common
good=common market, market freedoms= fundamental rights) and given that the
market freedoms are ipso facto instantiations of the common market, the common
good, the source of the most obvious collective invasions, effectively becomes the
equivalent of rights. There is no conceptual or hierarchical differentiation and, hence,
no tension between the two.
We saw above that the development of fundamental rights protection in the
Community legal order is not only characterised by a lack of clear conceptual
underpinning, but it has also incorporated within its deeper structures the logic and
the exigencies of the market. In light of the still predominantly economic objectives
of the treaties, the Community legal system has integrated a structural selectivity in
favour ofmarket efficiency . What is remarkable is that the incorporation of this
particular structural selectivity in favour of the market by the EU has been
successfully presented as a neutral process. But then again this is intricately
connected with the juridification process that we discussed in the previous chapter.
The deeply politicised choices ofmarket efficiency and utility maximization were
presented as legal (and therefore neutral) interpretations of a legal text. Thus, the
(neutral) authority of law functioned as a shield that protected economic integration
and economic liberalisation from the scrutiny of a political debate. It is interesting to
remind ourselves that similar choices at the Member-State level have been the object
of animated political debates. The outcome of this structural privileging of
economics is that the underlying coherence of fundamental rights judgements seems
to be underpinned by the exigencies of economic integration; the market freedoms
qua fundamental rights are prominent in the rights-related cases of the ECJ, the
proceedings for which are more often than not initiated by companies and big
economic actors.
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As for the substantive outcomes, these show a great deference to the Community
interest. Coppell and O' Neill have argued that the Court has adopted a two-
standards approach to fundamental rights; a strict one when it scrutinises national
legislation and a much more relaxed one when it decides the compatibility of
• • • to
Community legislation with fundamental rights protection . According to their
analysis, the overwhelming majority of the cases concerning a conflict between
fundamental rights and community legislation were decided in favour of Community
law. On the basis of these findings they level the accusation of instrumental
manipulation of rights against the ECJ. Weiler and Lockhart have vehemently
contested these findings and have cited a number of cases in which rights have been
successfully invoked against Community legislation.40 They actually criticise the
Court for being too deferential to the sensibilities of the Member States.
Evaluating the outcomes of the ECJ jurisprudence on fundamental rights, Foster and
De Witte (the former writing in 1987, the latter in 1999), aligned with Coppel and O'
Neill, also argue that the success rate of claims regarding violation of fundamental
rights before the ECJ is very low. Foster reviewed the fundamental rights
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice over a period of twenty years41. During this
period the protection accorded by the ECHR had been raised in 45 cases. Foster
found that only in two of these cases the Court upheld the fundamental rights claim.
Similarly in his evaluation of the ECJ's case law in the field of fundamental rights,
De Witte verifies the low number (low in comparison to those of the ECHR and the
national legal orders) of rights-related cases decided by the Court.42 He further
suggests that the Court should exercise "a somewhat stricter review" in economic
regulation disputes.
38 On the concept of structural selectivity see B. Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in
its Place, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p.268.
39 J. Coppel and A. O' Neill, op.cit. fn. 21, pp. 670-689.
40 J. Weiler and N. Lockhart, op. cit. fn. 29, pp. 84-92.
41 N. Foster, "The European Court of Justice and the European Convention for the protection of
Human Rights", 8 (1987) Human Rights Law Journal, p.245.
42 B. De Witte, "The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of
Rights" in P. Alston (ed.) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.859.
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I would like to stress, however, that independently of the empirical data that may
(according to Coppel, O'Neill, Foster, de Witte) or may not (according to Weiler and
Lockhart) suggest that the Community objectives override fundamental rights, in my
opinion the real problem is that once the deeper meaning of rights is trivialised
(through their equation with market freedoms and their unqualified restriction in light
of economic objectives), there is always the theoretical possibility that they can give
way to unqualified aggregate utility considerations. The statistical frequency of an
actual subordination of fundamental rights to the exigencies of the Common market
ceases to be as significant. One such case is one too many. The proclamations of the
Court regarding the conceptual status of fundamental rights and their hierarchical
relationship with the Community objectives constitute an inherent part of the acquis
communautaire and as such they may be retrieved from the Court's archives and can
be put in practice at any time. In his critique of the liberal system of rights Unger
presents the concept of rights as "a loaded gun that the right-holder may shoot at will
in his corner of town".43 This unattractive picture is reversed in the EU. One would
hope that the reversal of an unattractive picture might give way to a more attractive
one. This is unfortunately not the case here, as the loaded gun is still part of the
picture, but it somehow seems to have passed in the hands of the dominant market
players and is in any case instrumentalised in view of the economic objectives of the
Treaties.
One possible objection to the accusation that the concept of the EU fundamental
rights has integrated the logic of the market could be that all rights are market rights
and there is nothing sui generis/idiosyncratic about this development within the EU
legal order. On the contrary, this is perfectly consistent with the philosophical
tradition within which the concept of right as such has developed. One could in fact
argue that it is a positive development that the EU has brought to the fore this
common topos ofpolitical and economic liberalism. Let us not forget that according
to Locke, whose theory ofpolitical obligation is the background foundation of
liberalism, all rights ultimately stem from property rights. Human beings are
creatures of God and as such they are free, they cannot be slaves of anyone. This
43 R. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
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freedom is interpreted by Locke as entailing that human beings own themselves. But
if they own themselves, they necessarily own their labour, so goes Locke's theory,
and eventually whatever is mixed with their labour becomes part of their property.
This describes the state of affairs in the state ofnature. Before the introduction of
money as a means of exchange, people only appropriated small quantities of
perishable goods for their own use. The advent ofmoney meant that wealth could be
finally accumulated. This in combination with the fact that natural resources are
limited created problems, the solution to which could only be provided by the
institutionalisation of the State. In other words the government's main task is to
protect property. Individuals consented to a limitation of their freedom by the State
thus surrendering their state ofnature in the knowledge that this was the only way in
which they could effectively protect their property. Consequently, according to
Locke's theory, the legitimacy ofpolitical power actually depends on its ability to
44
protect property.
This exegesis views property rights and by analogy all economic rights, including the
EU market freedoms, as an intrinsic part of the human essence and dignity. In this
light, the distinction between market freedoms and what Phelan45, Coppell and O'
Neill treat as "more fundamental rights" cannot be sustained. Property is in fact
presented as stemming from human dignity and there is nothing more fundamental
than human dignity.
The problem, however, with the collapse of political into economic liberalism is that
it is premised upon an unfeasible and undesirable psychological theory, according to
which the existence of the individual, necessarily driven by self-interest, not only
precedes the constitution of society, but it also remains unalterable by his/her
participation in the Community's life. I will not, however, elaborate the problems
associated with the basic premises of liberalism. Given that my thesis is a critique of
EU constitutionalism and not of liberal theory in abstracto, I will return to this
Press, 1983, p. 36.
44 J. Locke, The Second Treatise ofGovernment, 3rd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1966.
45 See D. R. Phelan " Right to Life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in services: The European
Court of Justice and the normative shaping of the European Union", (55) 1992 Modern Law Review,
pp. 670-689.
170
argument below. In the following section I will argue that even ifwe were to accept
this conceptual affinity between property (and consequently economy) and
fundamental rights, the EU model would still fall below the standards of formal
equality set by liberalism, while in the last part of this chapter, arguing mainly
against the liberal faith in the market, I will question the ability of the market to
sustain a sense of belonging to a community.
iii) Uneven distribution of rights to EU citizens
I have so far analysed one expression of the marketisation of rights, which consists in
their being balanced against and possibly overridden by the good of the common
market (sections i and ii are in fact the two faces of the same phenomenon). I will
now turn to another, very important but rather hidden aspect ofmarketisation which
consists in the following: not only is the exercise ofEU fundamental rights
subordinated to the exigencies of the market, but their distribution to the EU citizens
also depends upon an economic element. EU fundamental rights are granted to
individuals, when they can establish some kind of economic nexus.
Let me use the Grogan case as an example of this.46 This decision has been
extensively used in the past as an example of a case in which Community law
undermined the constitutional order of a Member State and failed to acknowledge the
profound moral dilemma inherent in the prohibition of abortion47. Quite
interestingly, others have used it as an example of the great deference that the ECJ
shows to the political and constitutional sensibilities ofnational authorities whenever
it is alleged that there is a conflict between national rules and fundamental rights
protected in the Community legal order.481 will briefly comment upon these points,
but I have chosen this same case as a basis for my analysis, mainly because it
exemplifies the economic orientation of European fundamental rights and their
uneven distribution to the citizens of the Community legal order.
46 The Societyfor the Protection ofUnborn Children (Ireland) Ltd v. Stephen Grogan and others,
Case 159/90, reported in [1991] 3 CMLR 689.
47 D. R. Phelan, op. cit. fn. 45. See also J. Coppell and A. O'Neill, op. cit. fn.21, pp. 685-689.
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In 1983 an amendment was made to the Irish constitution according to which: "The
state acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and with due regard to the equal
right to life of the mother guarantees in its laws to respect and as far as practicable by
its laws to defend and vindicate that right"49. It is interesting to note that the Irish
Constitution's recognition and protection of the right to life of the unborn is a case of
a fundamental right, which is expressed in only one Member State of the community.
In 1989 the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) brought a case
against various Students' Unions in Ireland, which were distributing information
about clinics performing abortions in Great Britain. The Society was in fact seeking
an injunction to prevent the students from distributing such information. The Irish
Court referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary judgement under article 177 of
the EEC Treaty. The direct issue was not the Irish ban on abortion, but the
interdiction to advertise commercially available abortions in other Member States. It
was argued, on behalf of the students' unions, that such an interdiction was a
restriction of the freedom to provide services and, that derogations50 to that principle
had to respect fundamental community principles including the freedom of speech.
The ECJ accepted this line of reasoning and the Irish constitutional protection of the
unborn child was effectively treated as a simple restriction on abortion. The ECJ
further accepted that abortion came under the definition of services within the
meaning of article 60 [50], because abortion is "a medical activity which is normally
provided for remuneration and may be carried out as part of a professional
activity".51 The Court, however, came to the conclusion that as the legislation at
1,8 R. Dehousse, European Court ofJustice: the politics ofjudicial integration, Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1998, pp. 60-70.
49 Article 40(3) (iii) of the Irish Constitution.
50 In general national derogations from the principles of free movement in Community trade law must
be compatible with fundamental rights standards. See for example Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219
at 1231, para 27 where the Court restricted France's attempt to derogate on the grounds of public
policy pursuant to article 48(3) EC and held that the derogation must "be interpreted strictly so that its
scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each member state without being subject to control by the
institutions of the community." Thus, the Court of Justice held that derogations to fundamental
freedoms could not be tolerated unless the action was necessary to protect national security or public
safety, as those interests are understood in a democratic society. Similarly in Case C-260/89 [1991]
ECR 1-2925, the Court ruled that Greek legislation which had the effect of impeding market access by
broadcasters could not be justified because of its damaging effect on freedom of expression.
51 Case 159/90, 4 Oct 1991, reported in 3 (1991) Common Market Law Review, p. 689.
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issue was in this particular case primarily applicable to Irish student associations, and
not to clinics trying to market their "services" from abroad, it did not constitute a
prohibited restriction. As a result, the ECJ avoided pronouncing itself on the delicate
issue of the compatibility with freedom of speech and was able to stay out of the
heated abortion debate.
By defining abortion as a service rather than as a violation of a fundamental right
guaranteed in the Irish constitution,53 the regulation of abortion became a justiciable
matter under community law. It was only because abortion was defined in terms of
the possible commerce and profit resulting from it that the Court did not prohibit the
Irish restrictions on abortions. Had the Society for the Protection of the unborn child
brought a case against an economic operator based in another Member State, the
latter would have received full protection against the specific provision of the Irish
Constitution.54
It is quite clear, it seems to me, that this specific outcome was dictated not because of
a respect to a national constitutional order, but because the necessary economic link
was missing. Grogan exemplifies how individuals must assert their objectified
economic status in order to fall within the protection ofEU law. In this case the
students needed to defend their actions in economic terms, but, because they were
not economically linked with the providers of the services, they could not be
protected by the treaty articles referring to the freedom to provide services. In fact
Rigaux55 makes a very interesting observation. He points out that at the time of the
52 R. Dehousse, op. cit. fn. 48, p. 66.
53
Open Door Counselling & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland [1992]ECtHR Series A No.246 , a similar
case that came before the ECtHR, was decided on the basis of freedom of expression rather than
freedom to provide services. Once again, the issue ofwhether Art. 8 of the ECHR (right to respect
one's private life) contains a further right to abortion was not decided.
54 A protocol annexed to the Maastricht Treaty on European Political Union provides that nothing in
the Treaties of the European Communities shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of
the Constitution (Protocol annexed to the Treaty on the European Union" European Document 175051
of 13 Dec. 1991). Although this was an attempt of the Irish government to prevent a future challenge
to the Irish constitution, it is questionable if this protocol can ensure that the right to life of the unborn
will be upheld against the principle of freedom of services in cases in which an Irish citizen travels
abroad in order to have an abortion. A similar case came up in 1992 (reported in the Irish Times of
March 6 1992) when the Irish Supreme Court lifted an injunction prohibiting a 14 year-old Irish girl
from leaving Ireland in order to have an abortion.
55 F. Rigaux, "EEC Competence in the Cultural Field", 17(1992) Forum Internationale, p.8.
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proceedings against the students no sanctions were in place in Ireland against the
numerous advertisements in magazines giving information about abortion services.
Hence, EC law protects commercial advertising, but not the liberty of information
through non-profit organisations. I do not believe that the ECJ should have taken a
moral position regarding abortions, nor that it should have adopted the maximalist
approach of recognising the Irish constitution's protection of the unborn as a
community fundamental right. My point is that the students were not accorded the
protection of EC law, only because they were not directly involved in the common
market.
On the other hand, the defendants in ERTwere granted the free speech protection
that the students in the Grogan case were denied, because they were economic
agents56. This case too concerned the validity ofmeasures instituted by a Member
State (Greece) in derogation from Community law. The applicant, ERT, was a state
radio and television company having exclusive rights to provide television services
within Greece. It was forbidden under statute for any other party to broadcast
television programmes in Greece. This state monopoly was challenged by an
independent information company and the Mayor of Thessaloniki who had set up
their own television station. ERT sought an injunction from a domestic court against
the company and the Mayor. The defendants argued that the television state
monopoly was contrary to the free movement of goods and services as protected by
EC law and to the provisions of the ECHR concerning freedom of expression.
The Greek government's argument that the television monopoly was a public policy
derogation from the free movement of goods and services under article 66 was
rebutted by the ECJ on the basis of the following: "the limitations imposed on the
power of the Member States to apply the provisions referred to in articles 66 and 56
of the Treaty on the grounds ofpublic policy, public security and public health must
be appraised in the light of the general principle of freedom of expression embodied
in Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights."57 The comparison
56 Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas, Case
260/89, [ 1991 ]ECR 1-2925.
57 ibid., para.45.
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between these two cases -ERT and Grogan- reveals the gap between rhetoric and
reality in the EU. Those within the sphere of exchange are accorded different rights
than those outside it.
Coppel and O'Neill are disappointed because the Court failed to acknowledge in the
Grogan case "the way in which abortion exemplifies a situation ofprofound moral
dilemma"58, while Weiler and Lockhart try to rebut their objection by reminding us
that "in the context of a preliminary ruling it is often the referring Court which
determines the parameters of the reference. The first question asked by the Irish
Court was 'does the organised activity or process of carrying out an abortion come
within the definition of services in article 60 of the Treaty'.. ."59 Their argument is
that the ECJ had to reply to the question posed to it and it should, thus, not be
accused of something, which was the national court's choice. They fail to
acknowledge that the national court could only phrase its question in these terms in
order to be understood by the Community system.
The terms of a preliminary reference have been set out by the Community legal
order. This order has its own language and its own logic. Due to the principles of
supremacy and direct effect ofCommunity law, the national courts have become part
of this order. Hence, whenever they refer to it, they have to abide by its terms. They
cannot challenge its foundations nor its presuppositions. It seems that Weiler and
Lockhart are concerned with defending the ECJ against the accusation of
instrumental manipulation, but fail to see how the Community legal order as a whole
is liable to the accusation ofnot taking fundamental rights seriously. Coppel and
O'Neill60, on the other hand, make the mistake of identifying the Court as being
58 J. Coppel and A. O'Neill, op. cit. fn. 21, p. 687.
59 J. Weiler, N. Lockhart, op. cit. fn. 29, p. 599.
60
Coppel and O'Neill distinguish between the ECJ's initial defensive use of fundamental rights
(defence of Community law supremacy over national law) and its consequent offensive use of
fundamental rights. According to the latter, "references to fundamental rights are now being made by
the Court in order to extend its jurisdiction into areas previously reserved to Member States' courts
and to expand the influence of the community over the activities of the member States", op. cit. fn. 21,
p. 669.
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solely responsible for what is the outcome of the specific structure of the Community
system.61
There is a long chain of cases that further attest to the fact that conferral of the
Community fundamental rights depends on the exercise of some economic activity
and that there is a structural privileging of economic activities over other activities.
Indicatively, in the Levin case62 it was stated that a person falls in the purview of
Article 48, which concerns the freedom ofmovement ofpersons, if he/she is
involved in some kind of economic activity.
".. .it follows both from the statement of the principle of freedom ofmovement for
workers and from the place occupied by the rules relating to that principle in the
system of the Treaty as a whole that those rules guarantee only the free movement of
persons who pursue or are desirous ofpursuing a genuine economic activity." 63
Hence, participation for example in a community based on religion falls within the
field of application of community law only in so far as it can be regarded as an
economic activity. In Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie64 a German called
Steymann after having worked in the Netherlands as a plumber, joined a religious
order that provided for his living requirements. The Dutch court denied him the
residence permit for foreign workers he had applied for. The ECJ, however, argued
that, although " it must be observed that in view of the objectives of the European
Economic Community, participation in a community based on religion or another
form ofphilosophy falls within the field of application ofCommunity law only in so
far as it can be regarded as an economic activity within the meaning ofArt. 2 of the
Treaty", in this particular case the economic nexus could be established since the
religious community's provision of food and lodging to Steymann could be taken as
61 In a fascinating article, Gustav Peebles analyses a number of similar cases through the perspective
of the Marxist theory and shows that the European Union Treaties revolve around the rights of things
(commodities) rather than ofpeople. His point is that people primarily gain rights within the EU by
demonstrating that they embody exchange value and they are not accorded rights merely for being
human. His conclusion is clear: the EU treaties and the ECJ jurisprudence have enshrined the Marxist
notion of commodity fetishism into European law. See G. Peebles "A very Eden of the Innate Rights
of Man? A Marxist look at the European Union Treaties and Case Law", 23 (1998) Law and Social
Inquiry, pp. 581 ff.
62 Case 53/1981, 1982 ECR-1035.
63 P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 664-665.
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indirect remuneration for "his work". He was, thus, entitled to the rights enshrined in
the Treaty ofRome.
In this case, the Court classified religious activity as economic activity in order to
protect it. This is yet another example of the broadening reach ofEU law into non-
economic spheres, a development that the Member States could not have anticipated
or envisioned in the Rome Treaty. But when religion must be equated with economic
activity in order for its practice to be protected, it becomes clear that the laws of the
market are the reigning governing ideology of the EU. On the other hand, this very
same case shows that the Court's intention was to give a very wide interpretation of
the concept ofworker so that any person would fall within its scope, if his/her work
consisted of the pursuit of genuine and effective activities and was not so minimal as
to be purely marginal and ancillary. In doing so, the ECJ was trying to include as
many as possible within the right of free movement.
Similarly, in Cowan v. Le Tresor Public,65 even the use of the transport services of a
Member State by a tourist seemed to satisfy the threshold of involvement in an
economic activity. Cowan, a British national visiting Paris was attacked near a metro
station. When he applied to the French authorities for compensation (there was a
relevant criminal injuries compensation scheme), he was turned down on the basis
that he was not a French national nor a holder of a permit of residence. The ECJ,
however, ruled that he was entitled to compensation and grounded its decision on the
non-discrimination principle set out in Art. 12 EC (ex art.6). This could only apply in
the context of a specific provision of the Treaty, that is, ifCowan could show that he
was in some way participating in the economic function of the Community. Indeed
this was affirmed on the basis that he was a tourist using the French transport service
system.
From the above it is clear that human rights are conferred by the EU legal apparatus
on those individuals who are part of the economic process. Even though, the ECJ has
tried to reduce the financial threshold of the economic activity required for the
64 Case 196/87, 1988 ECR- 6159.
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affirmation of certain rights, participation in this economic process still stands as the
essential criterion that allows one to properly assume status as a citizen with all that
category's corresponding rights.66 As a result, one is effectively not a member ofEU
civil society unless one can somehow make connection to an economic activity.
Those outside the economic sphere do not achieve full EU legal citizenship; certain
Europeans have a more privileged legal status than others just because they have a
more privileged economic status.
It cannot be denied that the ECJ has exhibited an interest in protecting the human
rights of the citizens regardless of the needs and demands of capital and on occasion
it has confronted the demands of capital enshrined in the treaties by favouring the
protection of other demands. In fact, Mancini contends that "the Court has done all
within its powers to dilute the concept of economic activity. It has even applied it to
cases where the work was carried out in the context of activities like prayer and
meditation"67. But despite all efforts to extend protection to individuals outside the
narrow definition ofworker, human protection under EU law is ultimately bound to
economic definitions. Every time a fundamental right is invoked by people before the
Court, this must have a baseline relation to economics.
In any case and independently of its own responsibility, the fact remains that the
Court has been caught between protecting fundamental rights on the basis of some
economic nexus, on the one hand, and extending human rights protection beyond the
economic sphere (as delineated by its own competencies), on the other. In this latter
case, that is when the court tries to confront the economic structures of the Treaties
and accord protection of rights on some other basis, it ends up expanding the
competencies of the Union from the back door, which effectively amounts to a
usurpation of national sovereignty. It is useful to remember that national sovereignty,
too, can be analysed in terms ofhuman rights, as the sum total of the political rights
65 Cowan v. Le Tresor Public, Case 186/87, [1989] ECR-195.
66 G. Peebles, op. cit. fn. 61, p.608.
67 F. Mancini "The free movement ofworkers in the case-law of the European Court of Justice" in D.
Curtin, D. O' Keeffe (eds) Constitutional adjudication in European and Community Law, 1992,
Dublin: Butterworth, p.70.
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of the citizens of polities, whose sovereignty is being limited (namely the Member
States).
This aspect ofEU marketisation is another serious deviation from liberal theoretical
orthodoxy, the starting point ofwhich is formal equality in the conferral of rights to
individuals; all individuals have the same fundamental rights. The Marxists may be
right to criticise this formal equality on the basis that it facilitates the reproduction of
the existing economic inequalities, but the EU scenario, as described above, stands
one step behind the formal equality of liberalism, to the extent that it actually makes
the conferral of rights dependent upon the prior participation of individuals to the
market. Here the problem is no longer that formal equality may allow people of
different economic status to enjoy different levels of exercise (and thus enjoyment)
of their formal rights; the problem is that some individuals are excluded from the
system of rights simply because they are not active participants in the market.
Effectively this means that non-participation in the productive process of the EU
translates into legal "invisibility" (no standing in law).
b) Excursus on the theory of human rights: questioning the liberal
tenets
My analysis so far has been pointing out the flaws of the EU protection of
fundamental rights. These flaws have been identified by reference to the tenets of
liberal theory. To the extent that the EU presents itself as embracing liberalism, this
is an internal critique. It, thus, shares the assumptions of the liberal theory of rights
according to which rights are apolitical products of reason destined to protect
individuals and groups from the vicissitudes of the political, majoritarian will. In this
part I would like to challenge the liberal tenet concerning the apolitical character of
rights. This questioning of theoretical liberal orthodoxy will lead me to a re-
qualification of the role of rights in a legal order. I have so far shown that the status
of fundamental rights in the EU falls below the standards set by liberalism. Hence,
the EU is not consistent with its own normative demands from its Member States and
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the acceding Members. I will now show that the liberal conception of rights is itself
problematic. In doing so, my aim is not to vindicate the EU conception of rights. On
the contrary, my re-qualification of the role of rights in this part will only make even
more apparent the deeper deficiencies of the EU system of fundamental rights.
Martti Koskenniemi, giving a theoretical account of the development of fundamental
rights' protection within liberal theory, stresses that human rights were initially
introduced as a mechanism that would protect the individual from the vicissitudes of
political passion and from the potentially threatening (for minorities or individual
zro
citizens) role ofmajoritarian rule . The clash of the right versus the good is one that
has dominated political philosophy. Originally fundamental rights were viewed as
stemming from an autonomous "reason" (naturalism) that delimited the sphere of
individual freedom from/against the homogenising social order. Later, when faith in
the power of enlightenment reason started to lose its appeal, constraint and protection
from political controversy was sought "from legal rules and textual form
(positivism)".69 Eventually the loss of faith in formalism gave way to realism and to
arguments regarding social ends, predominantly utility and effectiveness.
Koskenniemi's very concise but accurate account brings to the surface the tension
that underlies the relationship between rights and social utility arguments. This
tension is an intrinsic feature of the very essence of rights. In a way, rights only exist
as a mechanism for protecting the individual from the pull ofmajoritarianism. The
common good then is the common measure ofutility against which individual rights
are defined.
However, one needs to unpack the polarised antithesis between rights and common
good as presented by liberal theory. On the one hand, rights cannot be wholly
independent from concepts of good, but are constantly examined, limited and
criticised from the perspective of alternative notions of the good. On the other hand,
the concept of the common good is not a fixed one, but is subject to constant re-
68 M. Koskenniemi, "The Effect ofRights on Political Culture" in P. Alston (ed.) The EU and Human
Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.100-101.
69 ibid.
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negotiation. The contestation of new rights and through this the re-configuration of
political power is part of this on-going re-negotiation.
As far as the partial dependence of rights on the concept of common good is
concerned, this is illustrated quite powerfully in the case of conflicts of rights. If
rights are universal and foundational (and this is the argument behind the
theoretically orthodox view of rights as trumps), these have to be independent of any
concept of the good. However, in cases of conflicts of rights where we have to define
the scope of rights and their limitations, we need something beyond rights that will
allow us to balance them. To use a rather trivial example, in all the cases in which
VIPs sue the media when these disclose details of their personal lives, we have a
conflict between two rights: the freedom of speech enjoyed by the media in question
and the right to privacy of the individual whose life has been exposed. Since we
cannot in abstracto privilege one right over the other, we need to proceed to an ad
hoc balancing that will allow us to articulate the specific meaning of these rights in
every single case.
According to liberal theory there is a presumption in favour of freedom and we are
all allowed to do anything as long as we do not harm others. Thus, a case of conflict
of rights such as the one mentioned here, would be resolved on the basis of the
principle of harm. But this only transfers the problem of deciding the scope of rights
to the problem of defining the concept of harm. And again the concept of harm is
socially conditioned and cannot in any way be seen as a politically neutral concept,
since there are competing conceptions of it. For example feminists who are opposed
to pornography, do so, on the ground that the production and circulation of
pornographic material is harmful for women in general, while the defenders of
pornography rebut any causal link between pornography and harm against women.
But even ifwe are not confronted with a conflict between different rights, rights are
very often insufficiently concrete to be policy-orienting. This indeterminacy is not
only due to semantic openness, but is also connected with normative evaluations.
The obvious example is the self-evident right to life (Art. 2 ECHR), which is,
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however, given different interpretations in different jurisdictions. Hence, in some
cases the protection of the unborn is included within its meaning, and thus abortion is
forbidden, while in some cases it is not. These interpretive variations are
institutionally embraced by the Court of Strasbourg through its jurisprudentially
developed doctrine of the margin of appreciation. This is nothing more than a healthy
admission that there is indeterminacy in the interpretation ofparticular rights and that
every interpretation is embedded in a particular (political and legal) culture. In other
words, the articulation and concretisation of the meaning of rights presupposes a
balancing between the different values of a society. And these are the very same
values that define the concept of the common good.
Jurgen Habermas is adamant that any actually existing system of rights is and can
only be a situated interpretation of the idea of rights. "The system of rights is not
given to the ffamers of a constitution in advance as a natural law. These rights first
enter into consciousness in a particular constitutional interpretation. No one can
credit herself with access to the system of rights in the singular, independent of the
interpretations she already has historically available. "The" system of rights does not
exist in transcendental purity."70
Hence the relationship between rights and democratic politics is an instance of the
relationship described in Chapter 2 between juridical universalism and cultural
particularism. The two are in a constant interplay. The existence of rights limits the
concept of the common good (as articulated by democratic politics), but at the same
time the on-going articulation of the common good defines the particular meaning of
rights.71 The coming back and forth between rights and common good can be
70 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p.415. For a similar
position see also J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1999, pp. 107-
118. Waldron explains that rights as "circumstances of justice" need to be interpreted in the
"circumstances of politics".
71 There is an indirect recognition of this in the ECHR and the jurisprudence developed around it.
Thus, according to the Convention, the power to derogate from the rights provided for in it is
conditioned by the criterion ofwhat may be necessary in a democratic society. In their interpretation
of what is necessary in a democratic society the Commission and the Court have introduced the
notions of "reasonable", "proportionate", "public order" and "morals". At the same time the
development of the concept of "margin of appreciation" recognises that rights are contextualized. For
an analysis of the above concepts as developed within the context of the ECHR, see P. Van Dijk and
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presented as producing different and constantly changing images of reflective
equilibrium. As I argued in Chapter 2, to acknowledge the necessarily particularistic
expression of universals (in this case rights), does not annul their universalism; it
does not make the role of rights redundant; it only pins them down in time and place.
Philip Alston, arguing in defence ofhuman rights, maintains that although these
rights are not rigid, absolute or forever enduring, they can provide a meaningful basis
for social order, because they are "capable ofpartly transcending the institutions that
gave birth to them and those very same institutions (or their successors) which seek
to exercise responsibility for their elaboration and interpretation".72
This position is aligned with Habermas's attempt to connect internally the basic
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values of liberal individualism and civic republicanism. Habermas accepts that both
popular sovereignty and human rights are the modern pillars of legal legitimacy and
political power. Unlike liberals and republicans who put the focus on one of these
two pillars74 and tend to subordinate either popular sovereignty to human rights or
vice versa, Habermas views these two concepts as mutually presupposing and
supplementing each other. In his view, "the liberal paradigm does not exhaust the
full-fledged meaning of the autonomy of a sovereign citizenry, because it introduces
human rights as antecedent or external constraints on the democratic process,
whereas the republican paradigm cannot account for the universalistic meaning of
human rights, because it ties the democratic process to the prior bond and shared
understanding of some particular ethical community."75 The Habermasian approach
views the internal connection between popular sovereignty and human rights as
G.V. Van Hoof, Theory and Practice ofthe European Convention on Human Rights, Deventer:
Kluwer, 1990, p. 604.
72 P. Alston, "Introduction" in P. Alston (ed) Human Rights Law, The International Library of Essays
in Law and Legal Theory, Areas 27, New York: New York University, 1996, pp.xv-xvii.
73 J. Habermas, "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: the Liberal and Republican Versions", 7
(1994) Ratio Juris, pp.Iff.
74 "The liberal tradition conceives human rights as the embodiment ofmoral autonomy and gives them
priority over popular sovereignty. On the other hand, the republican tradition conceives popular
sovereignty as the expression of ethical self-realisation of the people and regards it as prior to human
rights." Ibid., p.6.
75 ibid., p. 10.
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consisting in the fact that private and public autonomy presuppose each other.76
Hence, human rights state the conditions under which the various forms of
communication necessary for political autonomy can be institutionalised. Human
rights are in fact a formal condition of deliberative politics.
To recognise that the idea of human rights and the principle ofpopular sovereignty
mutually interpret each other (hence, public and private autonomy are of equal
weight), underlines the inevitably political character of rights77 and illustrates how
these lose their meaning when taken out of the context of a political constitution.
Under such a politically nuanced reading of rights, the political deficit of the
European Union would be an insuperable impediment to its achieving a normatively
adequate protection of fundamental rights. Hence to view rights as capable of
compensating for an incomplete political constitution such as the EU one (this was
Curtin's suggestion- see introduction of this chapter) is an illusion, since the meaning
of rights can only be sufficiently articulated through its interaction with democratic
politics, whose scope again is both enabled and limited by these very same rights. At
the same time the constitution offers the institutional framework for the exercise of
politics. An incomplete constitution cannot but offer an incomplete framework of
politics, which means that the interaction between politics and rights cannot be fully
developed.
At this point I would like to argue that although I agree with Habermas's position of
co-originality and mutual constitution of rights and democratic politics to a great
extent, it is not very clear to me whether his thesis tends to a dialectical synthesis of
76 Habermas's approach uses Rousseau's theory as its springboard. According to Rousseau, the
sovereign will of the people can express itself only in the language of universal and abstract laws and
is thus directly inscribed with the very right to equal liberties. Hence the "normative content of the
idea of human rights enters the very mode of carrying out popular sovereignty.. .According to this
idea, the procedurally correct exercise of popular sovereignty simultaneously secures the liberal
principle of legal equality (which grants everybody equal liberties according to general laws)".
Although Rousseau rightly regards equality in the content of the law as being central to the concept of
law's legitimacy, this equality cannot be satisfactorily explained by the semantic properties of the
general laws, but by the pragmatic conditions of discourses through which law came about.
77 M. Ignatieff connects the inescapably political character of human rights with the fact that they
imply a conflict between a rights holder and a rights "withholder", some authority against which the
rights holder can make justified claims. M. Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and idolatry,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 67.
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the universal (rights) and the particular (specific political culture). In Chapter 2 when
I was analysing his concept of constitutional patriotism, I situated it within an on¬
going process ofuniversalization. Although there is nothing explicit in Habermas's
writings which defies such an interpretation, I suspect that his aspiration would be
the consensus-based attainment of some type of dialectical synthesis, even a
temporary or purely abstract one. The way I view however the relationship between
rights and democratic politics emphasises the continual tension between the two and
at the same time acknowledges the impossibility of attaining a state of dialectical
synthesis. I am aligned in this with James Tully, who, in advocating an agonistic
form of constitutional democracy, not only accepts this impossibility, but he also
stresses the positive role of irreducible disagreements in fostering a critical and
• • • 78
inclusive democratic ethos.
Claude Lefort is another theorist who emphasises the politically radical aspects of the
relationship between rights and politics. In his opinion, democratic politics, apart
from contributing to the articulation of the meaning of existing human rights, also
creates new rights. Democratic politics "tests our rights which have not yet been
incorporated in it, it is the theatre of a contestation, whose object cannot be reduced
to the preservation of a tacitly established pact, but which takes form in centres that
power cannot entirely master."79 Viewed in this light, the gradual recognition ofnew
rights (such as rights to social security, strike and trade unions) has been
transgressing the boundaries within which the state claimed to define itself. Equally
powerfully, Lefort maintains that this on-going contestation ofnew rights is guided
by "the continuous imperative of a deciphering of society by itself."80 A politics of
human rights and a democratic politics are thus "two ways of responding to the same
need: to exploit the resources of freedom and creativity which are drawn upon by an
experience that accommodates the effects of division; to resist the temptation to
exchange the present for the future; to make an effort, on the contrary, to discern in
the present the signs ofpossible change which are suggested by the defence of
78 J. Tully, "The agonic freedom ofCitizens", 28 (1990) Economy and Society, pp. 161-182 and J.
Tully, Constitutionalism in an Age ofDiversity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
79 C. Lefort, The Political Forms ofModern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism,




acquired rights and the demand for new rights, while learning to discern them from
what is merely the satisfaction of interests."81
Let me close this excursus on the theory of human rights and pull together the
threads ofmy argument. So far I have attempted to show that the status of
fundamental rights in the EU is problematic. If one follows the self-proclamations of
the EU and adopts the liberal view that regards rights as trumps, EU fundamental
rights have not functioned as trump-cards against EU executive action, firstly
because of all the uncertainties that accompanied their judicial development
(uncertainty regarding the corpus of rights, the hierarchical position of the general
principles of law in the Community legal order and the restrictions that can be
imposed on them) and secondly because the Treaty-based market rights upon which
all Community executive action is in one or the other way based, have been elevated
to the status of fundamental rights and, hence, whenever there is a conflict between
the common good (the common market is taken to be the indisputable common good
of the EU) and fundamental rights, this is represented as a conflict between rights. In
other words, the rights cannot override the concept of the common good, because this
has for EU purposes dressed itself up as being a fundamental right (or rather four
rights: free movement ofpersons, services, capital, goods).
Things are much more disappointing once one decides to question the tenets of
liberal theory. The brief analysis undertaken above was an effort to articulate a more
sophisticated conception of rights, according to which, although these are not rigid
and inflexible trumps, they still retain their symbolic value in our system of
organising political power. In fact the argument was not only that we need the
concept of rights in order to prevent our systems from giving way to totalitarianism,
but that the existence of rights - when they are not treated as petrified legal objects-
can facilitate the contestation ofnew rights.82 In doing so, rights partly reflect and




Ignatieff argues that the language of human rights is the only universally available moral vernacular
that validates the claims ofminorities against the oppression they experience in our societies. Rights
can legitimise protest against oppression. Op. cit. fn.77, p.68. See also Klaus Gunther, "The Legacies
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This view rejects both the liberal conceptualisation of rights as merely external
constraints imposed on politics and the republican subordination of rights to the
principle ofpopular sovereignty. It acknowledges the two-way relationship between
rights and democratic politics, without however viewing it as aiming towards a
dialectical synthesis. The two poles- rights and democratic sovereignty- need to keep
their relative autonomy vis a vis one another, because the conflict and the tension
between the two and what they stand for, that is the universal and the particular, is
what ultimately keeps the way open for a reflexive constitution ofpolitical power
and society. And although the two intertwined categories resist each other, in the
sense that they are not subsumed under one another, they can still be viewed as
mutually constituted and co-original.
c) From Market citizenship to Union citizenship?
We saw above that the conceptualisation ofEU fundamental rights encompassed the
role of the individual as a homo economicus83 or, otherwise, as a market citizen
(Marktburger) . Europeans were only furnished the full array of rights of the market
citizen when "acting as participants in or as beneficiaries of the common market."85
The introduction of the EU citizenship by the Treaty ofMaastricht was supposed to
signal the transformation of the Community from an economic project into a political
union. Hence the union citizenship was intended to distinguish itself from the
economic connotations of the pre-existing de facto market citizenship.
The status of citizenship as introduced by the Maastricht Treaty was conferred on
o/:
those who are already nationals of a Member State and consisted of 1) a right to
of Injustice and Fear: A European Approach to Human Rights and their Effects on Political Culture"
in P. Alston (ed.) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 117-147.
83 A. Agh, "Citizenship and Civil Society in Central Europe" in B. van Steenberg (ed.), The Condition
ofCitizenship, London: Sage, 1994, p. 108.
84 H. Ipsen, Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1972, p. 187.
85
ibid.,p,102.
86 The Treaty makes it clear that "every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a
citizen of the Union" and "citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national
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free movement and residence subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in
the Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect, 2) a right to vote and to
stand as a candidate in municipal and in European Parliament elections in the place
of residence, 3) a right to protection by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any
Member State in a third country where their own Member State is not represented
and 4) a right to petition the European Parliament and to apply to the Ombudsman.
On a first reading it appears that the core right of the Union citizenship remains that
of the free movement and establishment, while the political rights attached to it are
on
very limited. We saw in the previous section that the recognition of fundamental
rights in the Community legal order has been associated with the prior establishment
of some economic nexus. It is interesting to see whether the introduction of the EU
citizenship, presented as the symbol for the transformation of the Community into a
political entity, reversed the prevailing marketisation of fundamental rights and the
concomitant market citizenship.
First of all, the most important right associated with citizenship is that of free
movement and residence. The conferral of a right to free movement and residence on
citizens (as opposed to the participants in the market) would prima facie seem to
make the presence of an economic nexus redundant. However, the crucial restriction
that this right "is subject to such limits and conditions as are laid down in the Treaty
and by the measures adopted to give it effect", effectively means that the freedom of
movement and residence of the citizens is still subject to the pre-Maastricht relevant
secondary legislation. And although the Council had adopted two years before the
citizenship". See also the Micheletti Judgement (Case 369190 Micheletti v. Delegacion del Gobierno
en Cantabria, [1992] ECR I- 4239) in which the Court made it clear that only the Member States can
determine the criteria for creation/abolition of nationality. "Under international law, it is for each
Member State, having due regard ofCommunity law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition
and loss of nationality. However, it is not permissible for the legislation of a Member State to restrict
the effects of the granting of the nationality of another Member State by imposing an additional
condition for the recognition of that nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental
freedoms provided for in the Treaty"(at para 4262 of the judgement).
87 H. d' Oliveira notes: "the core and origin ofUnion citizenship is the right to free movement.
Mobility is the central element around which other rights crystallise" and he concludes that this
definition of citizenship is "a gross misnomer". H. d'Oliveira, "Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?" in
A. Rosas and A. Esko (eds.), A Citizen's Europe: In Search ofa New Order, Thousand Oaks, Cal.:
Sage Publications, 1995, pp.65 and 84.
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TEU three directives granting rights of residence to categories of persons other than
oo
t . m
workers , these were still granted under the condition that those persons have
adequate resources so as not to become a burden on Member State social assistance
schemes and are covered by sickness insurance. As a result, the right ofmovement
and residence, although no longer relying on the exercise of an economic activity, it
is still dependent on the ability of the citizen to prove a certain degree of financial
self-sufficiency89. Unless financially self-sufficient, it is still the case that the citizen
exercising her right to free movement and residence needs to establish a link with
Community law (meaning an economic activity of some type or other). Hence, the
establishment of citizenship has so far not extended the scope of the Treaty as far as
its ratio materiae is concerned90 and, despite the Commission's declarations to the
contrary91, the economic imperative initially attached to the freedom ofmovement
. . . Q9
and residence, although set at a minimal level, remains in place .
Turning to the judicial post-Maastricht treatment of the freedoms ofmovement and
residence, the Court -contrary to its usual propensity to expansive teleological
interpretation- has taken small steps in the direction of de-coupling the concept of
citizenship from its economic affiliations. Despite the statements of the Advocate
General in the Boukhalfa case,93 according to which "every citizen of the Union
must, whatever his nationality, enjoy exactly the same rights and be subject to the
88 See Directive 90/366, which was later replaced by Directive 93/96, governing students exercising
the right to vocational training [1993] OJ L317, Directive 90/365, governing employed and self-
employed people who had ceased to work [1990] OJ L180/28 and directive 90/364 concerning all
those persons who did not already enjoy a right of residence under Community law [1990] OJ
L180/26.
89 P. Craig and G. de Burca, EULaw, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 3rd edition, p.75.
90
In cases C-64/96 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker and Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
[1997] ECR 1-3171 the Court made it clear that citizenship provisions could not extend the scope
ratione materiae of the Treaty to cover internal situations with no link with Community law.
91
According to the Commission the right ofmovement and residence is "now regarded as a
fundamental and personal right, within the EC, which may be exercised outside the context of an
economic activity" (Commission's second report on citizenship, COM (97) 230 para. 4.1.) and that in
any case "the introduction of these new provisions underscores the fact that the Treaty of Rome is not
concerned solely with economic matters" (Commission's first report on citizenship, COM (93) 702
final).
92
T. Downes, "Market Citizenship: Functionalism and Fig Leaves" in R. Bellamy and A. Warleigh
(eds.) Citizenship and Governance on the European Union, London: Continuum, 2001, pp.93-106.
93 Case 214/94 Boukhalfa v. Germany [1996] ECR 1-2253.
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same obligations"94, the Court has been hesitant to ground its rulings on the
citizenship provisions ofArt. 18. Hence, in cases such as Sofia Scanavi,95 and
Uecker and Jaquet96, in which issues of citizenship were raised by the claimants, the
Court preferred to ground its judgement on Treaty articles other than the citizenship
ones.
Maria Martinez Sala has been one of the very few cases in which the ECJ accepted
arguments for extension of the rights of individuals based simply on the legal status
ofUnion citizenship97. Mrs. Martinez Sala, a Spanish national resident in Germany
since 1968 claimed a child raising allowance. Mrs Martinez Sala had worked in
Germany for a period of time, but since 1989 she had been receiving social
assistance. Until 1984 she had been given residence permits from the German
authorities, but from 1984 to 1993 (when she applied for the child raising allowance),
she only had documents certifying that she had applied for an extension of her permit
(the actual residence permit was given to her in 1994). The German authorities
rejected her application for the child raising allowance on the basis that she was not a
German national and she did not have a residence permit.
When this case was taken to the ECJ, the Court opined that the requirement of a
residence permit for the granting of the allowance was discriminatory since German
citizens were not subject to the same condition. Hence, the case came under the
scope ofArt. 12 , which establishes the principle of non-discrimination. Although
there was an economic element in this case, not having sufficient information to
94
Similarly the Advocate General in his opinion in Shingara and Radion stated that: " the creation of
the citizenship of the Union with the corollary described above of freedom ofmovement for citizens
throughout the territory of the member states, represents a considerable qualitative step forward in
that.. .it separates this freedom from its functional or instrumental elements (the link with an economic
activity or attainment of the internal market) and raises it to the level of a genuinely independent right
inherent in the political status of the citizens of the Union." Joined cases 65 and 111/95, The Queen v.
Secretary ofstatefor the Home Department ex parte Shingara and Radion, [1997] ECR1-3343 at
3354 para 34.
95 In Case 93/94, Scanavi v. Chryssanthakopoulos, [1996] ECR 1-929 the ECJ refused to determine a
dispute about the exchange of driving licences by reference to the EU citizenship and resorted instead
to the economic rules associated with the right of establishment. For a similar position, see also C-
5/95 Stober and Pereira [1997] 1 ECR 1-511.
96 In Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Uecker and Jacquet, [1997] ECR I- 3171, the ECJ repeated its
jurisprudence (as developed prior to the establishment of the legal status of the EU citizenship) that
the free movement rights cannot apply in a wholly internal situation.
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decide whether the claimant could qualify under the rules relating to employment or
those relating to social security, the ECJ decided that the right in question could be
claimed on the basis ofArt. 18 (citizenship) in combination with Art. 12, establishing
the principle of non-discrimination. The principle ofnon-discrimination, as
mentioned earlier (see Cowan case) can only be applied when a case falls within the
scope of the Treaty. In this case the Treaty nexus was affirmed by reference to the
provisions of citizenship, because Mrs. Martinez Sala "as a national of a Member
State lawfully residing in the territory of another Member State.. .comes within the
QO
scope ratione personae of the provisions of the Treaty on European citizenship."
Before this case it was assumed that the citizenship rights to freedom ofmovement
and residence, being subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty,
did not in fact have the same constitutional potential as the market based right
relating to free movement ofworkers. Before we get carried away in our conclusions
regarding the significance ofMartinez Sala, however, we should remind ourselves
that the ECJ did not in fact recognise a right of residence on the basis of citizenship
as such, because the Court found that Germany had indirectly authorised the
applicant's residence. Thus, "it remains to be seen whether it [the Court] will take the
next step of declaring a general right of residence with associated benefits purely on
the basis of citizenship and without reference to any form ofmarket/economic
activity..."99
In two successive judgements, however, Calfa100 and Wijsenbeek]0\ the Court chose
not to ground its judgement on the citizenship provisions. In Calfa an Italian national
faced a lifetime expulsion from Greece because she was caught drug-dealing. The
Advocate general submitted that "Ms Calfa's position is already protected by her
status as a recipient of services.. .it is therefore superfluous.. .to have recourse to this
further protection offered by Community citizenship."102 And although the outcome
97 Case C-85/96, Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR 1-2691.
98 ibid., at para 61.
99 T. Dowries, op.cit. fn. 92, p. 102.
100 Case 348/96 Criminal Proceedings against Donatella Calfa, [1999] ECR 1-11.
101 Case 378/97, Criminal Proceedings against Florus Ariel Wijsenbeek, [1999] ECR I- 6207.
102 At para 10 of the Advocate General opinion.
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would have been the same, had the Court made use of the citizenship provisions
instead, the fact remains that once again the rights of the European "bourgeois", the
economic actor, take precedence over the rights of the European "citoyen", the
political actor. This preference for the employment of some economic nexus, even if
a very loose one, (in this particular case the ECJ, following its ruling in Cowan,
affirmed the economic nexus by reference to the fact that Ms Calfa's physical
presence in Greece necessarily entailed that she was a recipient of services in that
country in one way or the other) undermines the symbolic role of citizenship.
In Wijsenbeek, a case concerning the refusal of a Dutch national to show his passport
at Schiphol Airport who was consequently convicted by a Dutch criminal court, the
ECJ in answer to a question addressed to it by the Dutch court, made it clear that the
citizenship provisions do not have direct effect and as a result they do not foreclose
one's obligation to present a passport at airports.103 However, the imposition of
imprisonment was considered to be a disproportionate measure and, therefore, an
unjustified restriction to free movement.
While Calfa and Wijsenbeek demonstrate a more hesitant approach to the citizenship
provisions than the one put forward in Martinez-Sala (these cases suggest that
citizenship on its own is not enough to create an area without internal frontiers), the
Court finally returned to its more expansive stance (as demonstrated in Martinez-
Sala) in Grzelczyk104. Grzelczyk was a French national studying and working part-
time in Belgium, who in the last year of his studies claimed the minimum subsistence
allowance. The Court drawing on its reasoning in Martinez-Sala, repeated that "a
citizen of the EU lawfully resident in the territory of a host member State can rely on
Art. 6.. .in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae ofCommunity
103 In this case Advocate General Cosmas emphasised that the citizenship provisions are inspired by
"une philosophie anthropocentrique" which distinguishes them from the functional character of the
traditional free movement rules. As a result he accepts the direct effect of the relevant articles in his
opinion (see paras 83, 85, 97, 101).
104 Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d 'Aide Sociale d' Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve
(CPAS) [2001]ECR 1-6193.
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law"105 and it went on to clarify that the citizenship link could be a basis for the
ratione materiae application of community law.
It appears that the relatively newly developed rights of citizenship have not been able
to break completely their links with the concept ofmarket citizen as described in the
previous part of this chapter. Independently of whether the ECJ is powerless or
simply reluctant to develop citizenship rights outside the market framework, the
concept of citizenship is, according to Downes, "no more than a fig-leaf barely
hiding the inadequacies of the Treaty"107. Similarly Craig and De Burca insist that
"just as an economic community does not become a political union through the
deletion of a word from the title of a Treaty, neither do workers, retired persons,
students and their families become citizens of a polity solely through the addition of
a set of formal legal rights in a Treaty."108
Interestingly, a directive on the free movement ofEU citizens and their families is
about to replace the existing secondary legislation. However, it only provides to EU
citizens and their dependants a general right to move and reside in any member State
for up to six months. For rights of residence that exceed this time limit the proposed
directive still requires the financial self-sufficiency of the EU citizens.109 Given that
the ECJ jurisprudence has been timid and at times ambiguous in the application and
interpretation of the citizenship provisions, it is not really clear whether this
legislative initiative intends to make the free movement and residence rights ofEU
citizens more explicit (at least within the six-month time-limit) or it actually
functions as an impediment to a potentially more expansive judicial interpretation in
the future (one for example that would ground the movement and residence rights on
the provisions of citizenship without any reference to the financial means of the
citizens and without any time restrictions).
105 At para 32 of the judgement.
106 This judgement effectively overruled Brown (Case 197/86 para 18), according to which assistance
given to students for maintenance/training fell outside the scope of the non-discrimination principle.
107 T. Downes, op. cit. fn. 92, p. 104.
108 P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1998, p.725.
109 This directive also introduces a permanent right of residence, which is acquired after four years of
continuous residence in the host state. This means that the Member States will no longer be able to
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After over a decade since its introduction the limited use of the concept of citizenship
by the ECJ has managed to close some pre-existing gaps in the area of free
movement, but remains rather insignificant as a source of rights for the European
citizens. Its institutionalisation has done very little in the direction of granting rights
not only to the market citizen, but also to the non-economically active European
citizen110. Shaw's prediction that citizenship will develop "a framework of rights
which constitute the citizen as an individual subject of law"111 is yet to be fulfilled.
Norbert Reich's view, according to which citizenship appears to be "a sleeping fairy
princess that has not still been kissed awake by the direct effect ofCommunity
law"112 seems to be closer to the EU reality.
The above observations have briefly addressed the ability of the EU citizenship to
strengthen the protection of individual rights and to dissociate this protection from
economic considerations. This way of conceptualising citizenship corresponds to the
liberal model of citizenship as a locus of rights and duties. Under this conceptual
approach, citizenship defines an individual's passive legal status. Hence, citizenship
is connected with the enjoyment of rights which are not accorded to individuals
merely by virtue ofbeing a member of humankind. However, a number of theorists
maintain that analysing the rights and duties that are associated with citizenship does
not exhaust its deeper meaning; they insist that citizenship should be viewed as
participation in communal life.113 To be a citizen is to be an active member of a
polity and, thus, to participate in self-rule. This (mainly republican) conceptualisation
of citizenship puts the emphasis on political participatory rights.
deprive those with a permanent right of residence their right of residence on the basis of public order
or public security.
110 S. O' Leary, "The relationship between Community citizenship and the protection of fundamental
rights in Community Law", 32 (1995) Common Market Law Review, p.524. Norbert Reich also makes
the distinction between "a bourgeois" and "the citoyen", the first being a citizen defined in economic
terms, the second by participation in decision-making. N. Reich, "Union Citizenship- Metaphor or
Source ofRights?", 7(2001) European Law Journal, p.8.
111 J. Shaw, "Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-National membership?" in The European
University Institute (ed.), Collected Courses ofthe Academy ofEuropean Law, Vol. VI-1, Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1998, p.294.
112 N. Reich, op. cit. fn. 110, p.4.
113 See for example U. Preuss, "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of a Political Theory of
Citizenship", in R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi & D. Castiglione (eds.), Democracy and Constitutional
Culture in the Union ofEurope, London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995, pp.107-121.
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The political rights that escort the conferral ofUnion citizenship are the participation
in the elections for the European parliament and the participation in the municipal
elections of the host state. It is worth noting that in neither of these cases does the EU
citizen actually become a full citizen in the political sense of the term, because he/she
does not in fact through his/her participation to municipal/European elections
become a member of the corresponding body politic. In one case the municipal
representatives are only dealing with locally and most of the times materially
specified problems, while the European Parliament's powers do not correspond to
those of a legislative chamber, because they are heavily circumscribed. Hence the
Union citizen "is attached to two forms of society but is master of neither".114
The political character ofEU citizenship "lessens the impact of allienage" to a
certain extent, but does not in any way confer to the EU citizen substantial political
power. To quote d' Oliveira "the political dimension ofEU citizenship is
underdeveloped".115 Sionaidh Scott- Douglas concurs that "active citizenship has
remained hypothetical, only a pale relation of its imperfect counterpart (market
citizenship) capable of producing an anaemic political discourse and an anaemic
Union citizen".116 What makes this situation even less encouraging is the fact that
there seems to be little scope for the development of active citizenship in the future,
because of the lack of the necessary institutional structures.
Active citizenship is connected with political self-determination and is therefore
dependent on the existence of a public space that will sustain the deliberation and the
debate of the Community about its own self-rule. The institutional structures of
public life in the EU are underdeveloped; the unelected Commission has the
legislative initiative, the agenda for the EP elections is dominated by national issues,
the EP's powers, notwithstanding their gradual expansion are still weak etc. All these
function as impediments to the development of a public space of deliberation at
114 M. Everson, "The Legacy of the Market Citizen", in J. Shaw and G. More (eds.), New Legal
Dynamics ofthe European Union, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1995, p.77
115 H.-J. D' Oliveira, "European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its potential" in R. Dehousse (ed.), Europe
after Maastricht: An Ever Close Union?, Munchen: Law Books in Europe,1994.
116 S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law ofthe European Union, Essex: Longman, 2002, p.496.
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European level. Addressing these problems at the institutional level is a pre-requisite
for the development of a more active concept of citizenship that could foster the
political identity of the citizens and their sense ofbelonging in the EU political
community.
Putting aside its lack of a strong human rights component and its restricted political
character, however, the aspect ofEU citizenship which has attracted the most
prominent criticisms is its exclusionary character.117 Given that EU citizenship is a
derived condition ofMember State nationality, which means that third country
nationals lawfully residing in the Union are excluded from the privileges associated
with it and given that EU citizenship could potentially extend the rights of the EU
citizens, the difference of status between Member State nationals and third country
nationals becomes bigger all the time. This institutionalises an unjustified difference
in the treatment of different persons' human rights. The argument is that ifEU
citizenship is the vehicle through which eventually the marketisation of rights will be
counterbalanced, the fact that this (EU citizenship) relies upon Member State
nationality further increases the gap between EU citizens and third country nationals.
Citizenship has indeed frequently been coupled with nationality at the national level.
However, even in these cases, citizenship is viewed as the criterion for according
individuals their political rights rather than their civic ones. Within the context of the
EU, Member State nationality is not only the pre-requisite for the enjoyment of the
classical political rights (participation in elections etc), but also of the civic rights.
And this is exactly the second aspect of the "non-human" character of the EU
fundamental rights I alluded to at the beginning ofmy analysis in this chapter. It is
not that fundamental rights in the EU are in-human; rather that their conferral is not
in any way a necessary corollary of the human condition. Not only is their enjoyment
premised (more often than not) upon the exercise of some economic activity, but it is
also dependent upon the prior legal link with one of the Member States. At the same
time in most Member States the majority of subjective rights is no longer based on
117 H. d' Oliveira, "Nationality and the EU after Amsterdam" in D. O'Keeffe and P. Twomey, Legal
Issues ofthe Amsterdam Treaty, Oxford: Hart, 1999, pp.141-146.
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citizenship, but on lawful residence. This has prompted a number of theorists to talk
of "Fortress Europe".118
On the basis of the above objections, different theorists have tried to expose the
contingent character of the overlap between citizenship and nationality. Theodora
Kostakopoulou argues that the use ofnationality as the basis of citizenship is "neither
an 'objective reality' nor a 'natural necessity'."119 Ulrich Preuss has suggested that
"European citizenship could even be conferred on individuals who do not possess the
nationality of any of the Member States."120 Taking this further, Marie Jose Garot121
maintains that residence should be the central criterion for EU citizenship and Helen
Staples proposes that the citizenship provision is amended as follows: "Citizenship of
the Union is hereby established. A person holding the nationality of a Member State
or who has been lawfully resident in the territory of a Member State for five years
shall be a citizen of the Union."122 In fact the EU institutions seem to have realised
how unjustified the discrimination against third country nationals is. The European
Parliament in its 1997 White Paper on Citizenship recommended the abolition of this
discrimination, while the Commission published a communication in 2000 hinting at
the possibility to extend citizenship to certain third-country nationals. Even more
important than these promising but intangible so far proposals is Art. 45.2 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which "freedom ofmovement and
residence may be granted, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the EC to
nationals of third-countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State." And
although this is not enough to extend the freedom ofmovement and residence to
third country nationals, it does, however, facilitate their extension in the future.
118
Seyla Benhabib has argued that the EU self-declarations regarding its internal organisation as a
liberal democratic order create certain external obligations towards its "others". S. Benhabib,
"Fortress Europe or the United Colors of Benetton? Dilemmas of European Citizenship", Paper
Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington DC, 1997 as
quoted by J. Shaw, "The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship", 61 (1998) Modern Law
Review, fn.49.
119 T. Kostakopoulou, "Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe", 4 (1996) Journal of
Political Philosophy, p. 339.
120 U. Preuss, "Problems of a Concept ofEuropean Citizenship" 1 (1995) European Law Journal, p.
2 (P-
121 Jvl. J. Garot, La citoyennete del' Union Europeenne, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999.
122 pi. Staples, The Legal Status of third country nationals resident in the EU, Dordrecht; Kluwer,
1999-
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In sum, there has been much debate about the significance ofEuropean citizenship.
For some the advent of the concept ofEU citizenship has signified the beginning of
the development of a common European political (as opposed to the previous
market-oriented) identity. For others it has been nothing more than a re-statement
and a further consolidation of the pre-existing situation; a label for rights of free
movement already incorporated in the EC Treaty. In my analysis in this chapter I
have found the optimism unwarranted. This has been justified by reference to the
limited rights that have been associated with EU citizenship and to the absence of
those features that could give rise to a more politically active citizenship (e.g.
absence of significant political rights or even reciprocal duties). In light of the above
deficiencies, market citizenship still seems to be the main conceptual model for EU
citizenship. On top of these (or probably as a result of these), EU citizenship does not
do justice to the common humanity and the inherent dignity of all those who live
within its borders, but insists -unjustifiedly so in my view- on the conferral of all
rights (and not simply the political ones) solely on the basis of nationality of a
Member State. In doing so it fails to fulfil the requirements for a properly so-called
post-national citizenship.
d) The market as a societal bond
In the previous section I argued that the marketisation of the EU conception of
fundamental rights gave rise to the market citizenship and to a market model of
society. The market is connected with a certain conception of human rationality,
according to which individuals are self-interested, rational profit-maximisers. One of
the main accusations that have been levelled against the marketisation of the EU
fundamental rights and the emergence of the EU market citizenship is that within a
market society which is based on a single metric of value, namely that ofprofit
maximisation/economic efficiency, human relations are instrumentalised, while
values such as solidarity, which are necessary for the cohesion of a community may
be undervalued and as a result underdeveloped.
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As we saw earlier, the institutionalisation of the Union citizenship has not as yet
managed to do away with all the instrumental aspects of its forerunner. In light of the
fact that the market remains the focal point of the European Community, I will now
explore the ability of the market to provide the element of communality which is
required among the members of a political community. Bert van Roermund and Hans
Lindahl are among the theorists who have clearly argued in favour of the market's
ability to offer a basis for political cohesion within the context of the EC/EU. This
part will explore their arguments.
In their article "Law without a State? On Representing the Common Market"123, Bert
van Roermund and Hans Lindahl acknowledge that the common market is the central
category of Community law, but they insist that this development is not deplorable,
because the market can satisfy the conditions necessary for political representation
and it can, thus, function as the point of reference for the political self-identity of the
Community/Union. The main target of van Roermund and Lindahl in this article is
the Maastricht judgement of the German Constitutional Court. We analysed this
judgement in Chapter 2. Briefly, according to the reasoning of the BVerfG, in
democracy all normative relations must be referred to the sovereign people. The EC
is not yet a political entity, so goes the reasoning of the federal court, because there is
no sovereign European people; only peoples in the plural. The BVerfG argues that
what binds the people together (and what consequently constitutes the people as a
political unity) is cultural homogeneity. The BverfG thus views a polity as two
orders, an existential and a legal one, where the latter simply reproduces the former.
Van Roermund and Lindahl argue that "by contending that the legal order represents
a pre-given existential unity, the federal Court lapses into a form of
representationalism."124
123 B. Van Roermund and H. Lindahl, "Law without a State? On representing the Common Market" in
Z. Bankowski and A. Scott (eds.), The European Union and its Order: the Legal Theory ofEuropean
Integration, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp.1-16.
124 ibid., p. 12. They explain that".. .the Maastricht judgement falls prey to representationalism
because it views the distinction between the purpose of a legal order and the order itself as a
distinction in re". In their view, and in this I agree with them, the distinction between a legal order and
its purpose is strictly a distinctio rationis. This distinction, which draws on Ernst Kassirer's work, is
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In their opinion, the ECJ avoids this flaw by positing the common market as the
purpose ofCommunity law. Unlike, however, the ECJ, which hesitates to conclude
that the market-oriented community legal order is already a political community,
Van Roermund and Lindahl believe that the common market is a full-blooded
political project and that economic integration can satisfy the conditions necessary
for political representation. They agree with the federal court that the ground of the
legal order is "the purpose whence amanifold of relations can appear as a purposive
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unity, namely the common good" and that in a democracy the common good is the
people. They disagree with the Maastricht judgement only in so far as it introduces
homogeneity as a criterion ofpolitical unity, because this unavoidably implies that
the content of the common good is fixed in advance thereby condemning political
identity to immobility.
In their analysis ofpolitical power as an institution, Van Roermund and Lindahl
argue that this is a default reflexive setting of a purposive behaviour and that its
articulation is provided by the relationship between the constitutional/legal order and
the re-shaping of the common good. Ultimately, so goes their argument, a polity is a
relation between political/legal power and its purpose and the two terms of this
teleological relation are co-originary rather than sequential. In light of these
considerations, the sovereign people as the purpose of a democratic legal order does
not need to be postulated prior to the emergence of the legal order (this is what the
federal court did). Positing the realisation of the common market as the purpose of
the Community legal order (this is the ECJ stance) is the element of communality
that brings these people together as participants to the same community. Thus, the
common market provides the default settings of the purpose of Community law.
"Economic integration is not the harbinger ofEuropean political unity; it is the
continued process of re-negotiating the default settings of re-negotiating the default
further explored in H. Lindahl's article "Sovereignty and Symbolization", 28 (1997) Rechtstheorie,
p.3.
125 B. Van Roermund and H. Lindahl, op. cit. fn. 123, p.8.
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settings of the purpose ofCommunity law, or if you will, of the content ofpolitical
identity."126
In their effort to demonstrate that the relation between the Community legal order
and the common market is a teleological one, which in accordance with the
requirements of a non-substantialistic political representation, remains open to
renegotiation, van Roermund and Lindahl compare the different default settings of
the common market as offered by Art. 2EC and Art. Gb2 TEU. In the former, the
criteria that define what counts as a good market are the following: a harmonious and
balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and
solidarity among Member States. Art. G.b.2, on the other hand, includes some new
objectives and provides a new default setting of the common market. On the basis of
this development, van Roermund and Lindahl, then quite hastily confirm that the
reflexive relation between a legal order and its purpose, which is at the heart of all
political representation, is also present in the EU.
When Van Roermund and Lindahl conclude that the realisation of a common market
can be viewed as the common good of the EC and as such it provides the default
settings of the purpose of community law, or otherwise put, the content ofpolitical
identity, they also insert the proviso that they are "neither raising nor answering the
question about the institutional conditions necessary to assure the democratic
legitimisation ofCommunity law-making."127 But it is exactly their omission to look
at these issues from a holistic perspective that does not allow them to see how in
light of the institutional shortcomings and the prevailing juridification of the EC/EU
political order, the dynamic relationship between political power/legal order and its
purpose remains unsatisfactory. And it is because of this pervasive political deficit
that the market cannot currently instantiate the common good of the EU.
126 ibid., p. 13.
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If the purpose and the foundation of a legal order is ultimately the sovereign people,
as van Roermund and Lindahl seem to accept, the non-participation of this people in
the appropriate decision-making processes in which the common good is ultimately
shaped and transformed, necessarily entails that the norms specifying the content of
the common market cannot be imputed to the people. Van Roermund and Lindahl
argue that "determining what counts as a good market is not merely an economic
decision; re-negotiating the constitutive and regulative rules of the common market
instances the process of political representation"128. Although the market is
concerned with the fulfilment ofprivate interests, its institutionalisation, that is the
putting in place of the rules that regulate its organization, is subject to negotiation. It
is clear that for Van Roermund and Lindahl the market as an institution is a matter of
public interest; they refer to a properly so-called political economy. In the EC/EU,
however, the fore-mentioned re-negotiation (negotiation of the common good,
negotiation of the terms of the common market) is presented as a technocratic issue,
which is withdrawn from the sphere ofpolitical contestation. The criteria for the
definition ofwhat counts as a good market are effectively provided from within the
market.
Van Roermund and Lindahl clarify that "characterising the common market as a
default setting of the common good in no way implies elevating the market into a
false historical necessity."129 They believe that, although highly improbable in the
near future, there is always the possibility to have a default setting of the common
good other than the market. The problem however is that certain aspects of the
current default setting of the common good have penetrated the community legal
order and have become part of the constitutional acquis communautaire (e.g.
marketisation of fundamental rights). As a result any prospective change of the








In a period of "mounting enthusiasm" for free markets (especially after the demise of
the former Communist regimes), it seems almost "unnatural" to raise questions about
the proper role of the market in social ordering. But as Cass Sunstein points out, it is
imperative that we distinguish between the market as a means, a tool to the
1 ^0
promotion of human welfare and the market as an end in itself . Ifwe view the
market as an end, then economic efficiency is unavoidably the unitary metric of cost-
benefit analysis. If, however, we view the market as a tool for the promotion of
welfare and human happiness (as we should), then other factors such as altruism,
solidarity, social justice emerge as criteria for a different cost-benefit analysis. This
leads Sunstein to the conclusion that, although free markets are indispensable for
democratic politics, politics properly so called cannot be conflated with market
ordering. Democratic political processes allow for and affirm competing conceptions
of the good, while the market is identified with one particular conception of the
good. Thus, the market cannot exhaust the concept of the good. Besides,
democracy's role in ensuring autonomy goes beyond the satisfaction of existing
preferences and is also concerned with the processes of preference formation. And
within these processes, self-interest may not be the only motivating force. Other
morally relevant factors may affect the choices of citizens as political participants (as
opposed to private consumers). Sunstein reminds us that democratic controls of the
market are in any case justified.
Similarly, Michelle Everson draws our attention to the distinction between market as
a fact and market as a construct.131 This is a more sophisticated version of Sunstein's
distinction between the market as an end and the market as a means. The market as a
fact is premised upon the possibility of conceptually isolating the economy from
politics. This approach views the market as the most efficient form of growth and
resources management. It safeguards the internal security and stability of the market
from any extra-market considerations, including political intervention. In this view
political economy is redundant as the internal legitimacy of the economy rests purely
130 C. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 4-9.
131 M. Everson, "Economic Rights within the European Union" in R. Bellamy, V. Buffacchi, D.
Castiglione (eds.) Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union ofEurope, London: Lothian
Foundation Press, 1995, pp.138-139.
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upon its own procedural norms as expressed by technical regulation. Hence,
economic experts' opinions are privileged over political decisions. On the other
hand, there is another form ofmarket, the market as a construction or a creation.
Under this theoretical scenario, the market, instead ofbeing secured against state
intervention, actually depends upon on-going political processes. These define what
the market should encompass and which non-market oriented encroachments into the
economy are legitimate. Here the competitive impetus and the pure logic of the
market give way to politically informed decisions.
Each of the above types ofmarket is associated with a different conception of
economic rights. Within the view of the market as a fact, the individual is equipped
with "enabling competencies" which are like a double-edged sword "both
maintaining the internal security of the market and safeguarding it against any
external intrusions motivated by extra-market considerations."132 Within the market
as a creation, on the other hand, the individual possesses "instrumentalist economic
competencies". In this case the economic rights of the citizen are intricately
connected with his/her political rights. It is through the exercise of the latter (political
rights) that the scope and content of the economic rights/competencies can also be
defined.
In her evaluation of the legal status quo in the EU, Everson points out that the four
market freedoms (free movement of capital and workers, freedom of establishment
and services) were originally designed to be enabling economic competencies.133 The
ratification of the Single European Act and the passage from unanimity to qualified
majority voting signalled the withdrawal of state control (Member State
governments) over the market, the underlying assumption of this development being
that the logic of the market could yield the best outcomes. In parallel with the
withdrawal ofpolitical control came the introduction of the market criteria in the
case law of the ECJ (see section c of this chapter). The combination of the two






legal order) makes it apparent that for Community purposes, the market was for a
long time viewed as a fact.
After the signing ofMaastricht, however, and the incorporation ofmarket
externalities among the Community objectives, it can be argued that a created market
has started slowly to emerge. Elements of industrial policy, consumer and
environmental protection are some of the extra-market considerations that have been
integrated into the workings of the EU market. In light of this development, it
becomes problematic to decouple economic rights from political ones, because as we
saw above within the view of the market as a construction it is through the exercise
of their political rights that the citizens can also define their economic competencies.
However, as was shown in the previous section, the EU citizenship adds a very
limited political role to the status of the market citizen, who is thus unable to exercise
any direct influence in the shaping of the emerging created market. The alleviation of
this problem necessarily takes us back to the democratic and political deficit of the
Union.
And this is exactly the point that Van Roermund and Lindahl seem to be missing.
They are right in arguing that the organisation of the market in abstracto could
theoretically be viewed as the end-product of an on-going political process that
expresses the values of the citizens. The problem, however, is that because of the
prevailing juridification of the EU political system and the democratic deficit, no
such on-going participatory political processes exist. The political deficit of the
Union in combination with the lack ofpolitical focus in the institutionalisation of the
EU citizenship entails the under-development of the political rights of the citizens.
As a result of this lack of clear definition, political rights in their turn cannot control
effectively the definition and organisation of the corresponding economic
competencies of the citizens.
Van Roermund and Lindahl following the ECJ reasoning in Van Gend en Loos view
the common market as the end of the European integration. In doing so, they
postulate the market as the common good of the EC/EU. This postulation unlike the
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one assumed by the BverfG does not fix the content of the common good in advance;
the articulation of the market as an institution, a default setting of purposive
behaviour is open to re-negotiation and change. However, the very act of instituting a
market as a common enterprise is external to the conceptual presuppositions of the
market itself. The concept of the market rests upon an exchange of offer and
acceptance regarding supplies and demands. This is a factual presupposition.
Whether the market actually surpasses this basic factual level and becomes an
institution subjected to regulation is a political decision, which is external to the
market.134 I agree with van Roermund and Lindahl that the market as a process can
instance the logic ofpolitical representation to the extent that it can be articulated as
the on-going redefinition of the rules of this process. However, this on-going re¬
shaping of its common good can only be reflexive and properly so-called democratic
if it is enacted by the people and their representatives. This is not the case with the
EC/EU, where the market has been presented as a politically neutral, a technocratic
programme that is driven by experts in economics.
Let me end this on a somewhat different note: in an article entitled "The Other
Heading"135 Derrida, unlike van Roermund and Lindahl, deplores the market
orientation of the EU. Drawing on the polysemy of the word "capital", Derrida is
playing throughout this text with the relationship between the feminine "la capitale"
meaning the capital city of a country and the masculine "le capital", which is capital
in its monetary sense. The feminine "la capitale", the capital city of a country can
also be seen as referring to the cultural heritage of Europe. And what is proper to the
heritage of this culture is not to be identical to itself. "Not to not have an identity, but
not to be able to identify itself; to be able to take the form of subject only in the non-
134
Despite Smith's contention that the "invisible hand" will run the market (A. Smith, An Enquiry into
the Nature and causes of the Wealth ofNations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), or Hayek's
belief that the free market "dispenses with the need for social control" (F. Hayek, The Road to
Serfdom, London: Routledge, 1962), it is nowadays accepted , even by neo-liberal theorists such as
Posner (R.Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, Boston: Little Brown, 1986), that free markets need
legal regulation; in the absence of appropriate social control, the creation ofmonopolies and
oligopolies will eventually undermine competition. This further strengthens the argument that political
processes are indeed a prerequisite for the good functioning of the market and that, therefore, they
cannot be generated by the market.
135 J. Derrida, The Other Heading - Reflections on Today's Europe (translated by P.-A. Brault and
M.B. Naas), Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992.
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identity to itself 136 Although accepting that the history of a culture presupposes an
identifiable heading137, a telos, he also insists that this heading should not "be
identifiable in advance and once and for all"138. Derrida urges us "to make ourselves
the guardians of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own
identity".139
His fear is that the masculine "le capital", the capital in the monetary sense may not
be sensitive to the aporetic subtleties140 of a properly European identity, that is an
identity which is at the same time a difference with itself. Derrida strongly believes
that we need a new way of taking capital into account; keeping at distance "the
totalitarian dogmatism that under the pretense of putting an end to capital destroyed
democracy and the European heritage"141, but at the same time resisting the neo-
capitalist exploitation of the breakdown ofCommunism and the equally dangerous
dogmatism of an institutionalised religion of capital. This double aim is effectively
connected with the idea of a market as a construct, a market which is democratically
controlled and which necessarily presupposes the existence of strong political
processes in the background.
Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has aimed to show that fundamental rights have been
employed in a conceptually confused way within the EU. This conceptual confusion
is mainly the outcome ofjudicialisation. Due to the judicial constitutionalisation of
the Treaties, fundamental rights have been protected as being part of the general
136 ibid., p.9.
137 The etymological affinity between heading ("cap" in French) and capital is lost in English. It is
retrievable, however, in the other meaning of "cap" which is cape.
138 J. Derrida, op.cit. fn. 135, p. 18.
139 ibid., p.29.
140 The aporia consists in the following: on the one hand, the European cultural identity must not be
"dispersed into a myriad ofprovinces, into a multiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little
nationalisms, each one jealous and untranslatable", while, on the other hand, "it cannot and must not
accept the capital of a centralizing authority that would control and standardise". Neither monopoly
nor dispersion, therefore, neither universal nor particular. In this sense it is an aporia; an experience
and experiment of the possibility of the impossible.
141 J. Derrida, op. cit. fn. 135, p.77.
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principles of law. This development has entailed a number of uncertainties regarding
the corpus ofEU fundamental rights, the position of fundamental rights in the EU
pyramid ofhierarchy and, directly connected with the latter, the permitted
restrictions to rights. The signing of the EU Charter of fundamental rights, although a
positive step, has not changed the constitutional status quo in the EU and for the time
being fundamental rights are still protected as part of the general principles of law.
Elence the fore-mentioned uncertainties still remain.
The other problematic aspect of the EU protection of fundamental rights, which is
also connected with the judicial constitutionalisation of the Treaties, is marketisation.
In light of the mainly economic objectives of the Treaties, the protection of
fundamental rights has been conceptually subordinated to (the overriding objective
of) the realisation of the common market. My analysis in this chapter identified three
different expressions ofmarketisation. First of all the four market freedoms acquired
the status of fundamental rights. This meant that the EU fundamental rights could not
really play their role as the highest rules of the system against which the validity of
community legislation could be measured, simply because all secondary legislation is
in one or the other way connected with the market freedoms. Thus, a conflict
between a fundamental right and secondary legislation is no longer a conflict
between a higher and a lower norm, but a conflict between hierarchically equal
fundamental rights. This obviously undermines the role of fundamental rights.
The second expression ofmarketisation consists in the fact that, according to the
relevant ECJ judgements, restrictions to fundamental rights can be justified by
reference to their social function as defined by the needs of the common market. This
means that the common market has been postulated as the common good of the
EC/EU.
The third aspect ofmarketisation, the least obvious one, consists in the fact that the
actual recognition of rights to individuals is premised upon their ability to establish
some link with an economic activity. As a result, formal equality, for the purposes of
the EU is conferred to all participants in the market. Those outside the sphere of the
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market (unemployed, housewives etc)142 do not enjoy the same rights as those within
it, which raises some serious questions about the social justice of the system.
In light of the above problems it is obvious that the EU system of rights falls short of
the requirements of theoretical (liberal) orthodoxy, according to which a) rights are
trump cards against public authorities b) fundamental rights are the highest rules of
validation within a legal system and c) all citizens have the same rights.
Having demonstrated the inconsistencies and incompatibility of the EU system of
protection of fundamental rights with the theoretically orthodox view, which is
incidentally the one officially proclaimed by the Community legal order, I then
linked the discussion of the deficiencies of the EU system of fundamental rights with
some ofmy conclusions in the previous chapters. By revisiting these previous
conclusions regarding the on-going process of universalisation (chapter 2) and the
relationship between rights/law and politics (chapter 3), my intention was to question
theoretical orthodoxy and to offer amore sophisticated conception of rights, which
however, instead ofvindicating the EU conception of rights would further expose its
deficiencies. According to my analysis in this part, it is far too simplistic to view the
concept of rights as being only antagonistic with the concept of the common good.
The two are in fact in a constant interplay and mutually define each other's meaning.
This relation ofmutual constituency does not collapse into one of dialectical
synthesis as the tension between the two poles, (universal) fundamental rights and
culturally specific (hence, particular) common good is still there. Under this
approach, rights cannot be viewed as apolitical constraints on political power
(through the exercise ofwhich the concept of the common good is defined); they are
142 Louise Ackers offers an analysis of the definition of worker in the Community legal order and she
concludes that "despite the broad interpretation of the concept of 'worker' to include certain
categories of unpaid work or activity of marginal economic value, entitlement to social rights under
the free movement provisions nevertheless remains firmly based on the 'male breadwinner'
conceptualisation of the family and excludes many areas ofwork traditionally designated to women."
L. Ackers, "Women, Citizenship and European Community Law: The Gender Implications of the Free
Movement Provisions", 16 (1994) Journal ofSocial Welfare and Family Law, pp.393-394. For an
interesting analysis of women's rights in the EC/EU see also M. Weiner, "Fundamental
Misconceptions about Fundamental Rights: The Changing Nature ofWomen's Rights in the EEC and
their Application in the United Kingdom", 31 (1990) Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 565-610
and M. Everson, "Women and Citizenship of the European Union" in T. Hervey and D. O' Keeffe
(ed.), Sex Equality Law in the European Union, Chichester: ChanceryWiley, 1996, p.205.
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in fact partly constituted by political power. This internal link between rights and
politics necessarily discredits any attempt to ground the legitimacy of the
Community legal order on fundamental rights in the absence of a fully political
constitution.
Given the lacking political character and the market orientation ofEU fundamental
rights, I explored whether the introduction of the EU citizenship by the TEU changed
in any significant way the marketisation of the Community legal order that had taken
place prior to its institutionalisation. Through an analysis of a) certain conceptual
aspects of the EU citizenship and b) the ECJ case-law in this area, it was argued that
EU citizenship, focusing mainly on the mobility of the citizens, currently lacks a
truly political character which could transform it into a real lever of participation in
the Union. As a result, the EU citizenship has not yet fully overcome the
subordination of the Community legal order to the exigencies of the market.
In view of the fact that the market still remains the focal point of the Community
legal order, I finally turned to the arguments put forward by van Roermund and
Lindahl, according to which the market can offer a basis for political cohesion. I
agreed with them that defining what counts as a good market is a teleological project
that could instantiate the concept ofpolitical representation, but I inserted the proviso
that this happens only when the default settings of the market are open to a public
negotiation and are not treated as a technocratic issue that has been withdrawn from
the sphere ofpolitical contestation. Whether this actually happens or not is external
to the concept of the market as such. Hence, the proper working ofpolitical economy
is ultimately premised upon the existence of some democratic political framework.
The market can sustain such a framework, but it cannot generate it ex nihilo.
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Prefatory Conclusion
We shall not cease from exploration
and the end of all our exploring
will be to arrive where we started
and know the place for the first time
In my end is my beginning
T.S. Eliot (Little Gidding)
Constitutionalism offers a rich vein for philosophical inquiry.1 Tensions and aporias
are part of the constitutional lawyer's professional routine (that is, if she is sensitive
enough to acknowledge them). On the one hand, constitutional doctrine partly
presupposes the existence of that which it creates; "the demos which is called upon
to accept the constitution is constituted legally by that very constitution".2 On the
other hand, being the medium that enables the communication between abstract
• • • -5
universalistic principles and a historically specific political culture, a constitution is
unavoidably fraught with tension, the tension that underlies the relationship between
reason and passion.
The riddle(s) of all constitutions, contrary to Marx's contentions,4 remain largely
unsolved. And in the midst of all the riddles there is a recurrent theme: "what, if
anything, makes a constitution legitimate?" Does constitutional legitimacy stem from
the passion of democratic politics or from the reason of rights? Or again, could it be
that the legitimacy of law is always arbitrary as Derrida5 and Lyotard6 insist; a
simple performative which presents its own performativity in the form of a
constative?
' L. Alexander (ed.),Constitutionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.l.
2 J. Weiler, "The Promised Constitutional Land", 12 (2001) King's College Law Journal, p.6.
3 See Chapter 2.
4
According to Marx, "democracy is the solved riddle of all constitutions. Here not merely implicitly
and in essence but existing in reality, the constitution is constantly brought back to its actual basis, the
actual human being, and established as the people's own work." R. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels
Reader, 2nd ed., New York: Norton, 1978, p. 20.
5 J. Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical' Foundation of Authority" in D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and
D. Gray Carlson (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice, New York/London: Routledge,
1992, pp.35 ff.
6 J.-F. Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
211
The aim of this thesis was not to solve any of the constitutional riddles. The intention
here was a much more modest one; to explore the constitutional framework of the
EU and the role this has played in the development of a new type ofpolity. The fore-
mentioned tensions in the heart of constitutionalism are obviously both magnified
and multiplied when the normative concepts of constitutionalism are translated from
the state to the supra-state level. The fact that the EU constitutional framework does
not match the pre-existing statist constitutional templates is not necessarily a
problem. Besides, the aim of this thesis was not to expose the flaws ofEU
constitutionalism by reference to our inherited constitutional vocabularies, but to
articulate an internal, immanent critique, which, by bringing to the fore the internal
contradictions of the EU constitutional order, would also reveal its true potentiality.
The critique of ideology was suggested as the particular methodological tool which
would help us reveal the contradictions between official rhetoric and reality, but also
the emancipatory possibilities stemming from the EU project. Simulation, on the
other hand, which is usually associated with the end of ideology debate (hence, a
prima facie negation of ideology), was presented here as the mode in which ideology
functions most effectively today. The ultimate aim of this thesis was to show that EU
constitutionalism has facilitated the unfolding of a number of simulations and that
these simulations have played a significant ideological role in that they have served
to sustain the current asymmetrical structures ofpower in the EU.
a) Revisiting the basic concepts: simulation as ideology
In his essay "The orders of simulacra" (chapter from the book Symbolic exchange
and death)1 Baudrillard offers a history of simulation. He identifies three successive
stages of the simulacrum. The first order is that of the counterfeit; in this period signs
do not in fact attempt to pass themselves off as real; they actually refer to the real
through their difference to it. The second order of simulacra is that ofmechanical
production (and reproduction). Within this order, sign and reality become equivalent.
The sign no longer relates to the real via its difference from it; it attempts to be the
7 J. Baudrillard, L' echange symbolique et la mort, Paris: Gallimard, 1976. In English it appears in J.
Baudrillard, Simulations, New York: Semitext(e), 1983.
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same as the real. The best example for this order of simulacra is the assembly line
with its logic of serial reproducibility. "The relation [between objects on an assembly
line] is no longer that of an original to its counterfeit, neither analogy, nor reflection-
but equivalence, indifference. In a series, objects become undefined simulacra one of
the other. And so, along with the objects do the men that produce them."8
The third order of simulacra is that of simulation properly speaking. Unlike the
second order, where the real disappears in the self-referentiality of the sign, the third
order attempts to re-introduce the contingencies of the real. The code of the assembly
line and the reproduction ofmultiple exact copies of the same model here give way
to the small variations of the (re-)produced objects. These variations in fact function
as an alibi for the "reality" of the (re-)produced objects. This is a technique of
"tactical hallucination" which enables the system to justify itselfby reference to
some prior reality. And while the system justifies itself on the basis that it expresses
some pre-existing reality, the system actually constitutes reality in its image.
Paradigmatic cases of this third order of simulacra are the referenda; they seem to be
open to contingency and to surprise, as one cannot -one, in fact, does not- know in
advance what their outcome will be. On the other hand, the very phrasing of the
questions in a referendum also defines the possible answers. In this sense answers
and questions are bound together. The system presents itself as being open to the
contingency of reality, while actually producing reality in its image.
Likewise, the post-industrial form of duopoly (as opposed to the industrial form of
monopoly) presents itself as being open to competition, but in fact the presence of
two strong powers (be it participants in the market, political parties etc) makes
competition even more difficult. "It might appear that the historical movement of
capital carries it from open competition towards oligopoly, then towards monopoly-
that the democratic movement goes from multiple parties towards bipartism, then
toward the single party. Nothing of the sort. Oligopoly or the current duopoly results
from a tactical doubling ofmonopoly. In all domains duopoly is the final stage of
8 ibid. (English version), p. 97.
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monopoly Power is absolute only if it is capable of diffraction into various
equivalents, only if it knows how to take off so as to put more on."9
In his essay "The Precession of Simulacra" Baudrillard continues the exploration of
his order of simulacra using an allegory from Borges about a map of an empire
which was so detailed that it fully covered the territory it was supposed to depict.
Baudrillard explains that this is still a second-order simulacrum because it is based
on the equivalence between the simulacrum (map) and the real (territory). In the third
order of simulacra it would no longer be the territory that preceded the map, but the
map that preceded the territory. In fact, in the third order of simulacra, there is no
relationship, no contact between the original and the copy. The system simply puts
forward an other to itself, only in order to exclude the real, so that "the system itself
is proved all the more".
Another example of the way in which the system opens up to the other only to
further extend itself is drawn from the sphere of ethnology. Baudrillard analyses the
case of the Tasaday Indians found by anthropologists and ethnographers in the
rainforest in the Philippines, where they had lived for over 800 years. Upon their
contact with civilization, the Indians started decomposing "like a mummy in the open
air."10 The scientists decided to return them to the rainforest and to put them "out of
the reach of colonists, tourists, ethnologists."11 According to Baudrillard's analysis,
the primary aim of this decision was not to save the Tasaday Indians, but ethnology
as a science. Here, we are clearly within the realm of third order simulacra; the
system (in this case ethnology) produces an other to itself (the Indians are sent back
to the rainforest and kept apart from ethnologists, one could say that this amounts to
anti-ethnology), but eventually this other (Indians) can only be conceived by
reference to the original system (it is ethnology after all which "saves" the Indians by
deciding to put them out of its own reach). Through this reference, the system is
actually reaffirmed and further extended. This same tactic is followed with







In both these cases the system produces its other (real life-Disneyland, politics-
scandal) only in order to exclude the realisation that the "reality" we experience is in
fact contradictory; that all life in America is artificial and all politics is scandalous.
Simulation is undoubtedly one of the most confusing concepts. What makes it even
more confusing is the fact that Baudrillard does not always follow a clear and
consistent taxonomy throughout his work. The main idea, however, remains that
simulation defers the real. Simulation is designed by the system (any system) to feign
a certain presence and the feigning of this presence (the presence of the real) is
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functional to the self-reproduction and to the extension of the system .
As far as Baudrillard's normative agenda is concerned, this is quite troublesome.
Baudrillard renounces all Enlightenment reason and the possibility to distinguish
truth from falsehood; he views theory as a discredited enterprise and dismisses the
concept of critique. He asserts that apathy, which is the system's own logic, is the
most effective weapon against hyperreality. Thus, the theory of simulation "leaves us
paralyzed without any ground to articulate opposition."13
My use of the theory of simulation in this thesis is a qualified one; I agree with
Baudrillard's accurate description of our present media-controlled hyperreality and I
accept that his key-categories can help us understand better our post-modern social
environment, but I reject his debilitating normative agenda. Against Baudrillard's
proclamations regarding the obsolescence ofMarxist critique and the disappearance
ofpolitical economy, I argued that simulation cannot be divorced from the analysis
of capitalism and political economy. In fact, this theory's most important
contribution is that it can help us expand the Marxist critique ofpolitical economy. I
will agree with Douglas Kellner that the best way to make use ofBaudrillard's
12
According to Douglas Kellner, simulation is very much like the code of the DNA "which programs
various directions and constraints on behavior in an individual, but which itself is not perceived and
which is subject to aleatory combinations and permutations in interaction with other social and
environmental phenomena." D. Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to postmodernism and
beyond, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989, p.80.
13 S. Best, "The Commodification ofReality and the Reality of Commodification: Baudrillard, Debord
and postmodern theory" in M. Gane (ed.) Jean Baudrillard, Volume 1, London: Sage, 2000, p.251.
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analysis is to treat it as a "semiological supplement to Marx's theory ofpolitical
??14
economy.
Consumer capitalism (which is the current stage of capitalism) relies on the increase
of consumption. Consumer economy is, therefore, oriented at the creation of needs
for goods. In order to achieve this, it employs sophisticated marketing strategies
which manipulate our desires and create artificial needs. Commodities are no longer
characterised by use-value and exchange value; it is the sign value of the goods that
enhances their marketability. Sign value, which redefines the commodity as a symbol
to be consumed and displayed, is the key concept of capitalism today. Images, signs
and all aspects of symbolic reproduction overshadow production. Everything is
reduced to questions of symbolic exchange. Our perceptions are increasingly shaped
by market techniques as applied not only in the sphere of the market, but also in
politics. Sign value has effectively substituted all meaning.
Due to the proliferation of signs and images, capitalism has become "a system of
floating signifiers unchained from any referent whatsoever" 5; it has become almost
impossible to distinguish between the object and the sign, between the signified and
the signifier, between objective reality and the result of artificial intervention.
And this is exactly what simulation is all about; it is about the collapse of all
dichotomies between appearance and reality; the takeover of reality by its image; the
disappearance of all referential reason; the implosion of all realms of society into a
self-reproducing system of simulacra. Simulation is a functional element of the
current form of capitalism, which is organised around configurations of sign value.
Therein also lies its ideological function; by promoting the cultural logic of late
capitalism,16 simulation also serves to sustain the relations of domination which have
been established by it. The classical Marxian critique ofpolitical economy, relying
on concepts such as labour and use value, is unable to provide an adequate analysis
for the capitalist focus on symbolic exchange today. In this sense, once the
14 D. Kellner, Baudrillard: A Critical Reader, Oxford; Blackwell, 1994, p.3.
15 A. Huyssen, "In the shadow ofMcLuhan: Jean Baudrillard's theory of simulation" in M. Gane (ed.)
Jean Baudrillard, Volume 4, London: Sage, 2000, p.285.
16 See for example F. Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic oflate capitalism, London:
Verso, 1991.
216
underlying affinity between simulated hyperreality and capitalism is exposed,
Baudrillard's theory of simulation can illuminate the present age by putting the
emphasis on the analysis of the political economy of the sign.
b) The multiple facets of simulation in the EU
Chapter 3 re-visited the official narrative of the development of the EU constitutional
order in an attempt to challenge the naturalness and the retrospective inevitability of
our received acquis constitutionnel. Through an analysis of the history of
development of the Community legal order it was shown that the EU
constitutionalisation process has mainly been the product of the ECJ and has largely
taken place in the absence ofpolitical discourse. Not only was a mobilised majority
of the people not involved in the shaping of the EU constitutional charter (the
citizens were most of the times unaware of the constitutional developments and their
significance), but the representatives of the political body were also not in charge of
active constitutional engineering.
The psychoanalytical regression into the constitutional past of the EU showed that
the celebrated EU "constitutional moments", namely the Intergovernmental
Conferences, which gave rise to successive accessions and amendments of the
Treaties were not as important as the quiet constitutional revolution that was taking
place through the judgements of the ECJ; they very often functioned as the post-facto
confirmation of the changes that had already taken place at the judicial level. The
main structure ofEU constitutional law was effectively created through a process of
political parthenogenesis. Constitutional law emerged in the absence of constitutional
politics; in fact constitutional politics was not only absent, but it was furthermore
simulated.
The system of governance in the EU has replaced constitutional politics with its
image, the IGCs. The IGCs are presented as providing a deliberative political forum
for EU affairs. It is furthermore assumed that decisions at IGC level are the outcome
of a public political debate. The reality is that the IGCs are based on negotiation of
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interests rather than deliberation and that their workings follow the secretive rules of
diplomacy, which means that they are not open to public scrutiny. The IGCs provide
all the signs of real political conflicts (conflicts do arise in IGCs), but "short-circuit
their vicissitudes."17 The highly publicised conflicts that arise in the IGCs, usually
associated with the defence of the national interests of the Member States (see for
example the conflict regarding the voting rights of Spain and Poland in the IGC in
December 2003) do not really concern the important aspects of the EU constitutional
framework. The EU produces the "true symptoms" of the political, but the real
conflicts ofprinciple are short-circuited (see for example how the latest IGC on the
EU constitution avoided any discussion regarding the finality of the EU project). We
are experiencing the idealised transposition of a contradictory reality. The conflicts
among the different Member-States which appear to be threatening to the EU project,
are in reality a functional part of the EU system of simulations; they function as
alibis which improve the credibility of the overall political simulacrum.
The same applies to the ratification processes taking place at the national level; in
some Member States these involve a national referendum. As we saw earlier,
according to Baudrillard's taxonomy, a referendum is the paradigmatic form of the
third order of simulacra in that it presents itself as being open to contingency, while
actually pre-defining (through the phrasing of the questions to be answered) the
content of the possible answers. Hence, although one is allowed a range of choices,
the options are pre-determined. Following this approach, one could say that the
problems encountered during the ratification of the Maastricht treaty (negative
outcome of the referendum in Denmark) or the treaty ofNice (referendum in
Ireland), although prima facie oppositional to the EU a-political constitutional
structure, they actually re-affirmed its political character, because they presented it as
giving real political power to the disenfranchised citizens of the Member- States. But
even if one disagrees with Baudrillard's interpretation of the simulatory role of
referenda, it is clear that the ratification processes (with or without a referendum)
have a take-it-or-leave-it character, which means that the ambit of any deliberative
process they are associated with, is materially seriously limited from the very
17 J. Baudrillard, op. cit. fn. 7, p.4.
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beginning. This limited deliberative character is not really compatible with the
reflexivity ofpolitics and cannot in any case exhaust the meaning of the exercise of
primary constituent power.
In the absence of real constitutional politics, participation in the ECJ litigation
effectively became the substitute for participation in the political process. Given,
however, that participation in litigation partly relies on financial resources, it is not
symmetrical to participation in the political process. In fact, the possibility of
strategic use of litigation has led to the emergence of "repeat players" (usually big
financial companies or individuals having at their disposal a high level of resources
which enables them to undertake costly legal battles). This raises some serious issues
about the biased way in which the EU constitutional framework tends to favour
structurally the contribution of certain types (ifnot classes) of citizens. Actors of a
privileged economic status have had the opportunity to influence the shaping of the
EU constitutional framework more effectively than those who could not afford high
legal costs. This uneven contribution at the level ofprocedural formation of the EU
Constitutional charter has inevitably also affected its substance.
This latter point was further explored in Chapter 4. The starting point for this Chapter
was the claim put forward by some theorists, according to which the EU protection
of fundamental rights can counterbalance the political deficit of the Union. Arguing
against this stance, I showed that due to the specific conditions of their development,
fundamental rights have incorporated commodification within their inner structure
and they have been conceptually subordinated to the economic objectives of the
treaties.
The proliferation ofwhat is termed "fundamental rights" in the EU has led to a
trivialisation of the concept ofEU fundamental rights; the term "fundamental rights"
is no longer the sign for the highest rule of validation in the Community legal
system, but has ended up being an empty signifier, which depending on the signified
it is correlated with, may or may not be a rule of validation. This confused use of the
term "fundamental rights" is further exacerbated by the fact that the common market,
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being one of the objectives of the Community, has been put forward as a criterion for
the concretisation of the abstract notion of "common good" and, as such, it defines
the limits of the permitted restrictions to fundamental rights. This means that within
the EU, fundamental rights may (and occasionally have done so) give way to
unqualified aggregate utility considerations. By being balanced against and possibly
overridden by the good of the common market, EU fundamental rights have ended
up integrating the logic of the market into their conceptual core.
Another very important expression of the marketisation of fundamental rights is that
their distribution, for a long time, was also dependent upon an economic element;
namely EU fundamental rights were granted to individuals as long as they could
establish some kind of economic nexus (as dictated by the economic objectives of the
treaties). Until the institutionalisation ofEU citizenship, the EU system made the
conferral of fundamental rights dependent upon the prior participation of individuals
to the market. Thus, non-participation in the market effectively translated into legal
invisibility. The introduction of the EU citizenship seemed to make the presence of
an economic nexus redundant. A brief analysis, however, of the relevant secondary
legislation and the case-law of the ECJ showed that, although EU citizenship has
indeed managed to close some of the pre-existing gaps in the area of free movement,
it has not as yet broken completely its links with economic considerations.
These different aspects ofmarketisation compromise the conceptual coherence ofEU
fundamental rights to such an extent, that the use of the term "fundamental rights"
becomes questionable, if not ironic. Once again, this is a case of simulated reality, in
which the substance of fundamental rights is no longer present, but it still somehow
retains the signs, the "external symptoms" of the real thing. The simulation of
fundamental rights, which instantiates yet another case of distance between EU
symbolic order and reality, is also implicated in an asymmetrical distribution of
power and resources; the link between the distribution ofEU fundamental rights with
the participation of the individuals to the market in combination with the elevation of
market freedoms to the status of fundamental rights (entailing that fundamental rights
are commensurable with the values of the market) favour economically active
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individuals (or companies) over other categories of citizens (e.g. unemployed,
housewives, students etc). As a result of this development, the already established
economic inequalities of the market are translated into codified legal inequalities.
Moreover, in light of the absence of constitutional politics, the EU citizens who face
this unequal treatment do not have the political power to contest the established EU
constitutional order and to change their status within it.
The two facets of simulation as explored in Chapter 3 (simulation of constitutional
politics) and in Chapter 4 (simulation of fundamental rights) are internally
connected; one sustains and further extends the other. Furthermore, these two
simulations are the building blocks for a wider simulacrum. The simulation of
constitutional politics has brought about the substitution of law for politics, while the
simulation of fundamental rights has been largely responsible for the substitution of
economic rationality for the legal one. This double substitution of the legal for the
political and of the economic for the legal amounts to the subordination of the EU
concept of the political to the exigencies of the market. By doing away with the
reflexivity ofpolitics, this subordination has overstepped the boundaries of self-
production of the political and has deprived the European people(s) of their right to
place themselves under their own political agency, their own rule. Ultimately it is the
EU economic system which has put forward its simulated other (politics) only in
order to exclude it more effectively. And EU constitutionalism has been the vehicle
which has facilitated the exclusion ofpolitics. By masking ideas which are related to
the material conditions ofpeople in the EU and by converting them into neutral,
objective ones, EU constitutionalism has for a long time accounted for phenomena
which would otherwise prove embarrassing to the EU (a)political reality and, in
doing so, it has also contributed to that (a)political reality's legitimation.
221
Afterword
A preliminary assessment of the new Constitution
Ignoranti quern portus petat nullus ventus suus est.
(He who knows not which port he is heading for
never finds a favourable wind).
Seneca
In the course of this thesis I raised certain objections against the current
constitutional framework in the EU. My objections were based both on procedural
and substantive aspects ofEU constitutionalism. The argument put forward showed
that the judicialisation of the constitutionalisation process in combination with the
marketisation of the concept of fundamental rights has been unable to socialise
European citizens into a common political culture; consequently the affective
dimension ofbeing a European citizen is underdeveloped, while the emergence of a
European demos is yet to be fulfilled. In a series of sequential steps it was, thus,
argued that the current constitutional structure of the EU is unable to function as a
properly so called political constitution around which the citizens and the peoples of
Europe could develop their allegiances at the post-national level. It was, furthermore,
argued that this deficiency in terms of social cement, which is inherently connected
with the incomplete political character of the current de facto EU constitution, is also
implicated in the reproduction of the existing structures ofpower.
This is, however, a time of great excitement and fast-pacing developments for EU
constitutionalism (creating equally fast-pacing Angst for PhD students researching
on these issues). My so far analysis refers to the constitutional framework which is
offered by the Treaties as they have been amended by successive Intergovernmental
Conferences and as they have been interpreted by the ECJ. In 2001 the European
Council decided to set up a Convention which would "pave the way for the next
Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and as openly as possible."1 The
declaration of Laeken identified the key issues that the Convention should work on
as follows: a) simplification and reorganisation of the treaties, b) definition of
1 Laeken Declaration of the European Council, 2002.
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competences in the EU and c) democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU.
Under the section "Towards a Constitution for European Citizens", the European
Council asked whether the simplification and reorganisation of the Treaties "might
not lead in the long run to the adoption of a Constitutional text in the Union."2 One
year and a half later (summer 2003) the Convention on the Future ofEurope
produced a draft for an EU constitution (officially it was called a Constitutional
Treaty). This was initially discussed and negotiated at the 2003 Intergovernmental
Conference under the Italian presidency (Brussels Summit, 12-13 December), which
contrary to Prodi's hopes, failed to reach an agreement3 and continued into 2004. The
discussions continued under the presidency of Ireland and the text of the new EU
constitution was finally agreed upon and signed in the recently concluded IGC that
took place in Brussels (16-17 June). The most difficult part of this constitutional
event, the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty (subject to the turmoil of a national
referendum in up to 20 of the Member States), is still ahead of us.
In this part I will very briefly assess certain aspects of the proposed Constitution and
the process through which this has been produced. Given that this part refers to a
process which has not been completed (the ratification process is expected to last
approximately 2 years), the thoughts that will inform my analysis of the EU
constitution are unavoidably tentative. In the first chapter I argued that theory must
inform/precede praxis and that it cannot be viewed as the owl ofMinerva which flies
at dusk, after the events have taken place. I do not intend in any way to revoke my
earlier proclamations in saying that the reflective stance through which one can
theoretically assess a process such as the current changes of the EU constitution
require some temporal distance between the event to be theorised and the theoretical
evaluation of it. I am not suggesting that theory does not play a role in the actual
unfolding of the constitution-making process; on the contrary, it should be in the
centre of it, informing its choices. However, there is also a reflective aspect in
theoretical analysis which necessarily follows the event to be reflected. The
2 Annexes to the Presidency Conclusions- Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, SN 300/01 ADD1, ANNEX
1, Laeken Declaration on the Future of European Union, http://european-
convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf
3 For the reasons behind this failure see fn. 4 in the Concluding preface.
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reflection of the landscape into the water of a lake presupposes that the water is still;
otherwise the reflection is disrupted. Trivial as this analogy may be, it evokes clearly
the point I want to make.4 Besides, as already clarified in Chapter 3, the critical
evaluation of a constitution is not a matter of textual analysis alone, but it also needs
to take into consideration the particular constitutional practices which underpin it.
Before the new constitution enters into force, issues of constitutional practice and
constitutional ethos cannot be analysed. In fact, even after the ratification of the new
Constitution, it will take some time (probably years) before one can talk about new
constitutional practices.
According to the critique which has been put forward by this thesis, EU
constitutionalism is faced with two major challenges. The first one is to overcome
the monopolisation of the constitutional debate by certain elites (mainly ECJ and, to
a certain extent, European Council) and to enhance the inclusiveness of its
constitutional processes. The second challenge is for the EU to overcome the
prevailing marketisation ofpublic reason. Thus, the starting point for the assessment
of the new EU constitution is to examine whether this fulfils the EU constitutional
desiderata (or rather desideranda) as described above. In other words, have the recent
developments addressed the pre-existing problems of the democratic/political deficit
and the marketisation of the EU constitutional order?
As we saw in Chapter 3, the constitutionalisation of the EU took place in the absence
of constitutional politics; it was treated as either the negotiation of a Treaty through
the routes of diplomacy (Intergovernmental Conferences) or as the interpretation of
this Treaty by the ECJ; the specifically political input was limited and the
constitutional deliberative moment remained elusive. The limitations of the IGC
method, which follows the mechanisms of international treaty negotiation controlled
by national governments, with no publicity of their workings and with a limited input
4
A more sophisticated version of the same argument is given by Seyla Benhabib, who maintains that
there is an inevitable gap between political action and political reflection, as the two are "non
simultaneous simultaneities."
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from civil society,5 became apparent especially during the Nice Summit, which, due
to the oppositional divisions among the Member States and their respective threats of
vetoes, failed to produce answers to the questions it was confronted with (mainly
questions regarding the distribution of shares ofpower and votes). This prompted
national governments to turn to the convention model that had been successfully
tested in 2000 in the preparation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.6 The
Convention, the novel feature ofEU constitution-making introduces a preparatory,
deliberative phase which precedes the usual negotiating decision-making process of
the IGCs (it prepares a document which is then submitted to the negotiators of the
IGC) and engages a significantly wider range of actors than those involved in the
IGCs.8 The important feature of the Convention is that it opens up constitutional
politics to a deliberative process without, however, relinquishing the power of the
national governments, as the outcome of the deliberative phase is not binding on the
IGC.
There is a rapidly growing bibliography exploring different aspects of this new
method of constitution building.9 The convention method has been analysed in terms
5
According to D. Dinan, "Institutions and Governance 2001-2002: debating the EU's future", 40
(2002) Journal ofCommon Market Studies, pp.29-43 the IGC method "fed the democratic deficit in
the broadest sense of the word".
6 Different actors embraced the convention model for different reasons. The small states favoured the
convention model on the basis that it could offer a more egalitarian forum. The large states such as
France and the UK welcomed the involvement of representatives from their national parliaments into
the constitution making process, while some of the EU institutions (EP, Commission) hoped that the
Convention approach would enable them to play a more influential role in the shaping of its outcomes.
7 The preparatory work done by the Convention was until recently carried out by ad hoc Committees,
usually small groups of diplomats working together without any interaction with civil society and
without any public scrutiny of their work.
8 The Convention on the Future ofEurope comprised 105 members: a three-member Presidency, 15
representatives of the national governments, 39 representatives from the national parliaments, 39
representatives from the 13 accession states (one government representative and two parliamentary
ones), 16 representatives of the European parliament, 2 representatives of the Commission and 13
observers ( 6 from the Committee of the Regions, 3 from the Economic and Social Committee, 3 from
the Social partners and 1 from the European Ombudsman.
9 C. Closa, "Improving EU Constitutional Politics? A preliminary assessment of the Convention",
Constitutionalism Web-Papers, Con WEB No. 1/2003, http://lesl.man.ac.uk/conweb, D. Beach,
"Towards a new method of constitutional bargaining? The role and impact of EU institutions in the
IGC and Convention-method of Treaty reform", Paperpresented to Federal Trust Workshop "From
the Convention to the IGC", London , 10-11 July 2003, A. Follesdal, "Drafting a European
Constitution- Challenges and opportunities", Constitutionalism Web-papers, ConWEB No. 4/2002,
http:/71es 1 .man.ac.uk/conweb, L. Hoffmann, "The Convention on the Future of Europe-Thoughts on
the Convention-Model", Jean Monnet Working Paper 11/02, New York School of Law, 2002, K.
Lenaerts and M. Desomer, "New models ofConstitution-making in Europe: the quest for legitimacy",
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of its representativeness,10 its autonomy,11 the participation of civil society12 etc. All
the analyses agree that the convention process compared with constitutional
transformation by IGC (without the preparation offered by a convention) or by
judicial judgements clearly signifies an improvement. The convention model, with
IT
all its weaknesses, has made EU constitutional politics significantly more inclusive,
more transparent and more democratic. Having said that, however, one needs to point
out that the significantly more open and deliberative process offered by the
convention has failed to engage the attention of the disempowered EU citizens. The
Convention's appeal to civil society has broadened the scope of those consulted, but
should not be confused with the actual participation of the citizens. As Carlos Closa
observes, "the European citizens did not take part in the exercise in any great
39 (2002) Common Market Law Review, pp.1217-1253, A. Manzella "The Convention as a way of
bridging the EU's democratic deficit", 1 (2002) The International Spectator, A. Maurer, "Less
bargaining- more deliberation: the Convention-method for enhancing EU democracy", 1 (2003)
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, pp. 167-190, J. Shaw, "Process, Responsibility and Inclusion
in EU Constitutionalism: the challenge for the Convention on the future of the Union", Federal Trust
Papers on EU constitutionalism www.fedtrust.co.uk/EU constitution, updated version, September
2002, J. Shaw, P. Magnette, L. Hoffmann and A. Verges Bausil, The Convention on the Future of the
Union: Working towards an EU Constitution, London: federal Trust/Kogan page, 2003.
10 The introduction of the Convention-method signifies a change in the negotiating context of
constitutional reform as it changes the power of different EU institutions; in comparison to IGCs
which rely almost exclusively on the input of the Council and the Council Secretariat, the convention-
method strengthens the negotiating power of the European Parliament and the Commission.
11 As far as the selection process of the conventionnels is concerned, each body was free to choose its
own appointment procedures. Depending on the selection process through which the different
conventionnels were chosen, they enjoyed a different degree of autonomy vis a vis the body they
represented (e.g. different Member States have diverse parliamentary traditions which require a
different level of control over their MPs, national governments' representatives are subjected to
instructions etc). In the absence of any mles regarding the status of the conventioneers vis a vis the
institutions that nominated them, the Conventioneers were free to express their personal views and
were not expected to represent (not in the strict sense of the word) the institutional views of the
nominating body.
12 The Convention on the Future of Europe set up a Forum, a network of organizations which received
regular updates on the proceedings of the Convention. In terms of accessibility, the only requirement
for participation in the fomm was the submission of a written contribution. Later on the Convention
organised a plenary session with civil society (207 groups participated in the plenary session).
13 In terms of weaknesses of representation, on the one hand the participation of the candidate
countries was not equal to that of the other participants (they were not able to overturn any emerging
consensus among the already existing Member-States), on the other hand, as a result of the diffused
nominating system, which naturally lacked any unifying selection criteria, the final composition of the
Convention was characterised by a very low representation ofwomen (17 out of 105 members) and of
minorities (only 1 non-white member). The organisational autonomy of the Convention as a whole
was seriously limited by the fact that its President and the members of the praesidium were appointed
by an external body, the European Council. As far as the participation of the civil society is
concerned, there was no excitement in the exchanges between the Convention and the representatives
of civil society. See J. Scott, "The culture of constitution making? "Listening" at the Convention on
the Future of Europe", 3 (2002) German Law Journal, http://www.germanlawjournal.com
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numbers."14 Similarly Eurobarometre polls showed that only a small fragment of the
European citizenry was aware of the existence and the work of the Convention. This
is due to the fact that with few exceptions (e.g. Le Monde) the media did not cover in
any depth the issues that were discussed by the convention and at the same time the
convention itself did not have a specific "communicative strategy" that would allow
it to connect with the citizenry.
According to Bruce Ackerman, as we saw in Chapter 3, a constitutional moment is
preceded by a period ofmobilised deliberation during which there is an energetic
exchange ofpublic views and "serious reflection on the country's future". A
constitutional moment is an episode of constitutional politics which is not only
distinguished from ordinary politics, but which "also alters the framework of
ordinary politics within which it unfolds". Hence, for Ackerman, a properly so-called
constitutional moment, on the one hand, presupposes mobilisation of the people,
while, on the other hand, it marks a rapture in the existing constitutional body, it
affects the "macropolitical means and ends" of that polity.15
The making of the new EU constitution has so far failed to penetrate popular
consciousness and to raise the constitutional awareness of the citizens. The
Convention method presented as "the golden bullet that is able to blast a hole in the
Gordian knot which blocks communication between the Union and the citizens that it
wants to be close to"16 seems to have missed its target. The knot is still in its place.
Thus, according to Ackerman's approach, the recent constitutional development in
the EU would not qualify as a constitutional moment. Neil Walker (among others),
however, insists that within the EU context with all the problems of dual legitimacy
that exist at the supranational level, one needs to adopt a more expansive
conceptualisation ofwhat is properly called a constitutional moment. His suggestion
is that instead of focusing on popular mobilisation as the defining property of a
14
ibid., p. 16.
15 As interpreted by N. Walker, "After the Constitutional Moment", The Federal Trustfor Education
and Research, Online Paper 32/03, November 2003, p.3.
16 U. Halltern, "Pathos and patina: the failure and promise of constitutionalism in the European
Imagination", 9 (2003) European Law Journal, p. 38.
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constitutional moment, one should concentrate on the qualitative changes put
1 7
forward by the amending process.
According to the mandate of the European Council, the outcome of the Convention
should be a document that would either suggest the different points ofview on the
issues to be discussed (also suggesting the degree of consensus) or take the form of
recommendations if it achieved some consensus. In any case it was clear from the
very beginning that the outcome of the Convention would not be binding on the IGC
that would follow it. Despite this lack ofmandatory character, the Convention, under
the guidance of its Praesidium, oriented itself to a consensus-based process that
would lead to the submission of a draft Constitution of Europe. Theoretical questions
10
regarding the "raison d' etre" and the finality of the EU were systematically
avoided as it was expected that these would be too controversial to allow the
emergence of the sought after consensus. As a result, the new EU Constitution (based
on the draft proposed by the Convention) does not break in any significant way with
the EU constitutional past; it is more about a reflective consolidation of our acquis
constitutional, a reorganisation and distillation of the already existing constitutional
practices, rather than about policy change or redefinition ofmeans and ends.
Improvements have certainly been put forward, but in the end incremental tinkering
and marginal adjustment were favoured over a more radical re-evaluation of our
constitutional framework which would actually open past policy choices to public
scrutiny. Thus, the end-result vindicates those who from the very beginning
presented the new Constitution as "a tidying up exercise",19 aiming at overcoming
supposed weaknesses ofpopular perception rather than addressing actual problems
of the EU project.
17
Op. cit. fn. 15.
18 On the issue of finality see B. Cram, "Towards finality? A preliminary Assessment of the
achievements of the European Convention", in A. Verdun and O. Croci (eds.) Institutional and
Policy-Making Challenges to the European Union in the Wake ofEnlargement, Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2003 and S. Weatherill, " Is constitutional finality feasible or desirable?
On the cases for European Constitutionalism and a European Constitution", Constitutionalism Web-
papers, Con WEB No. 7/2002 at http://lesl.man.ac.uk/conweb.
19 P. Hain, "The Future of Europe: a Union of Sovereign states", Speech, Adjournment Debate,
Westminster Hall, London, 20 March.
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The problem of the marketisation of the EU constitutional order, as we saw in
Chapter 4, is inextricably connected with the finality of the European project and
more specifically with its economic focus. Since the official rhetoric of the EU has
not at any point acknowledged the existence of the problematic relationship between
means and ends in the EU project, it is only natural in a way that the new EU
constitution does not actively address this problem. The incorporation of the EU
Charter ofFundamental Rights into the Constitutional Treaty is undoubtedly a very
welcome development as it turns the Charter into a fully binding legal document and,
by doing so it also puts an end to a number of uncertainties which surrounded the
protection of fundamental rights as part of the general principles of law. Article 11-52
(2) of the Constitution, on the other hand, clearly stipulates that rights recognised by
the Charter should be exercised in accordance with the rules of the EU Treaties. This
brings to the fore the possibility of their being balanced against the Common market
and the other economic objectives. In the end, in cases of overlap between the
Charter and the rest of the Constitution, it will be, once again, the task of the ECJ to
determine the scope of rights; its task will be "to create synergies between the wider
and already embedded acquis which it has developed in concordance with the
existing Treaties and the new constitutional settlement."20 It remains to be seen,
whether the actual interpretation of fundamental rights and their balancing against
the other objectives of the Union will resist marketisation once the constitution
comes into force.
Article I- 7(2) of the Constitutional treaty declaring that the Union shall seek
accession to the ECHR is also a very positive development; the ECHR only allows
those restrictions to fundamental rights which are necessary in a democratic society
and in a democratic society market efficiency is only one of the several criteria
employed in decision-making processes. So, prima facie, one could optimistically
anticipate that the marketisation ofEU rights may be reversed. Before we get carried
away, however, we should remind ourselves that the ECHR recognises the existence
of a margin of appreciation which enables different polities to give differing
interpretations to the same universal rights. As discussed in Chapter 4, this is a
20 J. Shaw, "What's in a convention? Process and substance in the project of European constitution-
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healthy admission of the inevitable cultural contextualisation of the universal
meaning of rights. Hence, it cannot be excluded that even after the ratification of the
Constitutional treaty, or even after the accession of the EU to the ECHR, the
marketisation of the EU conception of fundamental rights may not be affected; it
may in fact be acknowledged that within the EU legal order the focal point is the
market, that this choice has been the outcome of the appropriate democratic decision¬
making processes and that it can, therefore, justify a more privileged role ofmarket
related criteria in the definition of scope and meaning of rights.
Given that the new Constitution has so far not penetrated popular consciousness and
has not (at least not prima facie) affected the macropolitical means and ends of the
EU, some have reacted to it with cynical pessimism, viewing it as yet another
exercise in constitutional inflation; a device of rhetorical discourse aiming at
emulating the profundity ofpolitical energy usually associated with "constitutional
moments". According to this approach, the EU constitution is nothing more than an
expression of consumer aesthetics; its signing is an attempt of the Union "to de-
stigmatise itself and to neutralise our distrust."21 Ulrich Haltern maintains that the
aesthetics of consumerism (and for him it is clear that the EU is about a Common
market and, thus, about consumerism) have incorporated the citizens' deep-seated
distrust into their marketing techniques; one such technique, a symbolic form of
resistance to consumerism is the signing of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights or
the Constitution, both appearing as providing a moral and ethical foundation for the
Union. By proclaiming a catalogue of rights or a Constitution, the Union "adorns
itself with the embellishments of the fountains of democracy."22 In his analysis of the
aesthetics of consumerism, although not explicitly referring to Baudrillard, Haltern
seems to be suggesting that both the Charter and the Constitution are simulacra;
presenting themselves as promoting democracy, while in reality their sole raison d'
etre is to create the impressions, the signs of democracy, which will enable the a-
building", 89 Political Science Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 2003, p. 20.




political EU system to safely reproduce itself. The Charter and the Constitution as
expressions of the European iconography are designed "to inject pathos", that is
stylishly domesticated passion, into the frozen and rigid world ofEU consumerism,
the faceless Brussels bureaucracy. At the end of the day, all these grandiose
constitutional phenomena provide us with nothing more than "an emotional cushion,
a form of camouflage, a credible disguise for a culture that refuses to admit the truth
about itself."24
On the other hand, Neil Walker reminds us that both the viability and the success of
the recent constitutional development as a community mobilising moment can only
be assessed in hindsight. He insists that the constitutional process may not expire
with the signing and the ratification of the Constitutional treaty and that this explicit
constitutional self-endorsement with all its symbolic resonance may act as a catalyst
for the deepening of the EU as a political order. According to this approach, the
surplus constitutional value of the new formal constitution (as opposed to the
existing pastiche of Treaties) lies in its potentially constructive role in the emergence
of a political (id)entity; it is, thus, connected with its capacity to transport symbolic
meaning in the future and its potential to be more than the sum of its present parts.25
The new EU constitution does not fulfil for the time being the constitutional
"desideranda" of the Union (simply because in the absence of a debate regarding the
raison d' etre of the Union these never transformed into "desiderata"). Haltern's
depiction of the constitution as "a credible disguise for a culture that refuses to admit
the truth about itself' is probably correct. I will agree, however, with Walker that
97
"in a climate of an as yet unpredictable environment" for the reception (ratification,
interpretation and application) of the constitution, a conditional assessment of it may
be the only plausibly available. I would therefore like to give this new Constitution
the benefit of a doubt and remain ambivalent towards it. I reserve some hopes (not
23
Interestingly enough, Haltern believes that it is wrong to view consumerism as a social pathology
that can be played out against "culture" and he suggests that if the EU wants to be close to its citizens,
it should openly embrace trade and consumption, abandoning all political rhetoric.
24
Op.cit.fn.16, p.33.




necessarily rationally founded) regarding the mobilisation of the European citizenry
during and after the ratification process and the changes in constitutional ethos that
the reception of the new document may bring about.
In any case, if this first formal constitutional text of the EU is ever to become the
point of reference for the emergence of an EU political culture, it is essential that the
constitutional debate goes on, that it involves not only a wide array of institutional
actors, but also the EU citizenry and that it finds the courage to confront our "mis-
remembered" past, acknowledging openly the problems of our acquis constitutionnel.
We can certainly not un-live our past, but we can, at least, try to engage with it and to
reconstitute its meaning. And by reconstituting its meaning we can open the way for
the reflexive constitution of the EU as a political entity in the future.
27 N. Walker, op. cit. fn. 15, p. 12.
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